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Abstract 
A Multi-Theoretic Analysis of Financial and Strategic Consequences of  
Corporate Venture Capital 
Yi Yang 
Supervisor: V.K. Narayanan, Ph.D. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationships between the structural and 
managerial characteristics of corporate venture capital (CVC) programs and the 
consequences of their CVC activities, and reveal the mechanisms that lead to enhanced 
CVC performance.  It consists of three studies which draw from three research streams: 
agency theory, option theory, and learning theory. 
The first study examined how the portfolio configuration as for technology and 
industry diversification influences the growth option value of the whole portfolio, and 
how the structural characteristics of a CVC program such as syndication and autonomy, 
influence its CVC managers’ investment decisions with regard to technology 
diversification.  The results suggested that both technology diversification and industry 
diversification among portfolio companies were related to the growth value of their 
corporate investor in a U-shaped relationship. In addition, syndication activities of a CVC 
program were significantly related to technology diversification, while the autonomy of a 
CVC program was significantly related to industry diversification.   
The second study investigated how autonomy, incentive scheme, and monitoring 
mode of a CVC program would influence knowledge flows between the corporate 
investor and the portfolio companies, thereby impacting the corporate investor’s 
innovativeness and the portfolio company’s performance. The findings provided support 
for the negative impact of the VC-like incentive scheme and autonomy on knowledge 
transfer from portfolio companies to corporate investors. 
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The third study investigated the impacts of four structural characteristics of a CVC 
program on its selection and valuation capabilities, including lifespan, stability, incentive 
schemes, and syndication with VC.  The results showed strong impacts of syndication 
activity on the selection and valuation capabilities pertaining to financial returns, and 
mixed effects of lifespan and stability 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Corporate venture capital (CVC) refers to equity investments from non-financial 
corporation in entrepreneurial companies for both financial and strategic purposes.  
Such investment activities have been flourishing in the United States, as well as other 
parts of the world, over the last several decades.  From 2000 to 2002, corporations 
participated in more than 20 percent equity investments in the United States1.  Despite 
the 2000 U.S. stock market crash, the remaining CVC programs continue to be active 
players in the private equity market.  Moreover, both the percentage of deals with CVC 
participation and the percentage of companies funded with CVC involvement stabilized 
at 16-19% in 20042.  Likewise, European equity investments with corporate 
participations represented approximately 10 percent of overall investments in 2001 and 
20023.  To date, more than 130 Fortune 500 companies have established CVC 
programs4.     
Accordingly, growing attention has focused on CVC activities in the academe.  
Extant studies regard CVC as one manifestation of corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra, 
1995) that helps companies to rejuvenate or redefine organizations, markets, or industries 
for the purpose of creating or sustaining competitive advantages (Covin & Miles, 1999).  
In the literature, numerous strategic benefits have been identified as being associated with 
CVC activities (e.g. Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 2005b; 
Keil, 2000; McNally, 1997; Winter & Murfin, 1988).  In particular, CVC activities are 
viewed as an effective means for technology innovation that facilitate companies to better 
                                                 
1 Ernest & Young Corporate Venture Capital Report 2002. 
2 PricewaterhouseCoopers/ Thomson Venture Economics / National Venture Capital Association MoneyTree™ 
Survey. 
3 Ernest & Young Corporate Venture Capital Report 2002. 
4 VentureXpert Database. 
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respond to environmental changes.  For example, several researchers view CVC as an 
alternative of external R&D that can help to update the parent companies’ knowledge 
base and stimulate their technology innovation (e.g. Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; 
Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 2005b).  In addition, CVC activities may leverage the 
parent companies’ existing technologies by stimulating demand and/or promoting the 
formation of de facto standards (Keil, 2000). 
In addition to strategic benefits, research has also identified factors that may 
influence the consequences of CVC activities.  Most of these studies have focused on 
factors at the industry level, such as uncertainty (Li & Zou, 2005) and intellectual 
property regime (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a), or at the level of parent companies, such 
as absorptive capacity (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a) and R&D resources (Li & Zou, 
2005).   
Although research has explored a number of consequences associated with CVC 
activities (e.g. Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky, 2004; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2005a; Keil, 2000; Li & Zou, 2005; McNally, 1997; Maula & Murray, 2001; Winter & 
Murfin, 1988), many unresolved issues remain. 
One area that appears to be under researched involves the issue of how to 
effectively organize CVC activities.  Much of the research investigating the 
consequences of CVC activities treat CVC programs as “black boxes” and assume that 
they are homogenous.  However, significant variance exists in the structural and 
managerial characteristics of CVC programs pertaining to objectives, organizational 
designs, and management styles (e.g., Chesbrough, 2002; Gompers, 2002; Miles & Covin, 
2002).  Anecdotal evidence and case studies suggest that structural and managerial 
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characteristics of CVC programs are critical to their success (Chesbrough, 2000), and that 
different structures should serve different purposes (Miles & Covin, 2002).  Thus, the 
role of CVC programs deserves further analysis.  
Second, pertaining to the question of how to effectively organize CVC activities, 
some scholars have suggested that independent VC firms may be a possible archetype of 
“successful venturing” practices against which corporate ventures should benchmark 
themselves (e.g. Brody & Ehrlich, 1998; Chesbrough, 2000).  On the other hand, a 
recent study surveying 95 CVC programs in 8 countries failed to find substantial 
evidence to support this assertion (Birkinshaw & Hill, 2003).  In this study, out of four 
VC-like practices (autonomy, carried interests, syndication, and monitoring), only 
syndication was found to be significantly related to CVC performance that was measured 
by CVC managers’ subjective perceptions of “strategic value” as well as the portfolio 
companies’ performance (i.e. had undergone an IPO, or been acquired, or been closed 
down).  
However, some shortcomings in the research design may have weakened the 
significance of their findings.  For example, all of the data were self-report, which may 
bias the results.  In addition, the scale employed to capture “strategic values” included 4 
items, such as (1) creating increased demand for the company’s offerings, (2) enhancing 
overall company reputation, (3) creating spin-off companies and (4) enhancing the 
importance of new business development to the company; however, it did not include 
technology innovation, which according to the literature is the most important strategic 
benefit associated with CVC activities.  Thus, the measure of “strategic values” was 
incomplete.  Indeed, strategic benefits associated with CVC activities can be various and 
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the impacts of the VC-like practices on different types of strategic benefits may need to 
be examined separately.  Thus, more evidence pertaining to the impact of the adoption 
of the VC mode is necessary, and future research should focus on how to adopt the VC 
mode, instead of the debate over whether or not to adopt it.   
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To fill the above discussed gaps in the literature, this dissertation addresses the 
following research questions: 
1. How do the structural and managerial characteristics of a CVC program 
influence the financial and strategic consequences of its CVC activities? 
2. To what extent does the adoption of the VC mode contribute to CVC 
performance? 
The second research question is really an extension of the first one.  To answer 
the general research questions, I will conduct three studies that investigate different 
consequences associated with CVC activities using a multi-theoretical analysis.  Each of 
them addresses sub-research questions within its specific context.   
The first study examines (1) how the structural and managerial characteristics of 
a CVC program influence technology diversification of its investment portfolio? and (2) 
what is the relation between portfolio configuration (e.g. technology diversification) and 
corporation growth value.  
The second study addresses two major research questions: (1) do the structural 
and managerial characteristics of a CVC program induce or eliminate agency behaviors 
in the knowledge transfers between its parent and its portfolio companies? and (2) what 
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are the outcomes of the bilateral interorganizational learning for both the corporate 
investors and the portfolio companies? 
The third study addresses the issue of how the structural and managerial 
characteristics of a CVC program influence its learning ability to improve appraisal and 
evaluation, a capability that directly relates to financial returns. 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation will advance our knowledge about CVC activities.  By 
analyzing the relationships between the structural and managerial characteristics of CVC 
programs and the consequences of their CVC activities, this dissertation will seek to the 
mechanisms that lead to enhanced CVC performance from a multi-theoretical 
perspective.   
From the perspective of organizational learning, this dissertation may advance our 
knowledge about CVC activities by suggesting models in which the structural and 
managerial characteristics of CVC programs may have impacts on their capability 
development and ultimate performance through several learning mechanisms.  For 
example, these structural features may link to the learning effectiveness by influencing 
not only the quantity and quality of CVC experiences, but also the learning direction.  
For the acquisitive learning process, structural characteristics may determine the 
availability of external knowledge sources as well as interorganizational knowledge flows 
that may lead to a mutual learning process.  In addition, structural characteristics may 
also help to mitigate learning myopias, thereby shaping the portfolio configuration in 
terms of technology diversification. 
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Grounded on agency theory, this dissertation, particularly the second study, will 
examine the dual role of CVC programs in the two-level principal-agency relationships 
embedded in CVC investments.  The dual role in the compound principal-agency 
relationships is quite common in business organizations where middle managers are 
agents that respond to their principals (top management team or the board of directors), 
and in the turn are also principals that delegate tasks to their agents (subordinators).  
However, the issue hasn’t been extensively examined in the literature. Specifically, the 
second study may further our understanding about agency behaviors associated with 
these structural and managerial characteristics of CVC programs, and how these agency 
behaviors may influence the dynamics in the bilateral interorganizational learning process 
and lead to strategic outcomes for both the corporate investors and the portfolio 
companies.   
Based on real options theory, the first study will empirically investigate how 
portfolio technology diversification will influence the growth value creation to the parent 
company.  In addition, the findings of the first study will further our understanding 
about multiple real options.  Although numerous researchers have pointed out that 
multiple real options, particularly growth options, should not be evaluated in isolation 
because of the interactive effects (e.g., McGrath, 1997; Trigeorgis, 1993; Vassolo, Anand, 
& Folta, 2004), to date, only one study has been conducted to investigate the interactive 
effects empirically (Vassolo, et al., 2004). 
Additionally, since the structural and managerial characteristics are summaries 
using the VC mode as the benchmark, this dissertation will also help to further our 
understanding of the extent to which the adoption of VC-like practices enhances the 
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efficiency of CVC operations.  The findings present new evidence for the debate over 
whether CVC programs should be designed “under the shadow of private venture capital” 
(Chesbrough, 2000, Birkingshaw & Hill, 2003; Gompers & Lerner, 1998).    
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this dissertation will also have significant practical implications.  
First, it will provide a guideline for corporate investors on how to organize CVC 
activities according to their objectives.  In particular, the findings of the present study 
may provide suggestions to corporations that are adopting or considering to adopt the 
VC-like practices in their CVC programs.  The exceptional rates of return generated by 
VC firms over the past twenty years (Chesbrough, 2000, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 1998) 
have attracted corporations to apply the VC-like mode to their CVC programs.  
However, certain obligations and constraints on CVC activities that VC firms are not 
subject to might hinder such attempts if corporations “blindly” replicate the VC mode.  
 This dissertation also helps the entrepreneurial companies who are seeking 
corporate investors.  It is important for them to understand the potential consequences 
associated with CVC programs possessing different structural characteristics, so that they 
could choose the right investment partners.    
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.   
Chapter Two provides an overview of CVC activities.  The definition of CVC as 
employed in this dissertation is first discussed.  Next, a review of the history of CVC 
activities in the United States is provided.  The structural and managerial characteristics 
of CVC programs are then summarized based on the comparison to the VC mode.   
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Chapter Three provides a review of three theories - organizational learning theory, 
agency theory, and real options theory - which are used as the theoretical bases for this 
dissertation.  The development of each theory is discussed as well as their relevant 
application in the CVC investment context.   
 Chapters Four, Five, and Six present the three independent empirical studies.  
Each chapter includes six sections: introduction, theory and hypotheses, methods, results, 
and discussion.  Specifically, from the perspective of real options theory and learning 
theory, the first study analyzes the relation between technology diversification of a CVC 
portfolio and the growth value of its corporate investor, and further examines how the 
structural characteristics of a CVC program affect the technology diversification among 
the portfolio companies.  The second study investigates how agency behaviors 
associated with CVC practices hinder or facilitate technological knowledge flow between 
the parent company and the portfolio companies, and ultimately influence technology 
innovation and development for both parties.  The third study uses the learning 
perspective to examine the influence of the structural characteristics of a CVC program 
on its capability development in selection and evaluation that are directly related to 
financial returns.   
The final chapter provides a discussion and conclusion of the overall dissertation.  
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Chapter Two: An Overview of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) 
This chapter presents an overview of the CVC literature.  Specifically, based on 
the extant literature, the definition of CVC as employed in this dissertation is clarified.  
Next, the history of CVC is reviewed, and furthermore, the structural and management 
characteristics of CVC are summarized based on the comparison with the independent 
venture capital (VC) mode.  
DEFINING CVC FROM TWO PERSPECTIVES 
This section will first critique the extant definitions of CVC from the perspectives 
of both corporate investors and entrepreneurial companies.  Thereafter, I will present the 
definition of CVC used in this dissertation by integrating these two perspectives.   
The Perspective of Corporate Investors  
Corporate venturing modes.  From the perspective of corporate investors, CVC 
is viewed as one mode of corporate venturing (e.g. Henderson & Leleux, 2002; Kann, 
2000; Keil, 2000).  In a broad sense, corporate venturing has been regarded as one 
manifestation of corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1995).  In their review on corporate 
entrepreneurship typology (1999), Sharma and Chrisman defined corporate venturing as 
corporate entrepreneurial efforts that lead to the creation of new business within or 
outside the organization.  Accordingly, a wide range of corporate venturing activities 
have been identified in the literature, including intrapreneurship, corporate venture capital, 
non-equity alliances, joint ventures, acquisitions, and spin-offs (Keil, 2000; Maula, 
2001).   
There are two major classifications of corporate venturing in the literature.  First, 
the academic literature has recognized that corporate venturing activities can be either 
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external or internal.  However, different criteria have been used to distinguish external 
and internal corporate venturing activities.  On one hand, some researchers made the 
internal-external distinctions in accordance with whether the new ventures invested reside 
outside or within the existing corporation (Ginsberg & Hay, 1994; Keil, 2000; Sharma & 
Chrisman, 1999).  For example, Sharma and Chrisman (1999) defined external 
corporate venturing as corporate venturing activities that result in the creation of 
semi-autonomous or autonomous organizational entities that reside outside the existing 
organizational domain.  Internal corporate venturing refers to the corporate venturing 
activities that result in the creation of organizational entities that reside within an existing 
organization.  On the other hand, the internal-external distinctions of corporate 
venturing activities can also be recognized corresponding to whether the entrepreneurial 
ideas originate within the firm or outside the firm (Miles & Covin, 2002; Sykes, 1986; 
Withers, 1995, 1997).   
In this study, I adopt the first criterion to classify external and internal corporate 
venturing activities.  In line with the extant literature, a CVC investment is viewed as a 
boundary spanning operation (Maula, 2001).  That is, the investment relationship exists 
between two independent organizational entities.  Thus, CVC belongs to the class of 
external corporate venturing (Keil, 2000, 2004).  Although CVC focuses on external 
venturing, the entrepreneurial companies invested may be originally initiated and 
developed inside the corporate investors.  Thus, CVC investments may include 
investments made in entrepreneurial companies that were originated within the corporate 
investors but have already spun off as independent businesses.   
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Second, corporate venturing activities can also be divided into direct and indirect 
investments, depending on the presence of investment intermediation (Miles & Covin, 
2002; Wither, 1995).  CVC activities can belong to either class.  A CVC investment 
may occur in the form of direct investment of capital by the larger firm into the smaller 
firm through an internal defined process or in an ad hoc way.  The investment also can 
be made through self-managed funds by wholly-owned subsidiaries, or dedicated funds 
or pooled funds outsourced to independent VC firms.   
Distinguish CVC from other corporate venturing modes.  To better define CVC, 
it is necessary to distinguish it from other corporate venturing modes.  As discussed 
previously, corporate venturing activities in general can be undertaken externally or 
internally in accordance with whether the new ventures are independent to the corporate 
investors.  Thus, as one mode of external corporate venturing, CVC is distinct from 
internal corporate venturing (e.g. intrapreneurship) in that regardless of its origin, the new 
venture resides outside the organizational domain of its corporate investor when 
receiving a CVC investment.   
With respect to external corporate venturing, Keil (2000) developed a 
classification of external corporate venturing modes (shown in Figure 2.1).  In his 
framework, external venturing modes consist of three groups: CVC (third party funds, 
dedicated funds, and self-managed funds), venturing alliance (non-equity alliance, direct 
minority investment, and joint ventures), and transformational arrangement (acquisitions 
and spin-offs).   
CVC can be distinguished from acquisitions, spin-offs, non-equity alliances, and 
joint ventures.  Acquisitions refer to the processes during which external ventures are 
  12 
 
internalized.  Opposite to acquisition, spin-offs are the processes in which internal 
ventures are externalized.  The distinction between CVC and non-equity alliances is also 
clear because the latter doesn’t involve any equity investment.  Joint ventures differ 
from CVC in that no entrepreneurial start-ups are involved in joint ventures (Maula, 
2001).   
However, the distinction between direct minority investments and CVC is not 
clear either in the extant literature or in practice (Maula, 2001).  Keil (2000) 
distinguished these two modes by the nature of the relationship with the venturing firms.  
He stated that in contrast to CVC in which the relationship with the ventures is built upon 
investment, direct minority investment is initiating a relationship based on intensified 
cooperation.  Nevertheless, most of CVC investments are motivated by strategic as well 
as financial objectives (e.g., Kann, 2000; Keil, 2000; Maula, 2001; Siegel, Siegel & 
MacMillan, 1988; Sykes 1990, Winters & Murfin, 1988).  In addition, relationships 
stemming from CVC investments oriented on financial purposes may develop over time 
into those involving intensified cooperation (e.g., Henderson & Leleux, 2001; Kann, 
2000; Maula, 2001; McNally, 1997).  Hence, it is almost impossible to separate direct 
minority investment from CVC investment by the nature of the relationship between a 
corporate investor and its investee.  In this study, I regard direct minority investment as 
part of CVC activities as long as such investment involves equity taking.   
In sum, from the perspective of corporate investors, CVC is viewed as one mode 
of external corporate venturing that involves equity investments.  These investments 
must result in the creation and/or development of an entrepreneurial startup residing 
outside the investor’s organizational domain, but may or may not be facilitated by 
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financial intermediation.  Basically, this definition of CVC includes direct minority 
equity investments in entrepreneurial companies, but excludes investments made in 
internal business development, acquisitions, spin-offs, non-equity alliances, and joint 
ventures.  
The Perspective of Entrepreneurial Companies 
From the perspective of entrepreneur companies, CVC is an alternative financing 
source compared to other sources in the private equity market such as independent 
venture funds, individual investors (angels), university endowments, pension funds, and 
funds sponsored by governmental programs.  In early studies, CVC has been defined as 
private equity funds sponsored by corporations (Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  To clearly 
distinguish CVC from funds associated with financial institutions such as commercial 
and investment banks, CVC is further defined as equity or equity-linked investment in 
young, privately held companies, where the investor is a non-financial corporation 
(Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Maula, 2001). 
The major distinction between CVC and other private equity investors is 
attributed to the investment objectives.  CVC investments are associated with strategic 
goals, and typically labeled as strategic investments.  Thus, in line with Chesbrough and 
Tucci (2003), I exclude the equity investment made solely for financial gain in the 
definition of CVC for this dissertation.   
In general, from the perspective of entrepreneurial companies, in the current study, 
CVC is defined as any equity investment made by non-financial corporations in 
entrepreneurial companies, for both strategic and financial purposes.  This definition not 
only reflects the similarity between CVC and independent VC in that they both involve 
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equity investments in entrepreneurial companies, rather than debts or other considerations, 
but also recognizes the distinction between them in terms of fund investors and fund 
objectives.  
CVC Definition in this Dissertation 
Combining the two perspectives, I define CVC as equity investments from 
non-financial corporations in entrepreneurial companies that should be separate legal 
entities outside the corporate investors’ organizational domain.  The purpose for the 
investments is not purely financial, but includes strategic objectives as well.  A CVC 
investment can be made directly by the corporation through an internally defined process, 
or by its wholly-owned subsidiaries through self-managed funds, or by independent VC 
firms through dedicated or pooled funds.  Thus, CVC activities in this dissertation 
include any direct or indirect equity investment from non-financial corporations in an 
independent entrepreneurial company except for equity investment in a joint venture, and 
an equity investment made for purely financial purposes.  In addition, this definition of 
CVC also excludes an investment made in internal business development, mergers and 
acquisitions of other companies, and non-equity strategic alliance.  
THE HISTORY OF CVC ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES  
The growth of CVC through the years 1970 to 2004 is depicted in Figure 2.2.  
From the figure, we can see that these corporate efforts have experienced three waves 
that exactly mirror the cyclical nature of the whole venture capital market since the 
mid-1960s when the first corporate venture capital program was founded (Chesbrough, 
2002; Gompers, 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 1998, 2001; Li & Zou, 2005).   
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In the first wave, from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, more than twenty 
Fortune 500 companies set up CVC programs, a corporate effort spurred by the successes 
of independent VC firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  In 1973, corporations began to 
scale back their corporate venturing activities due to the sharp decline in the IPO market.  
Many programs were terminated within only 4 years of being launched in this period 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1998, 2001). 
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, funds, including CVC funds, began flowing 
to the venture capital market again mainly because of the recovery in the IPO market 
(Maula, 2001). Two regulatory changes also contributed to the revival in the venture 
capital industry.  First, the federal government reduced the top capital gains tax rate, and 
second, pension funds were allowed to invest substantial amounts into VC funds 
(Gompers, 2002).  In addition, CVC revived as a tool of diversification in this period of 
time (Hardymon, DeNino & Salter, 1983; Maula, 2001).  However, the total venture 
capital investments as well as CVC investments shrank sharply after the stock market 
crashed in 1987.  By 1992, the capital under CVC programs plummeted to only 5 
percent of the venture pool from nearly 12 percent at the peak time of 1986 (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001).   
In the late 1990s, CVC activities resurged again in the United States as well as 
abroad, this time in a much larger scale than ever before.  In 2000, corporations 
participated in approximately 20 percent of equity investments in the United States1.  
The amount of CVC investments from 1999 to 2000 is similar to approximately 1/20 of 
overall R&D expenses in the United States (see Figure 2.3)2.  This revitalization was not 
                                                 
1 Ernest & Young Corporate Venture Capital Report 2002. 
2 VentureXpert Database and Word Bank Online Database. 
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only motivated by the unprecedented successes of VC firms, but also showed that 
corporations have looked at CVC programs as an effective route to innovation (e.g. 
Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a). 
With the bubble bust in the last quarter of 2000, overall VC investments declined 
dramatically for twelve straight quarters from a high of $28.5 billion in the first quarter of 
2000 to just over $4 billion in the first quarter of 20031.  CVC investments declined 
even more severely.  The percentage of total investment represented by CVC dropped to 
6 to 7 percent in 2004 from the peak of 17 percent in the first quarter of 20002.  Many of 
the corporations which initiated CVC programs at the peak of the public market had to 
dissolve the programs in the face of pressure to preserve cash. 
After two years of struggling, the venture capital industry as a whole is on the 
road to recovery, as are CVC activities.  In addition, investment statistics demonstrated 
that the remaining CVC programs are still active players in the private equity market.  
Both the percent of deals with CVC participation and the percent of companies funded 
with CVC involvement were stabilized at 16-19% in 20043.  Table 2.1 provides a list of 
the most active corporate investors from the beginning of 2001 through the first half of 
2002. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the number of corporations with CVC programs in operation 
annually from 1970 to 2004.  It is shown that at the peak time of 2000, more than 300 
corporations were active in CVC investments, and now the number has fallen to around 
100.  To date, more than 130 Fortune 500 corporations have established corporate 
                                                 
1 PricewaterhouseCoopers/ Thomson Venture Economics / National Venture Capital Association 
MoneyTree™ Survey. 
2 PricewaterhouseCoopers/ Thomson Venture Economics / National Venture Capital Association 
MoneyTree™ Survey. 
3 Ernest & Young Corporate Venture Capital Report 2002. 
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venture programs since 19691.  What should be clarified is that the corporations that 
established CVC programs often set up more than one CVC program overtime; that is, a 
single company might abandon and revitalize a series of such programs (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001).   
COMPARISON BETWEEN CVC AND INDEPENDENT VC 
In this section, I focus on the comparison between CVC and independent VC.  
Although some corporations have adopted certain VC-like approaches to manage their 
CVC activities, CVC programs display numerous features that are different from 
independent VC firms.  Generally, the VC mode is homogenous in terms of objective, 
structure, and management style, whereas the CVC mode demonstrates heterogeneity.  
In the following paragraphs, I will first compare the objectives associated with CVC 
activities to those of independent VC investments.  Next, I will elaborate the distinctions 
between CVC structures and independent VC structures including lifespan, stability, 
incentive scheme, and autonomy.  Finally, I will discuss the differences in their 
management styles such as syndication and monitoring modes.  Table 2.2 provides a 
summary of the comparison between the CVC mode and the VC mode. 
Objectives 
The major difference between CVC and VC is that unlike VC investments that 
only have pure financial goals, CVC investments also pursue a wide range of strategic 
objectives.  The underlying rationale is that complementary strengths of established 
corporations and entrepreneurial companies can achieve synergistic effects that will 
enhance corporate growth and performance in the future (Hagenmuller & Schmohl, 2003).  
Without strategic goals, it would be difficult to prove that CVC investments are 
                                                 
1 VentureXpert Database 
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legitimate since shareholders could make personal investments in entrepreneurial 
companies directly, or through independent VC firms, or indirectly through institutions 
such as pension funds.   
The literature has identified a variety of strategic objectives CVC programs can 
achieve.  With the theoretical roots in the innovation and organizational learning 
literature, several researchers view CVC as a form of external R&D that can stimulate the 
parent companies’ innovation rate and develop their knowledge base, technologies, 
products and processes (e.g. Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a).  
In addition, CVC programs provide parent companies with the frontier contacting venture 
capital community, which would help generate deal flows and optimize the internal 
venturing process (McNally, 1997; Winter & Murfin, 1988).  Corporations can also use 
CVC to stimulate demand for their technologies and products by sponsoring companies 
using and applying them (Keil, 2000), or to build options to acquire companies (e.g. 
McNally, 1997), or to proactively shape the market by steering and promoting the 
development of de facto standards (Keil, 2000).  
Table 2.3 summarizes some fine-grained classifications of those strategic goals in 
the recent literature (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998; Kann, 2000; Keil, 2000; Maula, 2001).   
Based on their consulting experience, Broady and Ehrlich (1998) asserted that 
only four objectives are legitimate to operate CVC programs in different situations.  
Improving the capture of value from strategic assets is most appropriate for companies 
able to exploit traditional assets such as world-class manufacturing skills, extensive 
distribution networks, or strong brand awareness.  Improving the capture of value from 
good ideas is apt for companies that are good at generating ideas but struggle to 
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commercialize them.  CVC programs also can help companies respond more 
competitively in a rapidly evolving industry where timely response means survival.  
Finally, CVC can be applied to support demand for core products when the demand form 
the core products is affected by the evolution of a separate industry niche.   
Founded on an extensive archival research of 152 CVC programs, Kann (2000) 
distinguished three classes of strategic objectives: external R&D, accelerated market 
entry, and demand enhancement.  External R&D refers to the intent of corporations to 
enhance their internal R&D by acquiring resources and intellectual property from 
ventures.  Accelerated market entry refers to corporations’ attempt to access and 
develop resources and competences needed to enter a new market.  Enhancing demand 
refers to leveraging corporations’ resource base and stimulating new demand for their 
technologies and products.  
Partially overlapping Kann’s classification, Keil (2000) identified four primary 
strategic objectives derived from seven in-depth case studies of external corporate 
venturing activities of information and communications technology corporations, which 
include monitoring of markets, learning of markets and new technologies, option building, 
and market enactment.  Monitoring of markets refers to a warning system for gathering 
weak signal on the future development of the markets.  Learning new markets and 
technologies refers to learning from new ventures about new markets and technologies.  
Options to expand refer to obtaining opportunities to enter new markets if they prove 
important and valuable.  Market enactment refers to CVC investments as a means of 
shaping markets, setting standards, and stimulating demands.   
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Maula (2001) created another classification by integrating the goals identified by 
Kann (2000) and Keil (2000).  In his classification, there are three major categories of 
strategic objectives: learning, option building, and leveraging.  In the category of 
learning, the CVC program can provide a learning vehicle to both market level and 
venture specific knowledge.  In addition, indirect learning takes place when 
corporations build knowledge stock on the CVC process itself.  By setting up CVC 
programs, corporations can build two kinds of options: the option to acquire the portfolio 
companies later if they prove strategically valuable, and the option to enter new markets.  
Finally, corporations can use CVC programs to leverage their complementary assets such 
as distribution channels and production facilities, or to leverage their own technologies 
and platforms by sponsoring companies using and applying them.   
These existent classifications in the literature are built up upon each other.  The 
most recent one by Maula (2001) may be the most parsimonious yet comprehensive 
classification of CVC objectives so far in the literature.  Almost every strategic goal 
associated with CVC activities identified in the prior studies or surveys can be 
categorized into the three major categories: learning, options, and leverage.   
In addition, the importance of each strategic goal is contingent upon the industry 
environment as well as the resources and capabilities a corporation possesses (Maula, 
2001).  In the era of the New Economy which is full of uncertainty, CVC activities have 
been viewed as an effective means for technology innovation that facilitate companies to 
better respond to environmental changes (e.g. Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2005a).  Thus, learning new technologies as well as simulating internal 
innovativeness becomes the two major strategic objectives associated with CVC activities 
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in this day and age.  This argument is supported by the result from the Ernest & Young 
Corporate Venture Capital Survey on 40 global leading CVC programs in 2002 (see 
Figure 2.5).   
Structures 
Independent VC structures. More than ninety percent of VC firms are structured 
as partnerships where investors such as pension funds, university endowments, and 
wealthy individuals, are limited partners, and professional VC managers are general 
partners (Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  This kind of structure is believed to be the most 
efficient organizational form to manage venture capital when measured by financial 
performance (Fenn, Liang, & Prowse, 1995).  It provides professional private equity 
managers with substantial autonomy since limited partners have no right to intervene in 
the daily management.   
Additionally, the finance literature (Fenn, et al., 1995) has suggested that this 
structure can mitigate potential principal-agent conflicts.  First, the covenants in the 
partnership agreement provide legal restrictions on potential agency behaviors by general 
managers.  For example, the partnership agreement may limit the amount invested in 
any single firm, the use of debt, co-investment with other funds in the venture 
organization, reinvestment of profits, personal investment of VC managers in firms, the 
sale of partnership interests by general partners, other fundraising, VC managers’ outside 
activities, the addition of new general partners, and investments in a certain kind of assets 
such as other VC, LBO, public securities, etc. (Gompers & Lerner, 2004).  Second, the 
finite time period of the VC fund, usually 10 years, enhances the VC managers’ concern 
about their reputation.  Without a good reputation in the venture capital community, it 
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will be extremely difficult to raise additional funds.  Third, the related incentive scheme 
-- carried interests – has directly tied professional private equity managers’ compensation 
with the performance of portfolio companies, thereby alleviating agency behaviors.    
CVC structures. CVC programs exemplify a diversity of organization structures.   
At least four structure types of CVC programs have been identified in the literature 
(Hagenmuller & Schmohl, 2003; Meyer & Gaba, 2003; McNally, 1997) (See Table 2.4).  
As shown in Table 2.4, CVC investment may either be direct or indirect.  CVC 
programs may indirectly invest in start-ups through external funds that are managed by 
independent VC firms. These funds may be pooled with other investors or dedicated to 
one corporation.  Also, two generic organizational vehicles for direct CVC investments 
exist: self-managed funds and fully internalized new venture department.  Different 
structures of CVC programs can be served for different purposes, and impact CVC 
performance uniquely (Block & MacMillan, 1993; Hagenmuller & Schmohl, 2003; 
Siegel et al., 1988; Thornhill & Amit, 2000).  A summary of each structure’s 
characteristics and strategic advantages is depicted as follows based on the extant 
literature (Hagenmuller & Schmohl, 2003; Meyer & Gaba, 2003; McNally, 1997). 
Pooled fund.  A corporation can pursue venturing activities by investing as a 
limited partner in a pooled venture fund managed by one or more independent VC firms.  
Under this structure, the corporation has little or no direct access to portfolio companies, 
and thus obtains very limited strategic benefits.  However, this approach can be 
employed as the vehicle for an inexperienced corporation to enter venturing investments, 
or even for some seasoned corporate venturing managers to initiate investments in new 
sectors or to enter new regions (Meyer & Gaba, 2003).  The pooled fund provides the 
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corporate venturing managers a frontier to form networks in the venture capital industry 
at a low level of risk.   
Dedicated fund.  In this approach, a corporation establishes a durable partnership 
with an independent VC firm, and collaborates in crafting a customized fund that is 
closely aligned with the corporation’s strategic focus.  In addition, the corporation 
serves as the only limited partner.  Under this structure, the corporation is embedded 
into the independent VC firm’s network and granted more opportunities to learn the 
venturing process firsthand.  Since the fund is designed specifically for the corporation’s 
strategic goals, this mode is expected to generate more strategic synergies.  On the other 
hand, being tied to a single VC firm may decrease the corporation’s exposure to the VC 
community. 
Self-managed fund.  A corporation can establish a wholly-owned self-managed 
fund, typically organized as a limited liability company (LLC) with the corporation as the 
sole limited partner.  As in private equity firms, fund managers are compensated with 
carried interest and management fees.  In this mode, the corporation can achieves more 
control over the venturing practice and capture a larger share of the financial return.  
However, how to effectively transfer strategic benefits back to the business units of the 
parent company is still a big challenge.   
Fully internalized CVC program.  The fully internalized CVC program 
establishes its own funds, builds its network, sources its deal flow, and undertakes direct 
investment in portfolio companies.  Under this structure, investments can be more 
closely aligned with business units’ strategic interests, and strategic returns can be more 
efficiently transferred from portfolio companies back into the corporate investors.   
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Typically, a fully internalized CVC program is also called a new venture 
department. Depending upon its relationship with other business units, a new venture 
department can be classified into centralized new venture department (NVD) and 
decentralized new venture departments that are operated by the respective business units 
(BUs).  De-centralized NVDs in each business unit are most powerful if innovation and 
access to the technologies of portfolio companies are the main objectives and the closest 
collaboration between start-ups and business units is required (Hagenmuller & Schmohl, 
2003).    
CVC structures vs. independent VC structures.  Independent VC firms 
employing the limited partnership structure have been highly prominent in the private 
equity market.  This kind of VC structure has demonstrated long duration, high level of 
stability and autonomy in operation, and provided high incentives to fund managers, 
which has been believed to positively influence investment performance (e.g., Gomber & 
Lerner, 1998; Fenn, et al., 1995).  Thus, a number of researchers and practitioners have 
viewed VC firms as a possible archetype of “successful venturing” practice and asserted 
that adopting venture capital practices may enhance corporate venturing performance.  
Indeed, the four types of corporate venture capital structures demonstrate such a tendency.  
In both pooled and dedicated indirect CVC investments, the corporate venturing function 
is outsourced to independent VC firms.  Investing in a pooled fund can be regarded as 
passive outsourcing whereas the dedicated fund is proactive outsourcing (Meyer & Gaba, 
2003).  The self-managed CVC fund may partially adopted “VC-like” practices such as 
the “VC-like” incentive scheme within the organization.  And most of internalized CVC 
programs are still operated under traditional corporate hierarchical structure.   
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The VC mode may be better pertaining to the financial returns, but there may be a 
tradeoff when adopting the VC-like approach into CVC activities in terms of strategic 
benefits.  Indirect CVC investment would suffer in strategic benefits because corporate 
investors act as limited partners who have limited control over venture fund management.  
The full synergistic potential of CVC would be better realized through direct investments 
by traditional CVC programs in entrepreneurial companies.   
Next, I will elaborate the distinctions between CVC structures and VC structures 
along four dimensions: lifespan, stability, incentive scheme, and autonomy.  As 
mentioned previously, the characteristics along these four dimensions have helped VC 
firms to enhance their investment performance.  Thus, in the remainder of this section, I 
will discuss how CVC programs are distinguished from VC firms along each dimension 
and how this may influence their both financial and strategic performance. 
Lifespan. Stark differences appears between the corporate and independent funds 
in terms of lifespan.  An independent VC firm has a typical lifespan of 10 years, which 
is predetermined by the limited partnership agreement.  Under some circumstances, VC 
managers can request an extension of several years but have to obtain permission from 
the limited partners.  In contrast, the lifespan of a CVC program could be infinite; 
however, it is typically terminated within four years of being launched (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001).  Even when corporations have adopted a limited partnership structure, 
they usually retain the right to dissolve the fund at any time.   
The short lifespan of CVC programs are due to a couple of structural failings 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  First, these early dissolved CVC programs suffered from a 
lack of well-defined long-standing missions (Fast 1978; Siegel, et al., 1988).  For 
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example, corporations established their CVC programs as a response to short-run period 
of technological discontinuity.  When the parent company changed its strategies, the 
dissolution of earlier CVC programs became inevitable.  In addition, some of the CVC 
programs sought to accomplish a wide range of incompatible objectives.  The confusion 
over multiple objectives often led to dissatisfaction with the outcomes (Gompers & 
Lerner, 1998).  Second, the duration of CVC programs is determined by the preference 
of the parent company’s top management team.  In many cases, new top management 
teams look at CVC programs as expensive “pet projects” of their predecessors, and are 
reluctant to make sufficient commitment (Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  Without 
protection for the long run investments by a legal partnership agreement, a successful 
CVC program will be terminated earlier.  A typical case in point is Xerox Technology 
Venture, a very successful CVC subsidiary that Xerox terminated in 1996, well before 
the completion of its originally intended ten-year life (Turner, 1997; Gompers & Lerner, 
1998).   
Stability.  The stability associated with VC practices can be manifested in three 
aspects: constant objectives, consistent operation, and reliable fund managers.  
Structured by the legal agreement, independent VC firms demonstrate high levels of 
stability; namely, independent VC firms steadily focus on the financial objectives defined 
by the agreements, their operations are protected by legal contracts and can not be 
interrupted subjectively, and VC managers are rarely changed since they signed 
contracts.  
In contrast, CVC programs are typically not as stable as independent VC firms.  
First, corporations tend to have multiple goals and different strategies in their corporate 
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venture capital activities (Maula, 2001), which might distract the efforts.  Brody and 
Ehrlich (1998) argued that one reason why VC firms can excel CVC programs is derived 
from the clarity of focus.  Second, due to the lack of legal agreements between investors 
and fund managers, CVC programs experienced operation discontinuity along with the 
ups and downs in the venture capital industry.  Third, without the VC-like incentives, 
CVC programs have difficult time to attract and retain seasoned personnel to manage 
their funds for a long term.  A successful CVC manager may be promoted to a higher 
position within the organization or leave the organization for a better-paid position within 
independent VC firms.  
Incentive scheme. In addition to the covenants mentioned in the preceding section, 
venture capital limited partnership agreements also clearly define how the general 
partners should be paid over the fund’s lifespan (Gampers & Lerner, 1999).  Typically, 
the compensation is composed of a percentage of the fund’s capital or assets as an annual 
management fee and a percentage of the profits as investment returns.  The investigation 
of 419 U.S. venture capital partnerships between 1978 to 1992 revealed that the fixed 
management fee is around 2-3%, and that the percent of profits ranged from 0.7 to 45%, 
but 81% of the funds are between 20-21%, inclusive (Gampers & Lerner, 1999).  In 
addition, unlike executive employment contracts, the limited partnership agreements are 
rarely renegotiated. 
Investors in limited partnerships rely on such incentive schemes to control VC 
managers. It is believed that the carried interest compensation helps align the venture 
capitalists’ interest with those of investors, and thus highly motivate them to create value 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  This high incentive scheme also helps VC firms to attract 
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and retain talented professionals (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  By the same token, a 
number of corporations have adopted similar incentive schemes in their venture capital 
programs in order to attract and retain sophisticated and experienced venture capital 
managers to manage their funds.  However, such high incentive systems may generate 
questions from shareholder, particularly when a corporation acquires a firm in its 
portfolio (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  The more the corporation pays to acquire the firm, 
the more the venture capital managers will get paid for their services, the less the 
shareholders will benefit from such corporate venturing activities.  More importantly, as 
high as 20 percent of profits will stimulate fund managers to maximize financial returns 
at the expense of strategic benefits to the corporation, and then the corporate venture 
capital program is aberrant from its original goals.  For example, Apple Computer 
established a venture program in 1986 with the dual objectives of a high financial return 
and third-party development of Macintosh software.  Apple modeled its compensation 
mechanism after those of independent VC firms.  Over five years, Apple’s venture 
program earned an internal rate of return of approximately 90 percent, but had no success 
in improving the position of the Macintosh (Gompers & Lernere, 2001).  Moreover, the 
financial returns had minimal impact on the company’s overall performance (Brody & 
Ehrlich, 1998).  
Because of the reasons discussed in the precedent paragraph, many corporations 
reject the VC-like incentive schemes.  Instead of providing carried interests, they 
compensate their venture staff based on similar mechanisms employed in other business 
units, such as base salary, bonus, and stock options.  Though these traditional corporate 
compensation packages could be more generous than those in other business units, they 
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couldn’t compete with the size of 20 percent of investment profits; hence, the 
shareholders can get greater profits from venturing activities (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  
On the downside, without high incentive schemes, corporations are unable to recruit 
experienced professionals to manage their funds.  This may worsen when the key 
principals of corporate venture capital programs feel frustrated at not receiving an 
acceptable share of the profits and leave the organization.  
  Some corporations have successfully employed hybrid approaches as an attempt to 
balance the financial goals as well as the strategic desires (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  
Typically, a hybrid incentive scheme allows corporate venture capital managers to 
receive a substantial portion but less than 20 percent of the profits they generated.  In 
addition, they also can receive a bonus based on strategic benefits to the corporation.  It 
is believed that this approach makes corporate venture capital managers sensitive to both 
financial and strategic objectives; however, it would be more challenging to the parent 
corporation since the measures of performance are inherently subjective.  
Autonomy. As discussed earlier, the limited partnership agreement provides the 
general partners with the maximum autonomy to operate the fund, allowing these 
professionals a great deal of discretion in choosing and overseeing investment.  On the 
contrary, the limited partners only can monitor the progress by attending annual meetings, 
and have no right to intervene the fund’s daily management.  It is essential to allow the 
general partners to operate VC funds autonomously in the venture capital industry where 
prompt responses are required to nail the most potential venture deals.  Also, the high 
level of autonomy enables VC managers to advance and retreat quickly in response to the 
change in the private equity market.  
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On the other hand, corporate venture capital programs exhibit a range of 
autonomy levels.  At one extreme, a corporate venture capital unit can function as an 
independent VC firm.  There is no exchange of personnel between the parent and the 
corporate venture unit, no need for the parent’s approval of an investment, and no formal 
reporting relationship.  At the other extreme, a corporate venture capital unit can be 
tightly controlled by the parent.  There is a regular exchange of personnel between the 
parent and the corporate venture unit.  In addition, the corporate venture unit also 
actively participates in the formal planning and budgeting system of the parent.  To 
coordinate its venturing activities with its strategic development, the parent requires 
approval for all investments.   
A number of researchers have advocated that corporations seeking benefits from 
venturing activities should replicate flexibility and freedom of the VC model as much as 
possible (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Hardymon, DeNino & Salter, 1981), because the 
tight control from the parent would keep corporate venturing managers from moving fast 
enough to seize the best opportunities and from quickly responding to the environmental 
changes.  Moreover, a close relationship with the parent may undermine the corporate 
venturing managers’ willingness to weed out the losers because of political concerns and 
vague strategic objectives (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998).  However, in order to achieve the 
desired strategic benefits, corporations usually insist on more oversight of their corporate 
venture programs, rather than let them stand alone.  Corporations also face regulatory 
pressures and legal liability for soured investments.  So, how to strike a balance between 
the need for control and the benefits from autonomy is another challenge when 
corporations design their CVC program. 
  31 
 
Management Style 
The differences in objectives and structures essentially lead to differences in fund 
management styles between independent VC firms and CVC programs.  In the next 
several paragraphs, I will elaborate on the distinctions in terms of investment syndication 
and portfolio company monitoring modes based on the extant literature. 
Investment syndication. Syndicates are a form of inter-firm alliance in which two 
or more venture capital firms co-invest in a portfolio company and share a joint pay-off 
(Wright & Lockett, 2003).  Syndication is an important and widespread part of the 
venture capital industry.  The statistics of the European Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA) show that almost 30 percent of the amount invested by European VCs and of the 
number of deals were syndicated in 2001.  The syndication ratio is even higher in the 
U.S. where more than 60 percent of total deals are syndicated by two or more VC firms 
(Manigart et al., 2002).   
A number of studies have investigated the question of why VC firms syndicate 
their investment.  First, syndication may be driven by financial considerations; that is, it 
is a response by VC firms to reduce risk (Lockett & Wright, 2001), and to share more 
expertise and a larger capital pool (Lerner, 1994).  Syndicating investments, particularly 
in the early rounds, may give VC firms “the second opinion” and lead to better decisions 
about whether to invest in firms (Lerner, 1994).  The second rationale for syndication is 
diversification through risk sharing (Wilson, 1968).  Fund performance directly affects 
VC managers’ incomes as well as their ability to raise new funds; therefore they may be 
apt to diversify their portfolio through syndication to ensure that they do not 
conspicuously underperform their peers (Yoshikawa, Phan & Linton, 2004).  In addition, 
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syndication can help VC firms generate the future deal flow (Lerner, 1994; Lockett & 
Wright, 2001).  Moreover, syndicating later round investments may avoid opportunistic 
behavior of the earlier investors.  Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) pointed out that early 
investors might take advantage of informational asymmetries between them and later 
investors, and overstate the price for the securities.  The only way to avoid such 
opportunistic behavior is to require early investors to maintain a constant share of the 
portfolio firm’s equity; therefore syndicating investments become inevitable.  Finally, 
VC funds may “window dress” (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, & Vishny, 1991) by the 
syndication of later-round investments.  In this way, they would exploit informational 
asymmetries and collude to overstate their performance to potential investors (Lerner, 
1994). 
As discussed previously, the rationales are different for VC investments in early 
stages from those in later stages.  Likewise, large, well-established VC firms may 
undertake syndicating investments for purposes different from small, young VC firms.  
Large, well-established VC firms are inclined to syndicate their investments for the 
purpose of risk sharing; whereas small, young VC firms are more likely for the exchange 
of resources and future deal flows.  In addition, syndication with well-known VC firms 
helps young firms enhance their reputation, and improve their legitimacy and position in 
the venture capital community (Lerner, 1994; Lockett & Wright, 2001; Manigart, et al., 
2002).  Due to the short history, quite a few corporations that are undertaking venturing 
activities are novices to the venture capital industry, and thus like young VC firms, CVC 
programs are willing to syndicate with well-established VC firms for experience learning 
and access to potential deal flows.  However, syndication based on deal flow 
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reciprocation may force CVC programs to invest in start-ups that do not fit their strategic 
objectives.  In addition, CVC managers are more risk averse than VC managers due to 
the incentive schemes and other structures discussed earlier; thus CVC managers prefer 
diversifying their portfolios through syndication to extensively monitoring 
entrepreneurial companies (Yoshikawa et al., 2004).   
Monitoring modes.  The extant literature has claimed that there is informational 
asymmetry between VC investors and entrepreneurial companies (e.g. Gompers, 1995).  
To control the entrepreneurs’ agency behavior, VC managers extensively monitor their 
portfolio companies by monthly visits, board representation, and/or regular requests of 
financial or other reports (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Lerner, 1995).  Typically, VC firms 
excel in the early-stage establishment activities, such as setting up management routines 
and top management team development (Maula, Autio & Murray, 2003).   
On the other hand, CVC managers are probably less motivated than their 
independent counterparts because monitoring requires a lot of personal efforts while the 
incentive schemes of CVC programs won’t reward them for such endeavors.  However, 
corporate investors do favor board representation.  Board service lets them protect their 
investments, and more importantly, may have additional strategic benefits, for instance, 
vital insights into industry trend or new technology secrecy (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  
At the same time, request for board representation may drive good deals away as many 
entrepreneurs fear that board services provide corporate investors with opportunities to 
appropriate their ideas (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  Unlike VC firms, corporate venture 
capitalists are superior in providing technology and marketing supports (Maula, Autio & 
Murray, 2003).   
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In sum, this section compares CVC programs with VC firms along several 
dimensions of their organizational structure and managerial style– lifespan, stability, 
incentive scheme, autonomy, syndication investment, and monitoring mode.  This 
comparison demonstrates that VC firms do possess some unique characteristics derivated 
from the limited partnership that is lacking in most CVC programs.  Additionally, 
compared to independent VC firms that are homogenous in terms of fund objective, fund 
structure, and fund management style, CVC programs demonstrate heterogeneity and 
complication.  On the other hand, this heterogeneity also reflects the variation in the 
adoption of VC-like practices in CVC programs.  The VC-like practices that are 
typically tied to the limited partnership structure may be constrained by the traditional 
hierarchical organizational structure in corporations. Thus, how to adopt the VC-like 
practices in corporation environment is a question that deserves further investigation.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review on Relevant Theoretical Approaches 
This chapter reviews the literature on theories potentially relevant to the three 
studies.  The theories included in this review are organizational learning theory, agency 
theory, and real options theory.  For each theory, the development of the theory is 
discussed first, combined with the most relevant applications in the context of corporate 
venture capital (CVC) investments.   
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Overview of Organizational Learning 
The literature on organizational learning has grown rapidly in the past decade.  
Researchers have made significant contributions to our understanding of organizational 
learning from several disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and strategic 
management.  In this section, I review the organizational learning literature in the field 
of strategic management.  Specifically, the review will elaborate on the organizational 
learning processes, the consequences of organizational learning, and the antecedents of 
organizational learning. 
  Organizational learning processes.  Organizational learning is commonly 
defined as an iterative, dynamic process, in which firms can engage in experiences (either 
their own or others’), draw inferences from them, and store the inferred material for 
future experience (Levitt & March, 1988).  In other words, new knowledge is acquired, 
processed, and maintained in this process (Argote, 1999; Huber, 1991).  In addition, 
Huber (1991) divided the organizational learning process into four main steps: 
knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, and 
organizational memory, which sequentially take place at individual, group, and 
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organizational levels.  Crossan, Lane, and White (1999) further elaborate the different 
learning processes associated with different levels.  They argued that organizational 
learning starts with intuiting and interpreting information at the individual level, and then 
integrating information occurs by developing shared understanding at the group level, 
and finally institutionalizing new knowledge leads to routinized actions at the 
organizational level.   
  In general, organizational learning can be classified according to the origination 
of information.  In his review, Huber (1991) suggested five types of organizational 
learning processes, including congenital learning, experiential learning, vicarious 
learning, grafting, and searching and noticing.  Congenital learning describes the 
learning process before the founding of the organization, whereby the knowledge of the 
organization is brought in when the organization is formed.  This form of learning 
cannot occur after the founding the firm.  Experiential learning, also referred as 
learning-by-doing (Levitt & March, 1988), includes both experiments and learning that 
may be unplanned or even unintended.  Vicarious learning describes learning from 
other organizations.  Grafting describes learning through new employees and includes 
hiring new employees or acquiring whole new organization.  Searching and noticing 
describes the process by which organizations systematically scan the environment for 
information they use to create new knowledge.  
In fact, these five types of organizational learning processes could be further 
categorized into two groups.  Congenital learning and experiential learning take place 
within the organization, whereas vicarious learning, grafting, and searching and noticing 
facilitate knowledge creation between organizations.  Thus, Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner 
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(1999) simplified the classification of organizational learning into experimental learning 
and acquisitive learning.  Experimental learning is similar to experiential learning, or 
learning-by-doing, where knowledge is derived within the organization; that is, firms can 
learn from their own experience.  Acquisitive learning refers to a process through which 
a firm acquires and internalizes knowledge that pre-exists externally to its boundaries 
(Zahra, et al., 1999).  This classification straightforwardly focuses on where the 
knowledge is derived, and throws light on different learning mechanisms associated with 
internal and external knowledge sources.  Thus, I adopt Zahra et al. (1999)’s 
categorization of organizational learning mechanisms in this dissertation.  In the 
following sections, I assess the literature on these two types of organizational learning. 
Experimental learning.  In the experimental learning process, organizations learn 
by conducting activities repeatedly and adapting to past experience (Cyert & March, 
1963; March & Simon, 1958).  In other words, firms evaluate outcome responses to 
their actions and generalize the causal relations between the actions and the environment 
responses for future performance.  Based on the evaluation and generalization, firms 
adapt their course of actions to increase the probability of securing desired outcomes 
(Van de Ven & Polley, 1992).  
The literature in organizational learning suggests that experimental learning 
relates to gains in experience.  Indeed, the majority of research has reported a positive 
relation between gains in experience and organizational performance (e.g., Argote, 
Beckman & Epple, 1990; Dutton, Thomas & Butler, 1984; see Yelle, 1979 for a review).  
However, most of the early studies focused on learning curves related to clearly defined 
problems, for instance, unit cost reduction in manufacturing firms (Haleblian & 
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Finkelstein, 1999).  In complicated and ambiguous conditions such as acquisitions, 
experience per se does not necessarily benefit firms.  Huber (1991) pointed out that 
learning does not always improve the learner’s effectiveness because firms might learn 
something incorrect.  In particular, ambiguous conditions may make firms draw 
inappropriate generalizations from experience and/or make incorrect discrimination of 
information (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002).  Scholars also pointed out 
that to deal with confusing experiences, firms tend to employ simplification and 
specialization mechanisms that contribute to three forms of learning myopia: the 
tendency to overlook distant times, distant places, and failures, thereby limiting their 
learning capabilities (Levintal & March, 1993).  Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) 
reported a U-shaped relation between acquisition experience and acquisition performance.  
This finding demonstrates that learning ability may not be associated with gains in 
experience, at least in the early stage of experience accumulation.  In other words, there 
is an experience threshold of the formulation of the learning-by-doing ability. 
In addition, learning may be more significantly related to the quality rather than 
the quantity of a firm’s experience (Hayward, 2002).  The literature has found that how 
firms can adaptively learn from their experience depends on the timing, similarity, and 
performance of their previous experiences (e.g. Haleblian & Frinkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 
2002).  For example, Hayward (2002) found that the temporal intervals between 
acquisitions influence firms’ learning ability, and are associated with acquisition 
performance in an inverted U-shaped way.  With respect to the impact of the similarity 
of prior experiences, the extant findings are not consistent.  The study of Haleblian and 
Frinkelstein (1999) suggested a positive relation, whereas Hayward (2002) reported an 
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inverted U-shape relation.  Moreover, mistakes are nearly inevitable in the learning 
process, and in fact, by recognizing such mistakes, firms may be able to adjust decision 
rules and routines that help them to pass environment selection (Glynn, Lant, & Milliken, 
1994; Winter, 1990).  The literature has provided strong evidence that small mistakes in 
prior experience promote learning and superior performance in the future (Hayward, 
2002). 
Acquisitive learning. On the other hand, firms can borrow experience from others 
(Huff, 1982), thus “acquisitive learning occurs when a firm acquires and internalizes 
knowledge that pre-exists externally to its boundaries” (Zahra et al., 1999: p. 173).  
There are three major factors that impact the acquisitive learning process: the availability 
of external knowledge sources, interorganizational knowledge flow, and absorptive 
capability of knowledge receivers.   
First, some knowledge assets lack mobility and are very difficult to articulate and 
imitate without direct observation (Inkpen & Dium, 1998).  Thus, strong ties and 
collaborations with the knowledge holders are necessary to access external knowledge 
assets (Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999; Kogut & Zander 1992; Mowery, Oxley, & 
Silverman. 1996; Steensma 1996; Steensma & Lyles 2000).  Numerous studies have 
identified learning and knowledge acquisition as important motivations for entering 
interorganizational relationships, such as alliances (Badaracco 1991, Hamel, Doz, & 
Prahalad, 1989, Hamel 1991, Inkpen 1996, Kogut 1988).  
Another core component of the acquisitive learning process is knowledge flow 
across organizational boundaries.  Interorganizational knowledge flow has been shown 
to be positively associated with firm performance (e.g. DeCarolis, & Deeds, 1999; Powell, 
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Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996).  DeCarolis and Deeds (1999) analyzed 98 initial public 
offerings of biotechnology firms and found support for the positive relationship between 
the amount of knowledge flow (measured by geographic location, alliance count, and 
R&D expenditure) and IPO market valuation. Moreover, Yli-Renko, Autio, and Sapienza 
(2001) demonstrated that knowledge acquisition was positively related to product 
development and technological distinctiveness.  
Absorptive capacity is another important factor that influences acquisitive 
learning processes (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal 1990; George, Zahra, Wheately, & Khan, 
2001; Lane & Lubatkin 1998; Van den Bosch, Volberda, & de Boer, 1999; Zahra & 
George 2002). Absorptive capacity was first defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128) 
as the firm’s “ability to recognize the value of new external information, assimilate it, and 
apply it to commercial ends.”  Acquisitive learning is most effective when absorptive 
capability exists (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  Lane and Lubatkin (1998) analyzed 69 
R&D alliances between pharmaceutical and biotech companies, and found that learning 
tacit and embedded knowledge required absorptive capacity in the recipient firm.  In 
addition, Zahra and George (2002) distinguished potential absorptive capacity from 
realized absorptive capacity based on the dynamic capabilities view of the firm, and 
proposed that these two types of absorptive capacity would differentially influence the 
creation and sustenance of competitive advantage.  In addition to the strategic 
importance of absorptive capacity, researchers have also investigated its antecedents.  It 
is believed that a firm’s absorptive capacity not only derives from knowledge stock 
within the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002), but also depends on 
the effectiveness of the information distribution system within the firm (Lenox & King, 
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2004), as well as its similarity to the other firm that it is learning from (Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998).  
Consequences of organizational learning.  From the perspective of the 
knowledge-based view, firms are knowledge-bearing entities, and a repository of 
capabilities in which individual and social expertise is transformed into economically 
valuable products (Kogut & Zander, 1992).  The underlying knowledge of firms can be 
conceptualized by both stocks and flows of knowledge (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  Stocks 
of knowledge refer to accumulated knowledge inventory internal to the firm.  The 
heterogeneity in knowledge bases among firms is the main determinant of sustainable 
competitive advantage and corporate performance (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999).  On the 
other hand, to adapt to environmental changes, firms also need to update their knowledge 
inventory by assimilating and developing knowledge flows into stocks of knowledge 
(DeCarlis & Deeds, 1999; Miller, 2002).   
Thus, as a process related to how to effectively create, transfer, and apply 
knowledge (Grant, 1996; Nonaka, 1994; Spender, 1996), organizational learning is 
viewed as an effective means to achieve and sustain competitive advantage, and 
contribute to superior firm performance (Easterby-Smith, 1997).  First, organizational 
learning can contribute to sustainable competitive advantage and firm performance by 
creating new knowledge that is valuable, rare and costly to imitate (Barney, 1991).  
Second, new knowledge and its employment in the process and routines provide an 
essential building block of new competencies (Zahra et al., 1999).  In their pioneer 
study on dynamic capabilities, Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) pointed out the function 
of learning in the development of dynamic capabilities.  Furthermore, Zollo and Winter 
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(2002) elaborated three learning mechanisms - experience accumulation, knowledge 
articulation, and knowledge codification, which facilitate the formation of dynamic 
capabilities.  Thus, not only is organizational learning strongly linked to new knowledge 
creation, but also contributes to the formation of dynamic capabilities (e.g. Lei, Hitt, & 
Bettis, 1996; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002), which will lead to superior 
performance.   
However, not every form of organizational learning leads to capability 
development.  Learning may occur in two loops: single-loop learning and double-loop 
learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978).  Single-loop learning is viewed as a reactive 
adaptation to the environment.  Through single-loop learning, new knowledge is created 
or acquired while goals, norms, and knowledge structures remain unchanged (Argyris & 
Schon, 1978; Keil, 2004).  On the other hand, double-loop learning is a proactive search 
process in which new knowledge creation modifies the prior goals, norms, and 
knowledge structures (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Keil, 2003).  Lei et al. (1996) argued that 
only double-loop learning enables firms to develop capabilities. 
Antecedents of organizational learning.  Learning exhibits path dependency 
due to the local search tendency (e.g. Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 1990); that is, 
existing knowledge forms the starting point of the search process for new knowledge, and 
the potential learning process is a function of previous knowledge (Keil, 2004).  Thus, 
initial conditions such as organizational structure and resource endowment define the 
learning trajectory (e.g. Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell, & Klepper, 2000; McGrath, 1997).  
For example, Holbrook et al.(2000) reported that firms’ origin and their founders’ 
experience have effects on the firms’ ability to integrate research and development and 
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manufacturing.  McGrath (1997) also found that the level of autonomy associated with 
an initial organizational structure significantly influences organizational learning.  
In addition, the literature suggests that organizational structures may affect 
learning effectiveness (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Levinthal and March (1993) 
reported three form of myopia related to organizational learning: 1) the tendency to 
overlook distant times, 2) distant places, and 3) failure.  They suggested that appropriate 
organizational structures as well as incentive schemes may help firms avoid such learning 
myopia and keep a balance between exploitative and explorative learning.  
Applications of Organizational Learning to CVC Activities 
 The extant literature.  In the area of corporate entrepreneurship, researchers 
have extended the organizational learning perspective to investigate why and how 
corporate entrepreneurship activities, such as technology innovation, corporate venturing, 
and strategy renewal, can improve organizational performance.  It is suggested that the 
knowledge generated from learning in corporate entrepreneurship activities has technical, 
integrative, and exploitative components (Zahra et al., 1999).  In addition, new 
knowledge creation significantly defines the domains and thrusts of organizational 
competencies, and thus determines the ultimate organizational performance (Dess et al, 
2003). 
As one manifestation of corporate entrepreneurship, CVC activities have also 
been examined through the theoretical lens of organizational learning (e.g. Chesbrough & 
Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky, 2004; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 2005b; Keil, 2004; Maula, 
Keil & Zahra, 2003; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005).  However, most of this work has 
focused on the consequences of organizational learning in the context of CVC activities.  
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In particular, CVC has been regarded as an effective instrument of external knowledge 
acquisition (e.g. Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 2005b; Maula, 
et al., 2003; Schildt, et al., 2005).  
For instance, Chesbrough and Tucci (2003) reported that CVC investments 
effectively stimulate additional corporate innovation activities, rather than substitutes of 
traditional corporate R&D activities.  Based on a large panel of public firms over a 
20-year period, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a) also found that CVC investments were 
associated with increases in firm patenting.  These positive relationships were especially 
effective in weak intellectual property (IP) regimes and when firms have sufficient 
absorptive capacity. These findings provide indirect evidence of interorganizational 
learning through corporate venture capital investment.  Moreover, Dushnitsky and 
Lenox (2005b) found that firms are more likely to invest CVC in new ventures in 
industries with weak intellectual property protection and, to some extent, in industries 
with high technological ferment where complementary distribution capability is 
important. These results suggest that in Schumpeterian environments incumbents may 
supplement their innovative efforts by tapping into the knowledge generated by new 
ventures (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b).  CVC investments are also found to assist in the 
recognition of technological discontinuities (Maula, et al., 2003). 
To date, two studies have been conducted to investigate the underlying learning 
processes (Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005; Keil, 2004).  In this study, Keil (2003) 
proposed a framework of external corporate venturing capability development based on 
two longitudinal in-depth case studies.  Here, external corporate venturing capability is 
defined as the capability to create and develop ventures through CVC, alliances, and 
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acquisitions.  In his framework, two kinds of learning processes – learning from 
experience and acquisitive learning - mediate the link between initial conditions, such as 
organizational structure and resource endowment, and external corporate venturing 
capability.  In addition, knowledge codification and knowledge exchange networks 
influence learning processes including learning from experience and acquisitive learning.  
In addition, Schildt, et al.(2005) examined the antecedents of explorative and exploitative 
learning of technological knowledge through external corporate venturing (CVC, alliance, 
and joint venture).  Based on citations in patents filed by a sample of the110 largest U.S. 
public information and communication technology companies from 1992 to 2000, they 
found that different forms of external corporate venturing modes and technological 
relatedness have significant effects on the likelihood of explorative learning.   
Gaps in the literature.  Although prior research has contributed to our 
understanding about the role of CVC activities in external knowledge acquisition through 
the lens of organizational learning, several shortcomings exist.  First, most of studies 
have focused on the strategic consequences associated with organizational learning in the 
context of CVC.  However, relatively few studies have directly examined the learning 
mechanisms underlying CVC investments or their antecedents.  Most of the prior 
studies either simply utilized organizational learning as a motivation of CVC activities 
(e.g. Dushnitsky, 2004; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 2005b), or employed it as an 
implicit apparatus to predict the contribution of CVC to a company’s performance, for 
example, technology innovation (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003).  
In addition, the two studies discussed previously provided only partial knowledge 
as to specific learning processes associated with corporate venturing.  First, although 
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Keil’s study (2004) has made significant progress towards a learning model of corporate 
venturing, this study was primarily aimed at investigating how firms develop new 
capabilities through learning processes in general, and thus more micro characteristics 
and processes related to CVC need to be examined in future research.  Second, while 
two in-depth case studies provided abundant information, the Keil’s model hasn’t been 
tested in a statistical sense.  Rigorous empirical research is called for to develop and test 
quantitative models of the learning processes, as well as their antecedents and 
consequences in the context of CVC activities.  Third, despite exploitative and 
explorative learning processes, many other learning processes may be worthy of 
investigation as well.  Fourth, the question of how to structure CVC activates so that 
effective learning can take place has been ignored in the literature. 
Thus, for future research, learning mechanisms underlying CVC activities as well 
as their antecedents need further investigation.   
Learning mechanisms underlying CVC activities.  As discussed previously, 
organizational learning may take place within the organizational domain or across 
organizational boundaries (e.g. Zahra, et al., 1999).  Likewise, corporate investors can 
learn from their prior CVC experiences.  During the learning-by-doing process, new 
knowledge regarding portfolio ventures, as well as CVC investments, is created and 
corporate venturing capabilities are developed, which ultimately leads to more efficient 
CVC operations.  In addition, learning ability is not only related to the quantity of prior 
experience, but is also associated with the quality of prior experience.   
On the other hand, acquisitive learning processes may play an important role, 
particularly when firms start new activities on which they do not have much prior 
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experience.  CVC activities provide a typical example of such new activity to big 
corporations.  As discussed previously, most CVC programs are novel to venture capital 
investments and CVC investments have flourished just in the past decade.  In the 
context of venture capital markets, investments syndicated with VC firms provide an 
opportunity for CVC programs to observe how experienced venture capitalists manage 
their investments.  In addition, recruiting new employees with strong venturing 
experience provides another avenue of acquisitive learning. 
Moreover, in the context of corporate venturing activities, new knowledge can be 
created at two levels: knowledge specific to the venture and knowledge related to the 
corporate venturing program.  At each level, the double-loop learning process may 
occur (Keil, 2004).  For example, the corporation might build knowledge of new 
markets or new technologies through the venture.  In parallel to this first order learning, 
the corporation also learns how to get access to interesting information about new 
markets and new technologies, how to transfer it back, or how to integrate it into the 
knowledge base.  Similarly, at the level of the corporate venturing program, knowledge 
related venture capital investment is accumulated; in the meanwhile, the corporation 
learns how to effectively organize its corporate venturing program.   
Thus, two types of corporate venturing capabilities can be developed through the 
double-loop learning processes.  Similar to venture capital firms, corporate venture 
programs need to pursue financial returns; thus, one type of capabilities a corporate 
venture capital program should possess is associated with the financial success of its 
investment portfolio.  Those capabilities enable CVC programs to perform better in 
project valuation, project selection, IPO timing, and portfolio nurturing from the financial 
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perspective.  In addition to financial returns, CVC programs also actively pursue 
strategic benefits for their parent companies, such as technology innovation, resource 
leverage, and option building.  Thus, the other type of capabilities CVC programs 
should develop is related to how to maximize the strategic benefits for the parent 
companies through their investing activities.  Those capabilities are uniquely attributed 
to CVC programs and, therefore, distinguish CVC operations from VC operations in that 
the former may have strategic considerations in project selection, project valuation, IPO 
timing, and portfolio nurturing.  In particular, to achieve strategic benefits, a CVC 
program should develop the capabilities to facilitate knowledge flows from the portfolio 
companies to the parent companies, as well as integrate new knowledge into the parent’s 
knowledge base. 
CVC structural and management characteristics as antecedents of 
organizational learning.  The literature suggests that initial conditions such as 
organizational structure and resource endowment define the learning trajectory and thus 
influence the evolution of new capabilities (Cockburn, Henderson, & Stern, 2000; 
Holbrook et al., 2000; Keil, 2004; Raff, 2000; Teece, et al., 1997).  First, the structural 
and management characteristics of a CVC program may influence what learning 
mechanisms are open to it and from what sources it can learn.  Keil (2004) reported that 
structural autonomy encourages a corporate venturing program to imitate venture capital 
operation, and thus presents the opportunity of learning-by-doing.  On the other hand, 
VC-like incentive schemes may enable CVC programs to attract talented venture 
capitalists, and thereby initiate an acquisitive learning process.  
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In addition, the structural and managerial characteristics of a CVC program have 
an effect on the development of learning ability.  For example, due to the lack of legal 
contracts between the fund providers (the parent company) and the fund managers (CVC 
programs), CVC programs typically have a shorter and instable duration than VC firms.  
The short lifespan cripples a CVC program in that it may never be able to reach the 
experience threshold which is necessary for the development of learning ability.  The 
instability of a CVC program may engender too long or too short intervals.  The former 
magnifies the inaccessibility of learning (Hayward, 2002), and the latter prevents 
efficient learning due to “the diseconomies of time compression” (Dierickx & Cool, 
1989).   
Finally, the structural and management characteristics of a CVC program may 
affect the knowledge flow between its parent and its portfolio companies. For instance, a 
VC-like compensation system may simulate knowledge flow from the corporate investor 
to the portfolio companies while deterring knowledge flow in the opposite way because 
such compensation system encourages CVC managers to pursue financial success of the 
portfolio companies rather than strategic benefits to the parent.  Similarly, some VC-like 
practices such as syndicated investments and intensive monitoring also impact knowledge 
flow between the parent and the portfolio companies.  Syndicated investments allow 
CVC programs to invest in more portfolio companies with certain amounts of venture 
capital funds, thereby eliminating the effort and time CVC managers could devote to each 
company, as well as the knowledge flow.  On the contrary, intensive monitoring of 
portfolio companies can lessen the agency behavior of the portfolio company and 
generate more knowledge flow between the two parties.  
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AGENCY THEORY 
Overview of Agency Theory 
Agency theory was originally concerned with contracts under which one or more 
persons (the principal) delegate work to another person (the agent) who performs the 
work (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Grounded in information 
economics (e.g. Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968), agency theory has developed along two 
lines since the 1960s: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983).  The positivist 
school, also called the descriptive agency theory (Mahoney, 2005), has focused almost 
exclusively on the principal-agent relationship between owners and mangers of large, 
public corporations.  This stream of research is concerned with describing the 
governance mechanisms that solve agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989).  On the other 
hand, principal-agent researchers are concerned with general mathematical 
principal-agent models that can be applied to many agency relationships, such as 
employers and employees, buyers and suppliers (Harris & Raviv, 1978). Today, it is 
believed that agency theory can be applied to all co-operative activities among 
self-interested individuals.   
Agency problems. The center of agency theory is the question of how the 
principals can ensure that their agents act in the principals’ interests and not in their own.  
Standard agency theory assumes that people in general are self-interested and 
opportunistic economic utility maximizers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In addition, the 
goals between the principles and the agents often conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989), for example, 
when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk (Arrow, 1971, 1985).  
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Moreover, principals have incomplete information of their agents’ action (Arrow, 1971, 
1985).  All this give rise to some problems for the principals.   
Researchers have identified two major agency problems that may occur in the 
principle-agency relationship: adverse selection and moral hazard.  Adverse selection 
refers to the difficulties principals have in ensuring that agents possess the capabilities to 
perform according to the agreement (Akerlof, 1970, Barney & Ouchi, 1986, Eisenhardt 
1989). In other words, the agent takes advantage of information asymmetry (Arrow, 
1985).  Moral hazard refers to problems when agents purposefully underperform 
(Eisenhardt 1989, Jensen & Meckling 1976).  The agent may have a hidden agenda that 
he or she would pursue after the principal has delegated the decision-making authority.   
Recently, Hendry (2002) pointed out that in addition to problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, principals have other problems which are derived from the 
principals’ incompetence.  First, facing “multitasking” (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), 
principals may be unable to clearly specify their complex or multifaceted objectives in 
the contract.  The agency problem arises as “agents perform to the specific terms of the 
incentives offered, rather than in the more general interests of their principals” (Hendry, 
2002, p. 90).  In addition, the agents may not have the ability to meet their principals’ 
objectives even though they are honest and dutiful.   
Agency costs. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard create three kinds of agency costs: (1) monitoring expenses 
by the principal, (2) bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) residual loss.  
Monitoring expenses include those expenditures made by the principal to control the 
agent's behavior. Bonding costs are expenditures undertaken by the agent to guarantee 
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that he will not undertake certain agent behavior to harm the principal's interests or, if he 
does, that he will compensate the principal.  The residual loss is the loss suffered by the 
principal from actions taken by the agent which differ from the actions which would have 
been taken had the decision been taken by the principal. 
In addition, the problems related to objective specification and honest 
incompetence result in four more costs to the principals: incompetence costs, 
specification costs, training costs, and guidance costs (Hendry, 2002).  Incompetence 
costs refer to losses as a result of deviations between objectives and outcomes arising 
from an agent’s limited competence.  Specification costs are accrued as a result of the 
difference between the satisfaction of a principal’s overall objectives and that of the 
objectives specified in the contract.  Training costs refer to expenditures devoted to 
improving an agent’s competence.  Guidance costs include expenditures associated with 
communicating the general objectives outside the contract specification.   
Controlling mechanisms.  In general, the costs associated with agency problems 
can be classified into two categories.  The first group, including monitoring expenses, 
bonding costs, training costs, and guidance costs, refers to the costs of devoting resources 
to reduce agency problems. That is, these expenditures could generate benefits to the 
principals.  Thus, I consider the first group “positive” agency costs.  The second group 
includes residual losses, incompetence costs, and specification costs, which are the 
principals’ suffering due to the agency problems.  Consequently, I consider the second 
group “negative” agency costs.  Overall, incentives exist to utilize certain mechanisms 
to reduce the “negative” agency costs as long as the marginal benefit of the “positive” 
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costs spent in reducing the agency loss is greater than the marginal “positive” costs 
associated with these mechanisms. 
Indeed, while early researchers tended to be pessimistic about the economic 
effects of agency problems owing to the separation of ownership and control (Berle & 
Mean, 1932; Smith, 1776), the focus of the theory has shifted to determining efficient 
mechanisms controlling the principal-agent relationship (Jaffe & Mahoney, 1999; 
Mahoney, 2005).  In the field of corporate governance, agency theory has been 
extensively applied to explore mechanisms aligning managers’ interests with those of 
owners, including the ownership structures of the corporation (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 
1976); information mechanisms such as efficient capital and labor markets (e.g. Fama, 
1980), and the board of directors (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983); and compensation schemes 
(e.g. Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Gomez-Mejia, 1992).  
Applications of Agency Theory to CVC Activities 
In the context of venture capital, there are two-level principal-agent relationships 
between venture capitalists and their fund providers, and between venture capitalists and 
entrepreneurs (Sahlman, 1990; Wright & Robbie, 1996).  Similarly, CVC investments 
also involve two levels of principal-agent relationships.  At one level, the parent 
company acts as the principal who provides funds and delegates the job of CVC 
investments to the agent – CVC managers.  At the other level, CVC managers behave as 
the principal when they deal with the portfolio companies.   
The principal-agent relationship between the parent company and the CVC 
managers.  In the venture capital industry, the limited partnership has been regarded as 
an efficient mechanism to mitigate potential agent costs in the relationship between 
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venture capitalists (the agent) and their fund providers (the principal) (Fenn, Liang, & 
Prowse, 1995; Sahlman, 1990).  First, the covenants in the partnership agreement 
provide the legal prohibition of certain agency behaviors on the part of the venture 
capitalist (Gompers & Lerner, 1996).  Second, the finite time period of the venture 
capital fund makes venture capitalists faced with the risk that if they do not perform 
satisfactorily they may fail to raise further funding (Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Norton, 
1995; Sahlman, 1990). Third, venture capitalists’ compensation is based on an annual 
management fee plus some percentage (typically as high as 20%) of the realized profits 
from the fund (Gompers & Lerner, 1999). The incentive system of “carried interests” 
aligns the interests between the limited partners and the general partners.  Moreover, by 
accepting the performance-sensitive compensation scheme, good venture capitalists are 
signaling their quality (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Sahlman, 1990).  
However, most CVC programs are wholly-owned subsidiaries or are internalized 
within the parent company as business units.  Thus, some mechanisms which are 
inherent in the limited partnership to control the agent costs are missing in the context of 
CVC investments.  First, without a legal agreement and written covenants, CVC 
managers are not imposed by the bonding expenditures and therefore, their behaviors are 
less restricted.  Second, CVC managers do not have the pressure for future fundraising.  
In addition, most CVC programs obtain funds from the budget allocation within the 
parent corporation instead of the external limited partners.  Thus, factors such as 
strategic consideration and organizational politics may be more critical than reputation.  
Third, without the “carried interests” incentives, the parent company is unable to reward 
its CVC managers in accordance with the financial performance, which may provoke 
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agency behaviors such as unnecessary portfolio diversification and preference to 
later-stage investments.   
In CVC activities, the parent company also faces the problems of objective 
specification and honest incompetence in addition to the standard agency problems.  
Apparently, CVC investments are multitasking processes, since the parent company 
requires both financial returns and strategic benefits, thereby impeding the precise 
specification of their objectives in the contracts.  As Hendry (2002) argued, when the 
principals’ objectives are complex or multifaceted, “attempts to specify outcomes can be 
dysfunctional, as agents perform to the specific terms of the incentives offered, rather 
than in the more general interests of their principals” (p. 99).  When the VC-like 
incentive scheme is adopted, the contract is clearly based on financial outcomes but 
ignorant of strategic benefits.  Thus, the adoption of  VC-like incentive schemes may 
be inappropriate in the context of CVC investments.   
Additionally, the agency problem of honest incompetence is more likely to occur 
in the case of CVC investment.  Without high incentive systems, CVC programs are less 
attractive to VC investment experts than independent VC firms.  On the other hand, the 
parent company may tend to hire insiders to manager its CVC funds due to strategic 
considerations.  However, staff from the parent company typically has very limited 
experience before entering the CVC program.   
In sum, more agency problems may exist in the relationship between the parent 
company and its CVC managers than in the relationship between the VC fund investor 
and its fund managers.   
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The principal-agent relationship between the CVC managers and the managers 
of the portfolio company.  The principal-agent relationship between venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs has been extensively examined in the literature.  It is suggested that 
this relationship can be compared to that of large block stockholders in leveraged-buyout 
firms (Jain & Kini, 1995), who carefully observe the firm to track its business potential 
and monitor agent behavior in order to protect against agent opportunism and agent 
incompetence.  
Accordingly, several mechanisms have been employed to mitigate such agent 
problems, including rigorous valuation process, staged finance, intensive monitor, and the 
threat of CEO dismissal.  First, venture capitalists will do an extensive appraisal and 
evaluation of the target company before they commit money.  Such rigorous valuation 
processes involve explicit research costs in an effort to lower information asymmetry 
(Norton, 1995).   
Second, venture capital investment is frequently structured as multiple rounds. 
The pressure for continuous financing mitigates the entrepreneur’s agency behavior.  
The literature has found that staged financing is strongly influenced by the agency costs 
(e.g. Gomper, 1995; Neher, 1999).  
Third, to reduce information asymmetries, venture capitalists keep in regular 
contact with their portfolio companies and frequently sit on their boards (Gompers, 1995; 
Lerner, 1995; Norton, 1995; Sapienza & Gupta, 1994).  Sapienza and Gupta (1994) 
analyzed 51 venture capitalist-CEO dyads and found that the frequency of interaction 
depended on the extent of venture capitalist-CEO goal congruence, the degree of CEO’s 
new venture experience, the venture's stage of development, and the degree of technical 
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innovation the venture.  Along the same lines, Lerner (1995) analyzed 271 venture 
capital backed biotechnology firms and found that venture capitalists’ representation on 
the board of directors increased around the time of turnover of CEOs, while the number 
of other outsiders remained constant. Gompers (1995) reported supportive evidence of 
the agency theory predictions: asymmetric information (decreases in the industry ratios of 
tangible assets to total assets, higher market-to-book ratios, and greater R&D intensities) 
lead to more frequent monitoring.  
Finally, venture capitalists may replace the incapable CEO.  Bruton, Fried, and 
Hisrich (2000) reported that the primary reason for CEO dismissal in venture 
capital-based firms is lack of agent ability, followed by expectation divergence between 
principal and agent, with managerial opportunism ranking last.   
In sum, agency theory has been one of the dominant theoretical perspectives 
applied to the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship.  However, to date, agency 
theory has seldom been applied to examine the phenomenon of CVC investments.  In 
the context of CVC investments, CVC managers are confronted with similar agency 
problems compared to independent VC managers.  Indeed, many CVC programs have 
employed the mechanisms discussed above to mitigate agency costs in practice.  Thus, 
agency theory provides a promising theoretical lens for CVC research.   
REAL OPTIONS THEORY 
Overview of Real Options Theory 
Real options theory was born almost simultaneously with the discovery of modern 
stock option valuation formulas (Black & Scholes, 1973; Cox, Ross, & Rubinstein, 1979).  
The main idea of real options theory is to apply option concepts to value the flexibility 
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inherent in managers’ investment decisions (Sanchez, 1993, 1995) when these investment 
decisions involve some irreversibility and uncertainty (e.g Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 
2004).  Analogous to a financial option, a real option conveys the right, but not the 
obligation, for a firm to buy or sell an underlying real asset at some point in the future.  
The flexibility is valuable in that it allows a firm to access a greater variety of 
opportunities than would be possible if each investment represented a full scale launch 
and irreversible (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004).  With flexibility, an investor can wait until 
uncertainty is reduced, and then select to exercise only those options that are ‘in the 
money’ and allow the remainder to expire.   
Thus, according to real options theory, the value of a firm’s investment is the sum 
of its traditional net present value (NPV) and its option value (Trigeoregis & Mason, 
1987).  Real options theory provides an important new framework of investment 
decisions under uncertainty, which are typically undervalued by the traditional 
investment decision approach based on the expected NPV (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; 
Trigeorgis, 1996).    
The types of real options.  A variety of real options have been identified in the 
literature to increase managerial flexibility under different uncertain conditions 
(Trigeorgis, 1993, 1996).  Those real options include the option to defer investment, the 
option to default during staged construction, the option to expand, the option to contract, 
the option to shut down, the option to abandon for salvage value, the option to switch use, 
and corporate growth options. 
The option to defer investments, to default during staged construction, and to 
expand can be regarded as call options that provide the holder the right, but not the 
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obligation, to make investments later at a given price.  In contrast, options to contract, to 
shut down, and to abandon for salvage value, are similar to put options that confer the 
privilege to sell an asset at an exercise price.  The option to switch use is a combination 
of a call option and a put option.  With the switch option, a firm is provided the “process 
flexibility” (Trigeorgis, 1993) to utilize new assets or technologies while abandoning the 
old.  
Corporate growth options are a group of options particularly important to strategic 
management.  In 1977, Myers perceptively noted that organizational resources 
investments are analogous to growth options.  In most situations, prior investment is a 
necessary precondition for launching a successful new major investment at a later date 
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993).  The trial investment serves to hold the option open for the 
firm to make the full-scale investment, and increases the chances of ultimate success.  
Thus, a growth option is the option that sets the path of future opportunities (Trigeorgis, 
1993). 
Interaction of multiple real options. The literature examining real options has 
tended to analyze real options individually; however, real investment projects typically 
involve a collection of real options (Trigeorgis, 1993; McGrath, 1997; Vassolo, et al., 
2004).  To date, only two studies have investigated this issue in detail.  Using a generic 
investment with multiple real options, Trigeorgis (1993) analyzed the interaction of 
compounded options over time.  His study showed that the presence of subsequent 
options increases earlier options’ value and that the exercise of prior options may 
eliminate the value of subsequent options.  It also demonstrated that the incremental 
value of the additional option in the presence of other options is generally less than its 
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value in isolation.  Furthermore, Vassolo et al. (2004) showed that under different 
conditions multiple options can be not only sub-additive in value (Trigeorgis, 1993) due 
to duplication, but also super-additive because of fungible inputs.   
Although these two studies have provided valuable knowledge about the 
interactive effects in a firm’s option portfolio, more research is needed to further our 
understanding in this area.  For example, there may exist factors other than duplication 
and fungibility that influence value additivity in portfolios.  In addition, the interaction 
may be multi-directional.  For instance, investment in new substitute technologies may 
lead to a sub-additive value of the portfolio in terms of growth options, but may lead to a 
super-additive value in terms of switching options.  Besides, the value of an option 
portfolio is not only influenced by the configuration of the portfolio but also by the 
configuration of the competitor’s portfolio.  Mahoney (2005) has suggested that 
research on real options in the strategy field should shift the direction from 
decision-theoretic problems to a combination of decision-theoretic and game-theoretic 
problems, namely, considerations where the timing of investments also depends on how 
other players will respond.   
Real options reasoning and strategic management.  Real options theory 
presents a very useful theoretical framework for the study of strategic management 
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993).  Through the options lens, strategy is an option building 
process through organizational resource-investment choices (e.g. Bowman & Hurry, 1993; 
Hurry, Miller, & Bowman, 1992; Kester, 1984; Kogut, 1991; Myers, 1977, 1984; Sharp, 
1991).  This process includes the recognition of shadow options, the conversion of 
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shadow options to real options, and option strikes when the condition materializes 
(Bowamn & Hurry, 1993).      
Specifically, real options theory has been applied to study many strategic issues: 
market entry (e.g. Folta & O’Brien, 2004; Miller & Folta, 2002), strategic alliance (e.g. 
Kogut, 1991, Reuer & Leiblein, 2000), and technology development (e.g. MacMillan & 
McGrath, 2002; McGrath, 1997; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Miller & Arikan, 2004; 
Steensma & Corley, 2001) 
In the case of market entry, Miller and Folta (2002) presented an entry timing 
decision criterion based on real options theory.  In their analysis, optimal timing for 
market entry (exercising the entry option) depends on current dividends, possibilities for 
preemption, and whether the option is simple or compound, proprietary or shared. Folta 
and O’Brien (2004) reported the nonmonotonic effect of uncertainty on the entry decision.  
That is, industry uncertainty leads to both the option to defer and the option to grow, and 
the tension between the two options is determined by irreversibility, the total value of 
growth opportunities, and early mover advantages.   
Strategic alliances have been characterized as real options since a pioneering 
study by Kogut (1991). The research suggests that through alliances, firms gain access to 
a diversity of real options including options to defer complete investment, options for 
future expanding, or options of future options (options to learn about the future 
opportunities).  From the perspective of real options, the literature has empirically 
shown that firms have a propensity to initiate alliances under high uncertainty (Folta, 
1998).  In addition, significant resource asymmetry must exist between partners for a 
real option with strategic value (Chi, 2000).  Also, joint ventures are regarded as a 
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platform that offers expansion opportunities (e.g. Kim & Kogut, 1996; Kogut & 
Kulatilaka, 1994).  
Real options theory has also been extensively used to investigate issues related to 
technology development (e.g. MacMillan & McGrath, 2002; McGrath, 1997; McGrath & 
Nerkar, 2004; Miller & Arikan, 2004; Steensma & Corley, 2001).  For instance, 
Steensma and Corley (2001) suggested that management stockholdings, firm risk 
orientation, and organizational slack moderated the negative relation between the 
perceived threat of commercial failure and technology sourcing decision.  Based on an 
analysis of a large sample of patents by firms active in the pharmaceutical industry, 
McGrath and Nerkar (2004) found that scope of opportunity, prior experience, and 
competitiveness in the new technology areas have effects on firms’ propensity to invest 
in new R&D options, for instance, initiating a R&D project in a brand new technology 
area.   
Application of Real Options Theory to CVC Investments 
The application of real options theory to CVC investment has aroused growing 
attention (e.g. Hurry, et al., 1992; Li & Zou, 2005).  Similar to strategic issues such as 
technology development and alliance, CVC investments are a promising area that could 
be explored through the option lens.   
Real options in CVC investments. One CVC investment at a time could create 
multiple real options: the option to default during staged financing deals, the growth 
options for portfolio companies and the corporate investors, and the switching option for 
the corporate investors.  
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The option to default during staged financing. Similar to independent venture 
capital investments, most of CVC investments employ the multi-stage financing structure 
(Gompter, 1995).  The staged CVC investment presents flexibility to invest now with 
the options to invest further at a later date, to re-value the project, or to abandon the 
investment (Sahlman, 1993). The investor has no obligation but has the right to make 
subsequent investments until new information is revealed.  The option to default during 
staged financing partially solves the information problem and creates value for both of 
the parties (Trigeorgis, 1993). 
The growth options for portfolio companies.  CVC investments provide startups 
with growth options that set the path of future opportunities (Willner, 1995), thereby 
generating future cash flows that either far exceed initial investments or total loss (Wright 
& Robbie, 1998) and making the pricing of start-up companies follow a jump model 
(Willner, 1995). 
 The growth options for corporate investors.  The strategic objectives of 
corporate venture capital investments imply that such investments would generate growth 
options for the parent on new technologies or new markets (Hurry, et al., 1992).  Initial 
investment in a venture may not generate sufficient cash flows, but as a consequence of 
the initial investment the corporate investor may obtain subsequent investment 
opportunities such as an option to acquire the venture, an exclusive licensing agreement 
with the venture, or R&D collaboration with the venture (Li & Zou, 2005).  In addition, 
initiating a venture investment may serve as a springboard for the corporate investor to 
undertake other interrelated, positive NPV projects in the future to seize certain strategic 
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opportunities such as introducing a new product, exploring a new technology, and 
entering into a new market (Chesbrough, 2002).  
Thus, CVC investments can be viewed as growth option building processes. In 
their study on 20 Japanese venture capital firms, 15 of which are subsidiaries of large 
corporations, Hurry et al. (1992) revealed this process in detail.  This option building 
process begins with a collection of shadow options derived from prior relationships 
between the investing firm and the venture firm.  At some point, the latent option is 
recognized and then an investment decision is made aimed at future opportunities; for 
example, acquiring a new technology at some currently unforeseeable point in the future.  
Typically the venture’s initial public offering signals the successful attainment of 
performance and triggers the call option exercise in the form of joint programs for 
product development or the acquisition of the venture.  During the option holding period, 
if it seems that a strike signal might never occur, the investing firm may abandon its 
option, namely divest the venture. 
The switching options for corporate investors.  In addition to growth options, 
CVC investments also would create switching options for the corporate investors.  
Investments in new technologies are typically irreversible, and involve considerable 
uncertainty.  Thus, in search of new technologies, the corporate investors may 
simultaneously invest in entrepreneurial companies undertaking technologies competing 
with other portfolio companies or with the parent companies.  This would give the 
corporation flexibility to switch from the current technology to the emerging technology 
as the latter becomes dominant in the market.   
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Real options theory and CVC investment valuation.  As discussed previously, 
CVC investments could create opportunities and managerial flexibility for both the 
corporate investors and the entrepreneurial companies.  However, the traditional 
valuation methods such as Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Price/Earnings multiples 
are not able to take these into consideration, and pose particular problems in the context 
of venture capital investments with high levels of uncertainty (Wright & Robbie, 1998).  
Thus, real options theory offers a potential development with respect to the valuation of 
venture capital investments (Amram, 2002; Seppa & Laamanen, 2001; Wright & Robbie, 
1998).  Using the valuation data of 421 U.S. venture capital transactions and 176 initial 
public offerings, Seppa and Laamanen (2001) compared the predictive power of the 
binomial pricing model (an option-pricing technique) and that of the traditional 
investment models with risk-adjusted rates of return.  Their findings indicate that the fit 
of the binomial model is better than the fit of the corresponding traditional models. 
Real options reasoning is also a useful tool to investigate the corporate investors’ 
evaluation behaviors.  Field studies have shown that venture capitalists explicitly 
consider the attractiveness of growth opportunities in their investments in terms of large 
and growing markets or new product / technology (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004). In 
addition, CVC investments are often viewed as windows on growth opportunities such as 
new technologies (Chesbrough, 2002; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 2005b). 
Real options theory and CVC exit strategy.  In general, the exit strategies of 
venture capital investments include IPOs, acquisitions, and divestures.  The choice of 
exit modes and the timing of exit are largely determined by the portfolio company’s 
performance and the private equity market conditions.  However, inconsistent with 
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independent VC firms, the corporate investors obtain real options through CVC 
investments.  Thus, exit strategies are associated with exercise or abandonment of the 
options; namely, in addition to those factors mentioned before, exit decisions are also 
determined by the conditions of the real assets underlying the options.  In addition, the 
likelihood and timing of exercise of a single option may be influenced by the presence of 
other options in the portfolio (Trigeorgis, 1993; Vassolo et al., 2004).  CVC programs 
should be more cautious when they liquidate a portfolio company because such an action 
may influence the value of subsequent growth options generated by the CVC investment 
(Trigeorgis, 1993).   Vassolo et al. (2004) found that duplication in the option portfolio 
may enhance the likelihood of divestiture of the focal portfolio company and fungibility 
of input recourses associated with a focal portfolio company may enhance its likelihood 
of acquisition.  
Real options theory and CVC portfolio configuration.  When a portfolio 
consists of multiple real options that interact with each other, their individual values may 
be sub-additive (McGrath, 1997; Trigeorgis, 1996; Vassolo, et al., 2004) or 
super-additive (Vassolo, et al., 2004).  That is, portfolio configuration is associated with 
value.  In line with this reasoning, we could investigate how to build the CVC 
investment portfolio so that the portfolio companies as a whole would most benefit the 
corporate investors.   
To date, one study has been proposed that correlation among the competing 
projects leads to a sub-additive value of the portfolio and that fungibility of shared 
resources among projects leads to a super-additive value of the portfolio (Vassolo, et al., 
2004).  However, this study did not empirically test these propositions.   Moreover, 
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there remains other features pertaining to portfolio configuration that deserve further 
study, for example, technology diversification among portfolio companies.  
The diversification in terms of technology relatedness among the portfolio 
companies may influence the value creation to the corporate investor.  Specifically, 
sub-additivity in costs through resource sharing, and super-additivity in value because of 
complementarities (Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005) would result in a curvilinear 
relation between technology relatedness within the portfolio and growth value of the 
portfolio.  The more an option is similar to the others, the more sub-additivity in the cost 
of buying this option; in addition, the cost of buying the option will grow as the portfolio 
diversifies.  On the other hand, similar option investments would have lower 
super-additive value because of duplication.  When the portfolio diversifies, the 
super-additive value will increase but at diminishing speeds because diversified 
knowledge will engender confusion that alleviates synergy effects.  Thus, if technology 
relatedness between the focal startup and the portfolio of other startups are too high or 
too low, CVC investment in such startups may reduce the option value of the whole 
portfolio. Investments in startups with a moderate level of technology relatedness will 
enhance the option value of the whole portfolio.    
GENERAL RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR THIS DISSERTATION 
Figure 3.1 presents the general research framework for this dissertation.  To fill 
the gaps identified in the previous literature review, this dissertation investigates the 
impact of the structural characteristics of CVC activities on strategic and financial 
consequences associated with such activities.  
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This dissertation consists of three independent empirical studies that examine 
specific consequences.  The first study focuses on technology diversification of the 
CVC portfolio as well as the associated growth value. The second study investigates 
issues related to both innovativeness in the corporate investors and performance of the 
portfolio companies.  The third study inspects the development process of the selection 
and evaluation capabilities in CVC activities, which are directly related to financial 
returns.   
In addition, these research questions will be examined through multi-theoretical 
lenses.  Specifically, organizational learning theory helps to investigate how to structure 
CVC activities so that a CVC program can effectively learn from its experiences, to 
acquire knowledge from external resources, to facilitate knowledge flow between its 
parent and its portfolio companies, and to build the appropriate portfolio configuration.  
Through agency theory, I will be able to identify agency behaviors associated with CVC 
practices that may hinder or facilitate technological knowledge flow between the 
corporate investors and their portfolio companies, and then generate different scenarios of 
interorganizational learning.  Third, the relation between technology diversification of a 
CVC portfolio and its growth value to its corporate investor will be studied from the 
perspective of real options theory.  
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Chapter Four: Study One 
The Value from CVC Portfolio Configuration: A Real Options Approach 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent research has documented that CVC investments could provide a corporate 
investor with the learning opportunities for new technologies, thereby stimulating 
technological innovation (e.g. Chesbrough, 2002; Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; 
Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005).  The literature, to date, has 
tended to focus on the independent impact of individual investment.  However, as 
Nelson (1961) pointed out, firms often consider a set of simultaneous and overlapping 
strategic investments, particularly when searching for new technologies.  Thus, CVC 
investments almost always involve multiple investments in a certain period of time; 
namely there simultaneously exists more than one entrepreneurial company in the 
portfolio.  It is quite possible that portfolio companies interact with each other, and that 
the portfolio companies as a whole may impact the corporate investor in a way different 
from their independent individual impacts.   
In this study, I examine the implications of multiple CVC investments using a real 
options approach.  As discussed in Chapter Three, CVC activities have been regarded as 
option investments (Maula, 2001; Li & Zou, 2005).  In particular, CVC investments 
provide the corporate investor with the right, but not the obligation, to make follow-on 
investments for new technologies.  In other words, CVC investments are creating 
growth value for the corporate investor on new technologies.  However, when a 
portfolio consists of multiple real options that interact with each other, their individual 
values may be sub-additive (McGrath, 1997; Trigeorgis, 1996; Vassolo, et al., 2004) or 
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super-additive (Vassolo, et al., 2004).  Thus, this research focuses on how the portfolio 
configuration in terms of technology diversification will influence growth value of the 
corporate investor.  In addition, I investigate the extent to which the structural 
characteristics of a CVC program influence its CVC managers’ investment decisions with 
regard to diversification.  
This study will contribute to the literature in two ways.  First, although numerous 
researchers have pointed out that multiple investments should not be evaluated in 
isolation because of their interactive effects (e.g. McGrath, 1997; Trigeorgis, 1996; 
Vassolo, et al., 2004), to date, only one study has investigated the interactive effects 
empirically (Vassolo, et al., 2004).  In their pioneering work, Vassolo and his colleagues 
examined how resource redundancy and fungibility within an portfolio could affect the 
timing or likelihood of exercise of a single option in this portfolio.  The current study 
will empirically investigate how portfolio diversification influences the value creation to 
the parent company.  In particular, I propose that sub-additivity in costs through 
resource sharing, and super-additivity in value because of complementarities (Tanriverdi 
& Venkatraman, 2005) would result in a curvilinear relation between diversification 
within the portfolio and growth value of its parent company.  
Second, this study considers the structural characteristics of a CVC program as the 
antecedents that influence diversification.  For example, when a CVC program is highly 
autonomous, its CVC managers may lack the vision to explore new technology domains, 
thereby increasing technology relatedness among the portfolio companies.  In contrast, 
syndication with independent VC firms may diversify the technology configuration of the 
portfolio in that such activities can bring more deal flows and broaden CVC managers’ 
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horizon.  In addition, syndication will allow CVC programs to invest in more companies 
with a certain amount of capital.  Thus, in line with the first two studies in my 
dissertation, this study will advance our knowledge with respect to the consequences of 
CVC programs’ structural characteristics.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Technology Diversification and Portfolio Growth Value   
As I discussed in Chapter Three, CVC investments can generate growth value for the 
corporate investor.  In particular, by initiating a CVC investment, the corporate investor 
may obtain subsequent opportunities for new technology development.  For example, 
the corporation could obtain the options to acquire a new venture for the new technology, 
or an exclusive licensing agreement with the venture, or R&D collaboration with the 
venture.  At the corporate level, such CVC investment also opens a window over new 
technologies and provides learning opportunities for future development (Li & Zou, 
2005).  Hereafter, in addition to the traditional NPV, the value of a CVC investment is 
also a function of growth option value and the costs of buying the growth options 
(Trigeorgis & Mason, 1987).  In the example of two CVC investments, a and b, by the 
same corporation, the value of each investment can be characterized as: 
aaaa IOVNPVV −+=  
bbbb IOVNPVV −+=  
where NPV refers to the traditional NPV, OV refers to growth benefits a option would 
generate for its investor, and I refers to option costs.   So the difference of (OV-I) can 
be viewed as net growth value that the option creates for the option holder.  If we 
assume that these two CVC investments will generate growth options that are 
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independent from each other, then net growth value (GV) of the portfolio with the two 
investments can be simply added together:   
 bbaaba IOVIOVGVGV −+−== +  
However, it is believed that firms typically consider a collection of strategic 
investments simultaneously and that these investments are frequently correlated with one 
another, particularly in search for new technologies (Madhok, 1997; Nelson, 1961).  In 
the case of CVC investments, CVC programs may be likely to invest in entrepreneurial 
companies with competing technologies, so that they could obtain switching options 
(Miller, 2002).  The value of such switching option may become salient when corporate 
investors explore in technological domains distant from their core capabilities because it 
is difficult for them to foresee the outcomes.  They also might invest in new ventures 
with complementary technologies to increase the odds of maximizing the strategic 
benefits.  Thus, CVC portfolios demonstrate different levels of diversification in terms 
of technology relatedness between their portfolio companies.  In the presence of 
technology diversification, the value of the option portfolio will not simply be the sum of 
the CVC investment standalone values, but also influenced by the interactive effects of 
the underlying technologies (Johnson, 1987; Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998; Stulz, 1982; 
Trigeorgis, 1993; Vassolo, et al., 2004).  These changes that affect the additivity of 
multiple options value are termed as “the portfolio effects” by Vassolo et al. (2004), and 
the simplified equation of combined growth values becomes: 
 abbbaaba PEIOVIOVGVGV +−+−== +  
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where PE denotes “the portfolio effects” and could be positive or negative1.  
Financial studies show that the portfolio effect associated with multiple options 
analysis can be complex (Johnson, 1987; Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998; Stulz, 1982; 
Trigeorgis, 1993).  However, the size as well as sign of the portfolio effects is 
determined by the interactive effects on both option value and option cost, which can be 
expressed as: 
)()( ababab vcPE ρρ +=  
where )( abc ρ refers to the interactive effect on option cost, and )( abv ρ refers to the 
interactive effect on growth benefit. 
Option cost additivity.  The portfolio may be sub-additive with regard to the option 
costs due to technology relatedness between its portfolio companies.  It is widely 
recognized that synergies can arise from resource relatedness across business units (e.g. 
Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Goold & Luchs, 1993; Robins & Wiersema, 1995; 
Silverman, 1999; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005; Teece, 1982).  Researchers in the 
diversification literature posit that the sharing of common strategic resources among 
business units help to achieve economies of scale and scope; that is, the joint production 
costs will be less than the sum of the standalone production costs (e.g., Amit & Livnat, 
1988; Palish, Cardinal & Miller, 2000; Rumelt, 1974; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988).  
Similarly, when CVC programs invest in entrepreneurial companies with similar 
technologies, they can share resources across investments.  For example, knowledge 
accumulated from one investment is redeployable and fungible among other CVC 
                                                 
1 Vassolo et al. (2004) argued that resource redundancy within the portfolio could leads to the negative interactive 
effects on the value, while fungible inputs within the portfolio could create positive interactive effects.  
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projects with similar technologies, thereby reducing the cost of related options.  On the 
other hand, the sub-additivity pertaining to option costs may diminish rapidly when 
technologies are diversified.  In addition to the lack of fungible resources across 
portfolio companies, CVC managers may be overwhelmed by the simultaneous 
commitment to a variety of portfolio companies with unrelated technology.  This gives 
rise to accelerating diminishment in cost saving and even a shift to super-additive option 
costs.  So, as shown in the figure below, we would expect that technology relatedness 
among portfolio companies is positively associated with sub-additivity in the option costs; 
that is, the more related the technologies underlying each growth options, the less the 
option costs for the portfolio as a whole.   
Growth benefit additivity.  On the other hand, CVC investments associated with 
similar technologies would influence the portfolio growth benefit negatively.  First, 
investing in similar technologies duplicates growth option investments, and the portfolio 
is at least partially overlapped.  Investment duplication may result in fewer growth 
opportunities with the same amount of inputs compared to independent investments, and 
thus generate diminishing returns.  Second, the exercise of one option will erode the 
value of the remaining correlated options, and thus there is a deceasing marginal return to 
holding correlated options.  
When the portfolio diversifies in terms of technologies undertaken in the portfolio 
companies, the value of the growth options becomes super-additive.  First, diversified 
investments may yield rich growth opportunities that may be complementary to each 
other.  The economics literature suggests that complementary resources lead to the 
super-additive value synergies (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). Here, complementary 
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resources are not identical, but supportive of one another (Tanriverdi & Vendatraman, 
2005).  The returns obtained from the joint adoption of complementary resources are 
greater than the sum of returns obtained from the adoption of individual resources in 
isolation (Milgrom & Robert, 1995).    
Second, diverse CVC experience presents different growth problems that CVC 
managers attend to, and may improve CVC managers’ skills in selecting, evaluating and 
nurturing various portfolio companies better than plain experience.  The learning 
literature has reported that students are more skilled at a subject after they have tackled a 
diverse range of problems associated with that subject (Calfee & Chambliss, 1987).  In 
strategic management, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) also reported that research and 
development groups with diverse prior experience develop greater capacity to identify, 
assimilate and apply new research and development opportunities.  The merit of diverse 
experience has been also found in the case of acquisitions (Hayward, 2002).  Hence, 
technological diversification in the portfolio may better prepare CVC managers to 
identify and materialize the growth opportunities associated with new technologies. 
Third, technological diversification is a result of the corporate investors’ exploration 
behaviors.  Due to learning myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993), organizations tend to 
exploit existing technologies and capabilities, rather than explore new ones.  The local 
search tendency may cause the portfolio centered on a couple of technological domains 
that mature, or familiar to the corporate investors, or close to their core capabilities.  All 
this may inhibit growth opportunities.  As Ahuja and Lampert (2001) argue, the 
familiarity trap, the maturity trap, and the propinquity trap hinder breakthrough 
inventions.  Investing in companies with diverse technologies can broaden the horizon 
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and provide opportunities to tackle novel, emerging, and pioneering technologies.  
Experience with these novel, emerging, and pioneering technologies help corporate 
investors overcome traps and create more growth benefits (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). 
However, excessively diversified portfolios will challenge the cognitive capabilities 
and resources of CVC programs.  In excess, technology diversification may engender 
confusion and information overload that alleviate synergy effects.  Thus, the logic of 
diminishing returns should be applied to the super-additive benefits, and eventually may 
shift to sub-additive benefits.   
Thus, as shown in Figure 4.1, we would expect that technology diversification among 
portfolio companies is associated with super-additivity in the growth benefits in a 
curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) manner.  
In summary, the growth value a CVC investment portfolio creates for its corporate 
investor is a function of both option costs and growth benefits of the underlying option 
combination.  Portfolio configuration in terms of technology relatedness among 
portfolio companies may lead to sub-additivity in option costs and curvilinear changes in 
growth benefits.  Thus, I propose: 
H1: Technology diversification among portfolio companies is related to the growth 
value of their corporate investor in a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) way.  
CVC Program Structural Characteristics and Portfolio Configuration 
Based on the previous discussion, we can conclude that there exists an optimal level of 
technology diversification that could maximize the portfolio growth value to corporate 
investors.  Too low or too high levels of technology diversification would lead to 
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decreases in the portfolio growth value.  In this section, I will further investigate the 
antecedents of technology diversification in the CVC investment portfolio.   
Portfolio configuration such as technology diversification results from CVC 
managers’ decisions. However, because of bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958), 
CVC managers can’t always build their portfolio at the optimal level of diversification.  
For example, one shortcoming of managers’ cognitive abilities is the lack of 
foresightfulness (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Cognitive limits force managers to 
allocate attention between current and future consideration, and pressing current 
problems are the most salient motivators of organizational search, not future-oriented 
consideration (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Furthermore, such short-termism would 
make investing in familiar technologies preferable to unfamiliar ones since developing 
deeper expertise with familiar knowledge bases yield more immediate and likely returns 
(Ahuja & Lampert, 2005).   
Spatial myopia is another major shortcoming of managers’ cognitive abilities.  
Numerous studies have documented that established organizations have the propensity to 
search for solutions in the neighborhood of existing solutions (e.g., Ahuja & Lampert, 
2005; Helfat, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  The tendency to overlook distant places 
makes organizations unaware of other technologies within or outside organizational 
boundaries (Miller, 2002), and predisposes organizations towards falling into the 
propinquity trap (Ahuja & Lampert, 2005).   
Thus, due to managers’ cognitive limits, organizations tend to exploit existing 
technologies and capabilities, rather than explore new ones.  CVC managers’ temporal 
myopia as well as spatial myopia may cause the portfolio centered on a couple of 
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technological domains that are familiar to the corporate investors, or close to their 
existing technologies.  All this will lower the level of technology diversification of the 
CVC investment portfolio.   
There are at least two structural characteristics of CVC programs that can help to 
alleviate myopia effects: autonomy of CVC programs and investment syndication with 
VC firms (see Figure 6.2 for the proposed model).   
Autonomy. CVC programs exhibit a spectrum of autonomous levels.  At one 
extreme, a CVC program can function like an independent VC firm.  At the other 
extreme, a CVC program can be tightly controlled by the parent.  Many CVC programs 
are overseen at an arms length (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).   
With a low level of autonomy, CVC programs are typically fully internalized into the 
parent companies, and there is a regular exchange of personnel between the parent 
company and the CVC program.  Such closeness could bind CVC activities tightly with 
the parents’ strategic considerations; however, it could narrow the field of search and 
create a frame for the interpretation of new information based upon the parent’s existing 
business mode (Chesbrough, 2002).  Thus, CVC programs with low levels of autonomy 
are more likely to fall toward the familiarity trap and nearness trap, thereby decreasing 
the technology diversification of the portfolio.   
On the contrary, CVC programs with a high level of autonomy typically have no 
formal reporting relationship with the parent and don’t need the parents’ approval for 
investment decisions.  Thus, CVC managers have more managerial discretion over their 
decisions and have more room to try alternatives.  Without specific strategic goals 
pressed by the parents, CVC managers can be motivated to pursue variance performance 
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instead of mean performance, and the variance-seeking learning process is crucial to 
exploration behaviors (McGrath, 2001).  Thus, CVC programs with high levels of 
autonomy will have a more technology diversified portfolio because the current 
distinctive competence of the parent is less likely to constrain the CVC managers’ 
cognitive ability, thereby balancing exploiting as well as exploring activities.   
All this analysis leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Autonomous level of a CVC program is positively related to the technology 
diversification of its investment portfolio.  
Investment syndication.  An investment syndication with independent venture 
capitals is another mechanism that could reduce the spatial myopia of learning and 
increase technology diversification of the portfolio.    
Syndicates are a form of inter-firm alliance in which two or more venture capital 
firms co-invest in a portfolio company and share a joint pay-off (Wright & Lockett, 
2003).  The literature has recognized several reasons underlying syndication activities in 
the venture capital industry, such as risk-sharing (Lockett & Wright, 2001), knowledge 
sharing (Lerner, 1994), reciprocal deal flows (Lockett & Wright, 2001), and larger capital 
pool (Lerner, 1994).  Likewise, syndication provides CVC programs the access to VC 
firms’ knowledge base as well as the access to potential deal flow, both of which will 
broaden CVC managers’ horizons and alleviate their learning myopia.  
First, as discussed in previous chapters, entrepreneurial companies are viewed as a 
particularly important source of highly innovative ideas (Kortum & Lerner, 2000; 
Zingales, 2000).  Thus, networks in the venture capital industry facilitate not only 
money flow, but also knowledge flow.  By syndicating with prestigious VC firms, CVC 
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programs could obtain central positions in the network and then be exposed to dense 
knowledge flows.  Such exposure will increase CVC managers’ awareness of distant 
new technologies, and lessen their spatial myopia.   Maula et al. (2003) found that 
syndication in CVC investments helps corporate investors recognize technology 
discontinuity.   
Second, syndication with VC firms can also increase CVC programs’ deal flows.  
Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a) have argued that business plans allow corporate investors 
to learn about entrepreneurial ideas and new technologies even prior to committing 
capital.  Thus, the more deal flow, the more new technological ideas may flow into the 
corporation.  In addition, the reciprocation of syndicated deals may force CVC programs 
to invest in entrepreneurial companies that don’t fit their strategic objectives, and compel 
them to explore new technology domains.   
Based on the above rationale, I propose: 
H3: Investment syndication is positively related to the technology diversification of a 
CVC investment portfolio  
METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
 A research design is a systematic plan or strategy that guides the investigators to 
validly, ethically, and reliably address the research questions.  According to McGrath 
(1982)’s typology of research strategy, there are at least eight research strategies for 
researchers in management: formal theory/literature reviews, sample survey, laboratory 
experiment, experimental simulation, field study (primary data), field study (secondary 
data), field experiment, judgment task, and computer simulation.  These designs vary in 
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their degree of generalizability, precision in measurement, control of the behavioral 
variable, and the realism of context (Scandura & Williams, 2000).  Basically these 
research strategies can be divided into two major categories: experimental designs and 
correlational designs.  Furthermore, research designs can also be classified into 
cross-sectional designs versus longitudinal designs in accordance with the timing of data 
collection.   
 The present study utilized a longitudinal, correlational design.  Longitudinal 
research involves the collection of information from any given sample of population at 
multiple points in a time series (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991).  The strength of a 
longitudinal research design is the researcher’s ability to address developmental issues as 
well as offer causal interpretation (Judd, et al., 1991).  Correlational designs examine 
relationships between variables without any manipulation of the independent variables, 
which distinguishes them from experimental designs.  Compared to experiments, 
correlational research designs allow researchers to examine independent variables that are 
not easily manipulated, to utilize multivariate research models, and to increase external 
validity (Kerling, 1986).   
 Consequently, the longitudinal, correlational research design of the present study 
resulted in an unbalanced panel data set derived from archival records.  A panel data set 
follows a given sample of individuals over time, and thus provides multiple observations 
on each individual in the sample (Hsiao, 2003).  Panel data have been widely used in 
economics and finance research.  They possess several advantages over cross-sectional 
or time-series data (e.g., Hsiao, 2003).  First, panel data usually provide researchers with 
a large number of data points, thereby improving the robustness of econometric estimates 
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(Hsiao, 2003).  Second, panel data allow the researcher to construct and test more 
complicated behavioral models that can hardly be analyzed using cross-sectional or 
time-series data sets.   
 Because most panel data are obtained from field studies rather than experiments (e.g., 
the data sets in this research), they are subject to certain limitations.  First, this kind of 
panel data may suffer from heterogeneity bias.  That is, the unobserved individual or 
time-specific effects that exist among cross-sectional or time-series units can lead to 
parameter heterogeneity in the model specification (Hsiao, 2003).  In the study, the year 
of investment, industry, and the characteristics of corporate investors and portfolio 
companies as for size, development stage, and age were used to control these biases.  In 
addition, selectivity bias is another frequently observed problem; namely, the sample may 
not be randomly drawn from the population (Hsiao, 2003).  Thus, it is necessary to 
consider selectivity and heterogeneity biases in the panel data, so that one can have 
confidence in the results.   
 Despite these limitations, the present study used a longitudinal, correlational design 
for the following reasons: first, there exists a time lag between independent variables and 
dependent variables (e.g. performance).  Thus, it is necessary to employ a longitudinal 
design rather than cross-sectional design to investigate the causal relationships among the 
study variables.  Moreover, the examination of these relationships requires the use of 
advanced multivariate statistical techniques.  Panel data provide a larger number of 
observations, thereby enhancing the degrees of freedom and reducing the collinearity 
among explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2003).  Finally, most of the panel data were 
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available in reliable archival databases, which provide time and cost efficiencies in terms 
of data collection and analysis. 
Data Collection 
Data Sources.  Multiple archival sources were used, including the VentureXpert 
database, Computstat (North American), SDC M&A database, LexisNexis, and the patent 
database from the United State Patent and Trademark Office.  
The major archival source used in the study was the VentureXpert database1.  This 
database is offered by Venture Economics, a leading source of global private equity 
intelligence and a division of Thomson Financial.  The data were collected through 
industry associations, such as European Venture Capital Association, the National 
Venture Capital Association, and other key associations in Asia and Australia, and the 
investment banking community (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a). VentureXpert provides 
comprehensive information on venture funds, venture capital firms, private executives, 
portfolio companies, and limited partners, as well as an analytic source of fund 
commitments, disbursements, statistics and performance.  Due to its richness and 
reliability, VentureXpert has been extensively used in venture capital research (e.g. 
Dushnitsky, 2004; Dushnitsky & Lerner, 2005a, 2005b; Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Maula, 
2001; Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2003).  Currently, it contains the official database for the 
National Venture Capital Association.   
From VentureXpert, the data related to the structural and managerial characteristics 
(i.e., lifespan, stability, and syndication activity) of CVC programs, post valuation 
associated with each investment, and the status of portfolio companies within five years 
                                                 
1 VentureOne is another prestigious venture capital database.  Compared to VentureXpert, VentureOne 
provides more accurate information but on a shorter period of time.  However, VentureOne is only 
accessible to its strategic partners and investors, and has not been open widely to academic research. 
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after the investments (e.g. IPO, dissolved) were collected.  Some control information 
was also collected from VentureXpert, including investment stage, the annual amount of 
CVC investments of each corporate investor, portfolio company’s industry, etc.  
Compustat (North American) is provided by Standard & Poor’s, a McGraw-Hill 
company.  It contains data for U.S. and Canadian corporations, banks, S&L's, 
ADR's/ADS's, business segments, geographic areas, industry composites and indexes. 
Also included is coverage of annual and quarterly Income Statement, Balance Sheet, 
Cash Flow and supplemental data items for publicly held companies.  The Compustat 
database has been extensively used as the major resource of financial information for 
public companies in economics, finance, and strategic management.  Likewise, financial 
information about corporate investors in the present study was collected from this 
database.  Most of the data were used as controls.  
SDC Merger & Acquisition database contains worldwide mergers, acquisitions, and 
alliances information in SDC Platinum, a database package provided by Thomas Finance.  
Its information is gathered from publicly available sources, including trade publications, 
news and wire sources, and SEC filings.  This database has been commonly used in the 
acquisition literature (e.g., Carow, Heron, & Saxton, 2004), and the alliance literature 
(e.g., Anand & Khanna, 2000).  
With respect to merger and acquisition information, it includes over 116,100 US 
acquisition transactions since 1979, and over 147,000 international acquisition 
transactions since 1985.  Among the data items included are target and acquirer profiles, 
deal terms, financial and legal advisor assignments and fees, deal value and stock 
premiums, synopsis and event history, deal status, financial information on target and 
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acquirer, investor group information, purchase and pooling accounting, etc.  This line of 
information was used to identify whether portfolio companies were acquired by their 
corporate investors, and whether they were favorably acquired by other companies within 
five years after receiving the CVC investments.  
Regarding alliances information, this database contains over 53,000 transactions since 
1988, including joint ventures, R&D agreements, marketing agreements, manufacturing 
agreements, supply agreements, and licensing and distribution pacts.  Over 200 data 
elements are included: participant profile, joint venture name, terms and conditions, 
current status, capitalization where disclosed, purpose of alliance, deal synopsis, and 
description of business and products.  Prior studies using this source have found the 
information on industry and type of alliance agreement to be reliable (Anand & Khanna, 
2000).  This line of information was used to identify whether any strategic alliance was 
formed between a corporate investor and its portfolio company within five years after the 
CVC investment, as well as the type of the alliance. 
LexisNexis is an online database published by Reed Elsevier plc. LEXIS publishing is 
for the legal profession and the NEXIS unit serves the business, government and 
academic markets.  LexisNexis is a popular searchable archive of content from 
newspapers, magazines, legal documents and other printed sources in academic research 
(e.g. Park, 2004; Reuer, 2001).  The present study used this database to search news 
announcements related to companies of interests.  These announcements were used to 
testify the accuracy of the VentureXpert data and the SDC Merger & Acquisition data.   
Population and sample.  The unit of analysis for the first study was individual CVC 
program.  Thus, the population included all of CVC programs in the United State since 
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1969.  VentureXpert database is primarily used to construct the population.  This 
database has been extensively used in earlier research on independent VC and CVC 
activities (e.g., Dushnitsky, 2004; Dushnitsky & Lerner, 2005a, 2005b; Gompers & 
Lerner, 2004; Maula, 2001; Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2003), and has been recognized as the 
leading source of U.S. venture capital investment data (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; NVCA, 
2001).  It contains comprehensive information over 150,000 private equity investments 
from 1969 to present (Maula, 2001). 
 In line with the CVC definition described in Chapter 2, I first searched all CVC 
investments using the following VentureXpert categories: Non-Financial Corporation 
Affiliate or Subsidiary, Non-Financial Corporation Affiliate or Subsidiary Partnership, 
Venture/Private Equity Subsidiary of Non-Financial Corporation, Venture/Private Equity 
Subsidiary of Other Companies, Venture/Private Equity Subsidiary of Service Providers, 
Direct Investor/Non-Financial Corporation, and Direct Investor/Service Provider.  These 
categories have been used in prior CVC studies (e.g. Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 2005b).  
This resulted in over 9,000 CVC investment observations from 1990 to 2004, from which 
I identified the base sample of U.S. public firms that had CVC investments during this 
period.   
The resulting unbalanced panel dataset included 222 firms and 1,666 firm-year 
observations.  For these 222 firms, there were a total of 3,127 portfolio companies under 
management from 1990 to 2004.  Ranging from 1 to 435, the average portfolio size was 
29.  Because this study is interested in technology diversification among portfolio 
companies, observations with only one portfolio company were omitted.  As a result, 
there were 1,233 firm-year observations left covering 189 public firms.  Six 
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hundred-twenty six out of 3,127 portfolio companies were identified with patent 
applications according to the U.S. Patent Office Database, and were able to be assigned 
to technology domains using the U.S. patent classification.  After observations with 
missing patent data necessary to construct the technological diversification measure had 
been deleted, the sample consisted of 355 firm-year observations covering 63 firms.    
To examine whether the final sample was biased, I compared the major accounting 
indicators between the samples with and without the data of technology diversification.  
The t-tests suggested that the corporate investors in the sample with technology 
diversification were significantly larger than those in the sample without technology 
diversification relevant to assets and employees, spent more in R&D and advertising, and 
had more capital expenditure, but experienced slower sale growth rates per year.  The 
results are presented in Table 4.1.   
Measures 
The present study was to examine the impact of autonomy and syndication activities 
of a CVC program on its portfolio configuration and its parent company’s growth value.  
The variables were operationalized by measures that were either newly developed for the 
study, or adopted from the literature.  This section describes how each variable is 
measured as well as the rationale behind each measure.  Measures of major variables are 
presented in Table 4.2. 
Dependent Variables 
Technological diversification.  To measure the technology diversification of a CVC 
investment portfolio, the dyadic measures of technological overlaps between any pair of 
the portfolio companies were calculated first.  Technological overlap of portfolio 
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company β on portfolio company α was measured as the ratio of common technological 
domains among them divided by the geometric mean of the numbers of total 
technological domains of portfolio company α and portfolio company β (Podolny, Stuart, 
& Hannan, 1996; Vassolo, et al., 2004).  The technological domains were identified 
according to the US Patent Classification1.  For example, a portfolio company has a 
vector of technological patents for every year y, with tiy = {t0, . . . , tN}, tj being the 
technological domain j and N the total number of possible technological domains. If the 
portfolio company has patents in the technological domain j , tj = 1 (tj = 0 otherwise), the 
technological relatedness between α and β for year y is equal to:  
Technology Relatednessαβ = ∑∑ ×
×′
j
yj
i
yi
yy
tt
tt
βα
βα  
This formula gives each company-pair an index between zero and one, representing 
the similarity of the companies’ patent portfolios.  In this index, a value of zero 
corresponds to no overlap between patent classes and one corresponds to perfect overlap 
in patent classes in which the focal firm was granted patents.   
 The technological diversification of a CVC investment portfolio was calculated by 
one minus the mean score of the technology relatedness between any pair of companies 
in the portfolio.  Thus, the higher the score, the more diverse the portfolio.   
The Corporate investor’s growth value.  Consistent with the literature, Tobin’s q to 
was used to construct the measure of growth value (Morck & Yeung, 1991).  Tobin’s q 
is a firm’s market valuation over the replacement costs of its tangible assets. Because 
                                                 
1 Some patent categories covering very similar technological domains were combined together according 
to Bronwyn et al., 2000.   
  89 
 
Tobin’s q incorporates growth values of equity, it explicitly includes not only investor 
valuations of current operations but also investor expectations for future growth.   
 In the present study, Tobin’s q was calculated following the procedure in Lang and 
Stulz (1994).  The firm’s market value was computed as the sum of the year-end market 
value of common stock, and the book value of preferred stock and debt.  The 
replacement cost of the firm’s tangible assets was the sum of the replacement values of 
inventories and property, plant and equipment, and the book value of all other assets. The 
value of inventories was calculated by adjusting book values for inflation when the 
inventory valuation method used by the firm is LIFO.  Each year, the replacement value 
from the previous year was reduced by 5 percent assumed depreciation, adjusted to the 
new price level according to the GDP deflator for private non-residential fixed assets, and 
added to the change in book value during that year.   
Independent Variables 
 Autonomy.  In the present study, two levels of autonomy existed among different 
CVC programs: an internal program, and a wholly-owned subsidiary.  Consequently, 
one dummy variable was used to capture the autonomous level.  If the investment was 
undertaken by a wholly-owned subsidiary, the value of one was assigned to the dummy 
variable; otherwise the value of zero was assigned.  The structure categories were 
obtained from VentureXpert.   Syndication activities.  In the present study, the 
frequency of syndication activities was measured objectively; that is, the percentage of 
syndicated investments to total investments before the focal one.  For example, if 
portfolio company A had syndicated 40 out of 200 CVC investments before the focal 
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year of 2000, syndication ratio for company A for the year of 2000 is 0.2.  If there was 
no investment prior to the focal one, the value of zero was assigned.   
Control Variables.  
In the present study, I controlled corporate investors’ capital expenditure, leverage 
ratio, sale growth, R&D expenditure and industry’s average q due to their impacts on 
Tobin’s q (growth value) in line with the literature (Li & Zou, 2005).  
Data Analysis 
This section elaborates on the data analysis techniques that were utilized to validate 
the measures and test the hypotheses.  SPSS and STATA statistical packages were used 
for conducting most of the data analyses.  
Reliability.  Reliability refers to the extent to which the results of a measurement can 
be replicated (Litwin, 1995).  The present study relied primarily on archival data 
collected from the VentureXpert Database.  The reliability of the archival data was 
examined through various complementary sources such as the other archival databases, 
such as the Corporate Venturing Yearbook 2000-2002, LexusNexus and Hoover’s.   
Validity.  Validity refers to the extent to which a measurement instrument does what 
it is intended to do (Nummally, 1978).  Basically, there are three kinds of validity of the 
constructs: face validity, content validity, and construct validity.  First, to enhance face 
validity and content validity, the constructs and measurements were developed based on 
previous research as much as possible.  In order to examine construct validity, for most 
of the variable, two or more measures per variable were employed.  In addition, 
correlation matrices were examined to determine whether the measures for the same 
variable are correlated and the measures for different variables are not correlated.   
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 Missing data analysis.  There are several solutions to missing data: (1) listwise 
deletion, (2) pairwise data deletion; (3) substitution of the variable’s mean for the missing 
data points on that variable.  As Roth (1994) suggested, the present study considered 
listwise deletion method if the proportion of cases with missing data is five percent or 
lower; otherwise a pairwise deletion method was considered.   
 Regression analysis. The present study primarily used multivariate regressions as the 
statistical analysis technique.   
Multivariate curvilinear regression model 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the technology diversification among portfolio companies 
is related to the growth value of their corporate investor in a curvilinear (inverted 
U-shaped) way.  To test the proposed relation, I specified a multivariate curvilinear 
regression model: 
errorscontrolsTECHPORTTECHPORTVALUEGROWTH ++++= 2210 ___ ααα  
   To support H1, I expected the coefficient for technology diversification 
(PORT_TECH) to be positive and the coefficient for the squared item to be negative and 
significant. 
Multivariate linear regression model 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predicted linear positive relations between autonomy and 
syndication activities of a CVC program, and the technological diversification of its CVC 
portfolio.  To test H2 and H3, I specified the following multivariate linear regression 
model:  
errorscontrolsSYNAUTONOMYTECHPORT ++++= 210_ ααα  
where PORT_TECH denotes the technology diversification among portfolio companies. 
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To support H2 and H3, I expected the coefficients for the autonomy level of a CVC 
program (AUTONOMY), and syndication activities with VC firms (SYN) to be positive 
and significant.   
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix  
 Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.  The average CVC portfolio 
size was 16 and ranged from 2 to 159.  The average technology diversification of a 
portfolio was 0.836, which indicates that most of the CVC portfolios were 
technologically diversified.  With regard to the two characteristics of CVC programs, 
approximately 81% of the CVC programs were wholly-owned subsidiaries, and the 
average firm syndicated 83.51% of CVC investments.  The average age of a CVC 
program was 10.48 years.  With respect to corporate investors, total assets averaged 
$34.2 billion and ranged from $479.6 billion to $35.8 million; leverage ratio (Long-term 
debt to equity) averaged 0.66; capital expenditure averaged $2.1billion; and R&D 
expenditure averaged $1.34 billion.  An average corporate investor had 12% sale growth 
per year.    
 The correlation matrix (Table 4.4) indicates that the technology diversification is 
negatively related to Tobin’s q.  In addition, CVC programs’ autonomy and syndication 
activity are also negatively related to Tobin’s q.  Neither CVC autonomy nor 
syndication activity is significantly correlated with the technology diversification.  
Furthermore, the significant correlations among the control variables (e.g., the log of 
assets, capital expenditure, and R&D expenditure) indicated that multicollinearity 
problems may exist.  To investigate potential multicollinearity problems, I examined 
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variance inflation factors (VIFs).  The maximum VIF obtained from the linear 
regressions was 3.17, which is substantially below the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10 for 
multiple regression models (Netel, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). 
Regression Results for Hypothesis One 
I used generalized panel-data linear regression models to examine the relationships 
between a corporate investor’ growth value (measured by Tobin’s q) and it CVC 
portfolio configuration in terms of the technology diversification among portfolio 
companies.  Due to other missing data in Compustat, 126 firm-year observations were 
usable.  In addition to the regressions using this year’s data, I also used last year’s data 
of independent variables and controls to test the possible lagged effects.  The results are 
reported in Table 4.5.   
Models 1 and 4 are baseline models in which the analysis was restricted to the effects 
of the control variables.  Models 2 and 5 argument the baseline models by including the 
direct effects of the technology diversification.  Models 3 and 6 include the squared 
term of the technology diversification to test the curvilinear relation.  Overall, in the 
models (1, 2, and 3) using this year’s data, p values (p<0.001) are lower than those in the 
models (4, 5, and 6) using last year’s data (p<0.05).  It shows that there are few lagged 
effects of the technology diversification as well as of the control variables on the 
corporate investor’s growth value.   
 The results for the control variables reveal that sales growth is significantly and 
positively related to Tobin’s q in the current year (p<0.001) but not significantly related 
to the next year’s Tobin’s q.  All other controls associated with the corporate investor 
such as firm size, leverage, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, CVC program age, 
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and CVC portfolio size were not significant in all of the six models.  The results also 
demonstrate that the linear effect of technology diversification is significant and negative 
on the current year’s Tobin’s q, but not significant on the next year’s Tobin’s q.   
Hypothesis 1 predicted that a corporate investor’s growth value (measured by Tobin’s 
q) is related to the technology diversification among its portfolio companies in an 
inverted-U shape.  Thus, a positive regression coefficient for technology diversification 
and a negative regression coefficient for the square item are essential to support this 
hypothesis.  However, although both items were strongly significant (p<0.01, p<0.001), 
the signs were opposite to what were expected.  This suggests that the relationship 
between technology diversification and Tobin’s q is a U shape rather than an inverted one.  
Because the linear effect of technology diversification was also significant, the 
interaction plot of Tobin’s q versus technology diversification based on standardized data 
was drawn which further confirmed the U-shape relationship (Figure 4.3).    
It is possible that there exists a reversed causal relationship between technology 
diversification and Tobin’s q.  According to James Tobin’s q theory (1969), high 
Tobin's q values encourage companies to invest more in capital because they are "worth" 
more than the price paid for them.  Thus, high Tobin’s q values may encourage more 
CVC investments.  To rule out this possibility, I performed several regression models 
using last year’s Tobin’s q as the independent variable and this year’s technology 
diversification as the dependent variable; however, no significant results were found.  
Post hoc analysis for Hypothesis 1.  The measure of technology diversification 
based on patent classifications is problematic in this study since most of the portfolio 
companies had no patenting activities.  This measure dramatically shrank my sample 
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size.  Thus, I constructed industry diversification among portfolio companies as an 
alternative to examine the relationship between the corporate investor’s growth value and 
its portfolio configuration.  The relationship between a firm’s industry diversification 
and its performance has been extensively examined in the literature of strategic 
management (e.g., Amit & Livnat, 1988; Rumelt, 1974; Palish, Cardinal & Miller, 2000; 
Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). It was believed that related diversification is more 
likely to lead to better performance than unrelated diversification or single business.  
Although firms in the same industry are likely to deal with similar technologies, industry 
diversification and technology diversification are two different concepts.  It is common 
that firms within one industry need to develop technologies in various domains.  On the 
other hand, technologies may also be applied in various industries.  For example, 
biotechnology can be used in both pharmaceutical industry and agriculture.  In the study, 
the correlation between industry diversification and technology diversification is 0.4.   
Industry diversification was measured based on the Venture Economics Industry 
Classification (VEIC).  VEIC was originally developed by Thomson Financial 
Institution to track venture capital-backed companies, and later this classification was 
also applied to Thomson Financial Institution’s other databases such as Merger & 
Acquisition.  Similar to SIC codes, VEIC is a hierarchical classification.  But VEIC 
focuses on high-tech industries and classifies industries into narrower ranges.   
According to VEIC, VentureXpert database provides the industry descriptions for each 
portfolio company at six levels: industry (3 categories), industry major group (6), 
industry minor group (9), industry sub1 (17), industry sub2 (59), and industry sub3 (590)1.   
For example, Calient Networks, Inc., a portfolio company under Juniper Networks, was 
                                                 
1 The categories for each level are listed in the Appendix A. 
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assigned to information technology (level 1) -> communications and media (level 2) -> 
communications and media (level 3) -> communications (level 4) -> data 
communications (level 5) -> switches/hubs/routers/gatewarys/ATM (level 6).  Because 
the difference between the categories of industry major group and industry minor group 
is not very significant, I omitted the level of industry minor group, and thus there were 5 
levels of industry classifications in the present study based on VEIC.  
 To calculate the industry diversification of a CVC portfolio, I first computed the 
industry relatedness between any pair of portfolio companies active in the portfolio for 
the focal year.  If the two companies were in the same industry at the 5th level, a score of 
5 was assigned; if they were in the same industry at the 4th level but in different industries 
at the 5th level, a score of 4 was assigned, and so forth.  If the two companies were in 
different industries at the 1st level, a zero was assigned.  The portfolio industry 
diversification was calculated by 6 minus the mean score of industry relatedness between 
any pair of companies in the portfolio. Thus, the higher the score, the more diversified the 
portfolio.  In the present study, the average industry diversification of a portfolio was 
4.09.    
 Table 4.6 reports the regression results using industry diversification on both the 
current year’s Tobin’s q and the next year’s Tobin’s q.  Similar to the regressions using 
technology diversification, sales growth was significantly and positively related to 
Tobin’s q in the current year (p<0.001).  All other controls associated with the corporate 
investors such as firm size, leverage, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, CVC 
program age, and CVC portfolio size were not significant.  In contrast to the regressions 
using technology diversification, the regression coefficients of industry diversification 
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and its squared term were not significant on the current year’s Tobin’s q, but were 
significant on the next year’s Tobin’s q (p<0.01, p<0.05).  The lagged effects were 
consistent for the 2-year lag and the 3-year lag.  In addition, the signs of these 
coefficients were the same as those of technology diversification; that is the coefficient 
for industry diversification was negative and the coefficient for the square item was 
positive.  Thus, the evidence still suggests that the relationship between industry 
diversification and Tobin’s q is U shaped rather than inverted.   
The interaction plot of Tobin’s q versus industry diversification was drawn to further 
confirm the U-shape relationship (see Figure 4.4).  It became apparent that two outliers 
existed in the dataset.  To test the robustness of the results, I ran the regressions again 
excluding these two outliers.  The results are shown in Table 4.7.  Without these two 
outliers, the U-shape relationship remained significant in the regression on the next year’s 
q as the linear effect of industry diversification became insignificant (both p<0.001).   
Results for Hypotheses Two and Three 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that the autonomy level of a CVC program is positively 
related to its portfolio’s technology diversification.  Hypothesis 3 proposed the similar 
positive relationship between the syndication activities a CVC program performed and its 
portfolio’s technology diversification.  To test these two hypotheses, I performed 
several panel data linear regressions by controlling the year and CVC program’s age.  
The findings are reported in Table 4.8. 
The coefficient of autonomy was not significant and thus Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported.  The coefficient of syndication activity was positive and significant at the 
level of 0.1, which was consistent with Hypothesis 3.  These findings suggest that 
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syndication activity is positively related to technology diversification among portfolio 
companies, while autonomy has no impact.  I also performed similar regressions using 
industry diversification.  The results are different from those using technology 
diversification.  The coefficient of autonomy was positive and significant (p<0.1), which 
suggests a trend that the autonomy level of a CVC program is positively related to the 
industry diversification among its portfolio companies.  However, the coefficient of 
syndication activity was not significant.   
DISCUSSION 
This section first evaluates the findings of study one in detail.  Next, a discussion of 
the contributions of the research is provided.  The limitations of the study, as well as 
future research directions are then addressed.  
Discussion of Findings 
CVC activities have been regarded as a manifestation of corporate entrepreneurship that 
provides corporate investors with learning opportunities for new technologies and 
stimulate technological innovation within existing business units (e.g. Chesbrough, 2002; 
Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; Schildt et al., 2005).  Thus, CVC investments can create 
growth value for corporate investors and thus have been viewed as option investments 
(Maula, 2001; Li & Zou, 2005).  Considering that CVC portfolio typically involve 
multiple investments simultaneously, the current study examined the impacts of CVC 
portfolio as a whole rather than the individual effects through the theoretical lens of real 
options theory.  The study further investigated how the structural characteristics of a 
CVC programs – autonomy and syndication activity – influenced the portfolio 
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configuration.  Table 4.9 presents an overall summary of the study’s results, which are 
discussed in detail below. 
 Contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 1, the results show that technology 
diversification among portfolio companies is related to the growth value of their 
corporate investor in a U-shaped relationship rather than an inverted U-shaped one.  
That is, a CVC portfolio in which portfolio companies developing new technologies in 
similar technological domains or in diversified technological domains may generate high 
growth value for its corporate investor, while a CVC portfolio with the moderate level of 
technology diversification among its portfolio companies leads to low growth value.  
When technology diversification was replaced by industry diversification, the U-shaped 
relationship remained significant.  The findings are surprising as the diversification 
literature has suggested that firms with related diversification may perform better than 
those with non-related diversification or operating in a single business.  Why the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between diversification and firm performance couldn’t 
hold in the context of CVC needs further investigation in the future research.  
 As expected, the syndication of a CVC program was significantly related to 
technology diversification, while the autonomy of a CVC program was significantly 
related to industry diversification.  The findings provide support for the idea that the 
structural characteristics of a CVC program helps to broaden the learning of CVC 
managers.  Interestingly, the two characteristics have different impacts.  Syndication 
activity provides CVC managers with a frontier to make networks in the venture capital 
industry, which may lead to more potential deal flows as well as more ideas of new 
technologies.  Thus, syndication activity helps increase technology diversification.  On 
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the other hand, CVC programs with a high level of autonomy have more managerial 
discretion, and the existing business units have less influence on them.  Thus, they may 
be more likely to explore the new industries, and increase industry diversification of their 
investment portfolio. 
Contributions of the Study 
The study contributed to the literature in several ways.  First, this study furthers our 
understanding of the interactive effects of multiple real options.  A number of 
researchers have pointed out that multiple growth options should not be evaluated in 
isolation (e.g. McGrath, 1997; Trigeorgis, 1996; Vassolo, et al., 2004).  From the 
perspective of the Resource Based View (e.g., Barney, 1991), one study has recently 
investigated the interactive effects on option exercising (Vassolo, et al., 2004).  The 
current study extended this line of research by investigating the impacts of portfolio 
diversification on the value creation to the corporate investor.  Evidence is suggesting a 
curvilinear relation portfolio diversification and growth value of its corporate investor.  
This finding implies that the existence of interaction among portfolio companies and that 
the portfolio companies as a whole affect the corporate investor in a way different from 
the sum of their independent individual impacts.  
Second, this study also linked the structural characteristics of a CVC program to the 
portfolio configuration. Both autonomy and syndication activity were found to be related 
to either technology diversification or industry diversification among portfolio companies.  
These findings advance our knowledge with respect to the consequences of CVC 
programs’ structural characteristics.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
As with all research, this study has several methodological limitations.  First, the 
measure of technology diversification based on patent technology classification is 
problematic because 75% of the portfolio companies never applied for a patent.  The 
missing data may cause the inaccuracy in computing technology diversification because 
not every portfolio company can be assigned to technological domains in many CVC 
portfolios.  Although industry diversification was used as an alternative, industry 
diversification is quite different from technology diversification. The correlation between 
the two variables was 0.40.  Thus, new criteria should be employed to identify the 
technology domains for each portfolio company in future research. 
Second, the current study used a dummy variable to measure the autonomy level of a 
CVC program.  This measure may be too rough to capture sufficient information related 
to the different dimensions of autonomy such as the financial recourses, decision making 
process, and human resource management.  Future studies should employ finer-grained 
measures.   
Third, the current study focused only on the technology relatedness between 
portfolio companies, and did not focus on the technology relatedness between corporate 
investors and portfolio companies.  These two kinds of technology relatedness may 
influence the corporate investor’s growth value in an interactive way, and need to be 
investigated together   
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Chapter Five: Study Two 
Bilateral Interorganziational Learning in CVC activities: 
The Perspective of Agency Theory 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Learning new knowledge has been regarded as one of the most important objectives 
of corporate venturing (e.g. Keil, 2000; McNally, 1997; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005).  
As one mode of corporate venturing, CVC activities provide vehicles to not only exploit 
extant knowledge but also explore new development (e.g. Dushnitsky, 2004; Schildt et al., 
2005).  In particular, CVC investments enable firms to monitor the development of 
markets and technologies (Keil, 2002; McNally, 1997), to assimilate technologies 
previously used by the portfolio companies (Dushnitsky, 2004), and more generally to 
become more innovative (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 
2005b). 
A number of studies have empirically analyzed the learning implications focusing on 
the relation between CVC investments and parent performance (Chesbrough & Tucci, 
2003; Maula Keil, & Zahra, 2003; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a). For instance, prior 
studies have found a positive relationship between CVC investments and parent 
company’s innovativeness (e.g. Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; 
Maula, et al., 2003).  Chesbrough and Tucci (2003) reported corporate venture capital 
investments effectively stimulate additional corporate innovation activities, rather than 
substitutes of traditional R&D activities.  Dushnisky and Lenox (2005a) also found that 
the size of CVC investments is positively associated with firm innovation rate.  In 
addition, CVC investments are also found to assist in recognition of technological 
discontinuities (Maula, et al., 2003). 
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These studies have furthered our understanding of the learning function of CVC 
investments with respect to innovation.  However, they largely focused on the outcome 
of learning and typically treated the learning process as a “black box”.  In fact, 
interaction between the portfolio company and the corporation is usually mediated by the 
CVC program.  Thus, in this study, I extend these studies by revealing the mediating 
role of CVC programs in the interorganizational learning process.  Specifically, I 
empirically examine the extent to which the structural characteristics of CVC programs 
will influence the knowledge transfer processes. 
On the other hand, the interorganizational learning is not unidirectional in a CVC 
investment.  To add value and create wealth for both the entrepreneurs and VC fund 
investors, venture capitalists should act as advisors in addition to risk financial sponsors 
(e.g. Norton, 1995).  A number of studies have investigated the value-added roles of 
venture capitalists from the knowledge perspective (e.g. Fried & Hisrich, 1995; Steier & 
Greenwood, 1995).  In the context of CVC investment, knowledge transfer from the 
corporation to the portfolio company is an important value-added mechanism as 
corporate investors have more knowledge resources to share with their portfolio 
companies.  Besides general business knowledge, corporate venture capitalists are 
superior in providing technology and marketing supports (Maula, Autio, & Murray, 
2003).   
Although interorganizational learning is bilateral throughout CVC investments, the 
extant literature has examined the learning in each direction separately.  So far, no study 
has been carried out to inspect the mutual learning processes between the corporation and 
the portfolio companies.  Research focusing exclusively on either side of the story may 
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generate biased conclusions.  For example, the factors found to be beneficial to 
knowledge transfer from the portfolio companies to the parent may impede knowledge 
transfer in the reversed way.  Thus, it is necessary to inspect the two-way learning 
processes simultaneously, and the question of how to build a reciprocated learning 
relation is worth further investigation  
To fill the gap in the literature, this study will investigate outcomes of 
interorganizational learning from both the parent and the portfolio company’s 
perspectives.  In addition, I will examine how the structural characteristics of CVC 
programs facilitate knowledge transfer processes through the theoretical lens of agency 
theory.   
In sum, this study makes two main contributions. First, this study contributes to the 
interorganizational learning literature by empirically analyzing the mutual learning 
processes as well as the factors that may lead to a reciprocated situation.  Second, I 
extend the prior literature of corporate venturing by revealing the underlying mechanism 
of interorganizational learning between the corporation and the portfolio companies.  
Specifically, I investigate to what extent the structural characteristics of CVC programs 
can facilitate interorganizational knowledge flows based on agency theory, as well as the 
strategic consequences for both the corporation and the portfolio companies.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Interorganizational Learning in CVC activities 
From the knowledge-based view, firms’ knowledge status can be conceptualized by 
both stocks and flows (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  To sustain competitive advantage, 
firms have to update their knowledge assets continuously by creating knowledge flows 
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into stocks.  Flows of new knowledge could be generated internally through activities 
such as experimental learning (e.g. Zahar et al., 1999), R&D activities (e.g. DeCarolis & 
Deeds, 1999), and intraorganizational knowledge transfer (e.g. Tsai, 2001).  Yet, firms 
can’t rely solely on internal knowledge accumulation especially in the era of the New 
Economy where new knowledge generation is occurring at a rapid pace.  Thus, 
obtaining new knowledge across organizational boundaries is of great importance to all 
companies although the learning may have a different focus for well-established and 
entrepreneurial companies.   
Well-established companies.  A number of researchers have pointed out that 
established firms have difficulties in generating innovations through internal knowledge 
development (e.g. Henderson, 1993; Tushman & Anderson, 1986).  Innovation largely 
requires the integration of diverse knowledge assets (Arrow, 1974).  However, the 
tendency of searching knowledge locally makes firms trapped by their existing 
knowledge stocks (e.g. Levintha & March, 1993).  The learning myopia might cripple 
firms’ ability to explore new areas (Levintha & March, 1993).  Thus, there are 
constraints on the creation of new knowledge within a single organization, and 
established companies may find that they lack the knowledge stocks necessary to 
innovate rapidly (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a). 
Learning from external knowledge sources is an alternative to overcome these 
constraints (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  Henderson and Cockburn (1994) have found 
that the recombination of knowledge across organizational boundaries is positively 
related to research productivities in the biotech industry.  The potential sources of 
external knowledge include regional networks of employees and firms (Almeida & Kogut, 
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1999; Saxenian, 1990), universities and government labs (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh., 
2002), alliance partners (Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1994; Powell et al., 
1996; Schildt et al., 2005), and acquisition targets (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Capron, 
Dussange, & Mitchell, 1998; Schildt et al., 2005).  Recently, entrepreneurial ventures 
have been regarded as a particularly important source of highly innovative ideas (Kortum 
& Lerner, 2000; Zingales, 2000).  Empirical evidence has shown that new venture 
formation is associated with entrepreneurial inventions (Shane, 2001).  
Therefore, some scholars have suggested that CVC investments provide established 
companies with an important avenue to access this collection of external knowledge (e.g. 
(Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; Gans & Stern, 2003; Poser, 
2003; Roberts & Berry, 1985; Schildt, et al., 2005).  Through equity investment, 
established companies are authorized access to the entrepreneurial company’s 
technologies and practices (Chesbrough & Tucci, 2003).  The exposure to novel and 
pioneering technologies may increase the likelihood that established firms would create 
breakthrough innovation (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001).  Indeed, Dushnitsky & Lenox 
(2005a) reported that CVC investments are positively related to increases in the investing 
firm’s innovation rate.  Maula et al. (2003) also found that CVC investments help 
established management to recognize technology discontinuity.  In other words, CVC 
investments provide established companies with an opportunity to learn from 
entrepreneurial companies, thereby improving their innovation capability.  
Entrepreneurial companies. As I discussed previously, entrepreneurial companies 
typically are formed based on brilliant inventions and innovative technologies (e.g. 
Kortum & Lerner, 2000; Shane, 2001; Zingales, 2000).  However, the possession of 
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such knowledge per se cannot lead to the company’s survival.  More importantly, the 
survival of an entrepreneurial company depends upon how successfully it can 
commercialize those brilliant inventions and technologies.  Technology 
commercialization is a complex and multi-disciplinary process.  As young ventures, 
entrepreneurial companies typically don’t have the broad range of skills, expertise, and 
capabilities to accomplish this task alone (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Teece 1986).  One of the 
solutions to this problem is the access to external knowledge resources (e.g. Deeds, et al., 
1999).  For example, Deeds and his colleagues (1999) reported that strategic alliances 
are positively related to the new product development capabilities of biotech companies.  
Through these external linkages, entrepreneurial companies obtain access to 
complementary capabilities that technology commercialization requires; in the 
meanwhile they can build capabilities through observation.   
CVC investments provide entrepreneurial companies a unique opportunity to access 
such external resources.  Typically, corporations with CVC branches are 
well-established, prestigious companies.  With years of investments in knowledge 
accumulation, those big companies possess huge knowledge stocks related to R&D, 
marketing, human recourse management, etc.  Thus, having a corporate investor, 
entrepreneurial companies would access a wide range of complementary knowledge 
assets (Block & MacMillan, 1993; Pisano, 1994; Teece, 1986), such as technological and 
marketing supports (Maula, et al., 2003), that are critical to their technology 
commercialization and firm performance.  In addition, some corporate investors are 
leaders in the marketplace.  Thus, entrepreneurial companies can learn the best practices 
by observation and benchmarking.  Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that 
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CVC-backed ventures fair better than those solely backed by independent VC firms (e.g. 
Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Maula & Murray, 2001).  In sum, through CVC investments, 
entrepreneurial companies can learn from their corporate investors and enhance their 
performance.  
The mediating role of CVC programs.  Both the established corporation and the 
entrepreneurial company could be benefited from interorganizational learning through a 
CVC investment.  On the side of the established company, the CVC investment opens a 
window into new technology/market, and knowledge transferred from the entrepreneurial 
company can simulate innovation in its existing business units.  On the other side, the 
entrepreneurial company looks forward to technological and marketing support from their 
corporate sponsors to assist its new product development.  However, neither the 
established company nor the entrepreneurial company learns from each other directly.  
Typically, CVC programs are the mediators which facilitate the interorganizational 
learning. 
On one hand, corporations normally delegate the task of CVC investments to their 
CVC programs, and moreover depend upon their venturing branches to collect and 
deliver knowledge from the entrepreneurial company.  Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a) 
have identified three channels through which established companies could learn from 
their portfolio companies by CVC activities.  First, the appraisal and valuation process 
allows the firm to learn about entrepreneurial ideas and new technologies even prior to 
committing capital.  Second, a corporate investor may learn about novel technologies by 
maintaining board seats as well as utilizing dedicated monitoring.  Finally, a failing 
venture may also constitute a learning experience to the extent that it offers technological 
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insights, or conversely points at market unattractiveness.  Most of the learning tasks are 
largely carried out by CVC managers who appraise and evaluate target companies by 
reading business plans and other resources, act as the board of directors to observe and 
monitor the entrepreneurial companies’ operation, and summarize lessons from 
investment failure for their future investments as well as convey the information back to 
the parent.   
Some researchers have observed that CVC managers often work closely with other 
business units (e.g. Henderson & Leleux, 2002).  The involvement of other business 
units in CVC investments will also contribute to learning from the portfolio company 
(Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a).  However, to what extent other business units can be 
engaged in this process is largely determined by CVC managers’ judgment and efforts. 
On the other hand, knowledge flow to the entrepreneurial company from the parent is 
mostly controlled by CVC managers.  First, most CVC managers are veterans in the 
corporation and possess abundant industrial experience.  By directly monitoring and 
assistance of the new venture’s business, CVC managers pass on their knowledge to the 
entrepreneurial company.  In addition, some corporations encourage their business units 
to establish liaisons with the portfolio companies post investment in attempt to learn 
about the portfolio companies’ technology.  On the other hand, these liaisons also offer 
the portfolio companies an opportunity to communicate with the business units and 
observe their operations.  Likewise, to what extent the interaction with the business 
units can facilitate knowledge flows mostly relies on CVC managers’ coordination ability 
as well as their efforts.  
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In the current study, I will, on the basis of agency theory, investigate to what extent 
the structural characteristics influence the knowledge flows between the corporation and 
the portfolio companies, and finally affect both parties’ strategic performance.  
CVC Programs’ Structural Characteristics 
In this study, my research focuses on the impact of CVC programs’ structural 
characteristics on the mediating role of CVC managers during interorganizational 
learning.  In particular, I identify three CVC program structural characteristics – 
incentive schemes, autonomy, and monitoring mode, that could stimulate or mitigate 
CVC managers’ agency behaviors.  Furthermore, I propose that these agency behaviors 
may change the dynamics of knowledge flows between the corporation and the portfolio 
company, and ultimately influence the strategic performance for both parties.  The 
proposed model is presented in Figure 5.1, and I will elaborate the hypothesized relations 
in the following sections. 
Incentive schemes.  How to provide incentives to agents to behave in the principals’ 
interests has long been discussed in the literature of agency theory (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Roth & O’Donnell, 1996).  It is believed that an appropriate compensation package 
would align the agents’ interests with those of the principals, and then limit the agency 
problems (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In general, compensation systems can be 
classified into two groups: behavior-based and outcome-based.  Numerous studies have 
argued that outcome-based incentive schemes are more appropriate when agent behaviors 
are costly or difficult to observe due to information asymmetry (Conlon & Parks, 1990).   
This kind of information asymmetry commonly occurs in venture capital investments.  
As the limited partner, fund investors are away from daily operations and usually don’t 
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have specialized knowledge about venture capital investments.  In addition, venture 
capital investment decisions are complex and require a high level of managerial 
discretion.  Thus, under the circumstances, especially when financial returns are the sole 
objective for both of the parties, the “carried interests” incentive scheme presents an 
excellent example of outcome-based compensation system that effectively mitigates the 
principal-agent conflicts.   
Indeed, a number of corporations have adopted VC-like incentive schemes in their 
CVC programs.  However, this adoption is a thorn with two sides. On one hand, with 
the incentives of as high as 20 percent of profit-sharing, CVC managers will pay more 
attention to the success of their portfolio companies, and thus devote time and knowledge 
to nurture them. In addition, they would make use of the parent’s resources including 
knowledge to leverage the portfolio company’s product development.  Thus, we would 
expect that under the VC-like incentive scheme, CVC managers are willing to commit 
resources to their portfolio companies, and are dedicated to knowledge transfer from the 
parent.  
However, CVC investments also should pursue strategic objectives in addition to 
financial returns.  It is well understood that incentive schemes signal the principle’s 
objectives and directly influence the actions and behavior of their agents (Galbraith & 
Merrill, 1991).  Thus, the financial outcome-based compensation would send CVC 
managers misleading messages, and encourage them to perform to the incentives offered, 
rather than in the more general interests of their principals (Hendry, 2002). Thus, under 
the VC-like incentive scheme, CVC managers may pay less attention to strategic 
objectives, and devote less to transfer knowledge back to the parents.  In addition, the 
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VC-like incentive schemes could cause goal conflicts between CVC managers and their 
parent corporations.  To chase their personal financial success, they may be reluctant to 
transfer knowledge back to the corporation, for this kind of knowledge sharing would 
expose the portfolio companies’ technology secrets and disadvantage them in the 
competition.  
In contrast, traditional salary-bonus-option incentive schemes would motivate CVC 
managers to better serve the strategic objectives.  First, the outcomes of strategic 
objectives are hard to predict and difficult to measure, and therefore behavior-based 
compensation, like salary, is more appropriate (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Second, bonuses and 
options connect CVC managers’ income with the parent’s performance, and motivate 
them to consider the long-term strategic benefits.  Thus, we would expect that under the 
traditional incentive scheme, CVC managers are willing to facilitate knowledge transfer 
from the portfolio companies, and are dedicated to the longstanding strategic contribution 
to their parent companies.  However, the traditional incentive scheme would also 
discourage CVC managers’ commitment to their portfolio companies, in particular when 
the parent company has learned about new technologies (Alvarez & Barney, 2001).  
CVC managers’ principal opportunism may dramatically frustrate entrepreneurs, and 
even drive away future deal flows.  
Based on the above analysis, I propose:   
H1a: The VC-like incentive scheme is positively related to the knowledge flow from 
the parent to the portfolio companies, and increases the performance of the portfolio 
companies.  
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H1b: The traditional incentive scheme is positively related to the knowledge flow 
from the portfolio companies to the parent, and increases innovativeness in the parent 
company.. 
Autonomy. When the principals delegate the tasks to their agents, they 
simultaneously grant a certain level of autonomy for their agents to accomplish the tasks.  
The low level of autonomy helps the principals to better monitor and verify agent 
behaviors, thereby tightly controlling the agency problem.  Yet, this will increase 
monitoring costs.  In addition, excess intervention from the principals may deeply 
frustrate their agents, and decrease efficiency particularly when the agents need to make 
decisions in a timely fashion (e.g. Gomper & Lerner, 2000).  Thus, facing 
environmental and strategic complexities, the principals tend to empower their agents 
with a high level of autonomy.  However, autonomy is typically associated with 
managerial discretion, low task programmability, and ambiguous cause-effect 
relationships, all of which give rise to information asymmetries (Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 
1992). Thus, high levels of autonomy may stimulate agency problems unless other 
controlling mechanisms exist.  
In the context of CVC investments, corporations face the same dilemma when 
designing their CVC programs.  In order to obtain the desired strategic information, 
corporations will insist on close oversight of their CVC programs.  The tight control will 
mitigate CVC managers’ agency behaviors, for instance, pursuing personal financial 
interests by sacrificing corporation’s strategic benefits.  Nevertheless, the tight control 
would keep CVC managers from quickly responding to environmental changes.  Thus, a 
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number of studies have advocated that corporations replicate flexibility and freedom of 
the VC model to design their CVC programs (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Hardymon, 
DeNino & Salter, 1983).  However, as discussed in the precedent paragraph, the high 
level of autonomy creates information asymmetries, and makes corporations difficult to 
monitor CVC managers’ behaviors.  So, I propose that: 
H2: High levels of autonomy leads to lower knowledge flow from portfolio companies 
to parent and negatively affects corporate innovation. 
Monitoring mode.  Board representation is the major monitoring mode post CVC 
investments (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  A study of 91 U.S.-based ventures that 
operated in the computer and communication industries during the late 1990’s, finds that 
in 31% of the cases the corporate investor held a board seat and in 40% of the cases it did 
not have a seat but did hold observer rights (Maula, 2001). These results were repeated in 
a recent survey of European venture capital practices (Bottazzi, DaRin, & Hellmann, 
2004) that reports 68% CVC investors serve on portfolio companies’ boards. 
This is not surprising.  In line with the literature on agency theory, the board of 
directors is considered an effective information mechanism in control of managers’ 
agency behaviors (e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983).  In the context of CVC investments, 
board seats, at least the right of board observation, allow corporate investor access to 
inside information about a portfolio companies’ operation.  This information not only 
protects corporate investments, but more importantly, provides vital insights into industry 
trends and new technology secrecy (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  To a certain extent, 
board representation is essential because entrepreneurial companies are typically 
unwilling to share knowledge with their corporate investors for fear the corporate 
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investors might unfairly exploit their knowledge assets and appropriate their ideas 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  Thus, we would expect that board representation should be 
positively associated with knowledge transfer from the portfolio companies to the parent.  
On the other hand, board representation also demonstrates a corporate investor’s 
commitment to the focal entrepreneurial company.  As board directors, CVC managers 
have the responsibility of consulting and advising in addition to monitoring.  Thus, we 
would expect that board representation would also increase knowledge flow to the 
portfolio companies. 
All this analysis leads to the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Board representation of CVC managers in their portfolio companies is 
positively related to the knowledge flow from their parent to the portfolio companies, and 
increases the performance of the portfolio companies.  
H3b: Board representation of CVC managers in their portfolio companies is 
positively related to the knowledge flow from the portfolio companies to their parent, and 
increases innovativeness of the corporate investors 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
Similar to the first study, the present study utilized a longitudinal, correlational design, 
and an unbalanced panel data set was consequently generated from archival records and 
survey.   
Data Collection 
Archival data collection.  Similar to the first study, multiple archival sources were 
used, including VentureXpert, Computstat (North American), SDC M&A database and 
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LexisNexis.  In addition, the patent database from the United State Patent and 
Trademark Office was also used to collect patent data.   
Survey. Survey instruments were used to collect data on incentive schemes and the 
autonomy of CVC programs, as well as data on the knowledge flows between corporate 
investors and their portfolio companies.  
Survey methods.  There are several survey methods available for researchers, such as 
personal interviews, telephone interviews, mail surveys, and web-based, electronic 
surveys.  In the present research, mail surveys were used due to the availability of 
contact information.  In addition, because the survey questionnaires were addressed to 
organizations rather than individuals, mail-in surveys may have a higher response rate 
than other survey methods such as web-based, electronic surveys.  
Questionnaire.  The questionnaire started with a letter inviting each corporate 
investor to participate in the study.  The invitation letter (see Appendix B) included an 
overview of the study, explained why the company was being asked to participate, 
emphasized the voluntary nature of the study and assured complete anonymity.  The 
survey contained two questions pertaining to the incentive scheme the CVC program 
employed during the period 1996-2000, 8 questions pertaining to the autonomy of CVC 
programs, and 6 questions pertaining to the knowledge flows between the corporate 
investors and their portfolio companies (see Appendix).  The relevance and clarity of 
these questions were examined using a pilot survey with several experts in the venture 
capital industry.  Due to the need to match the data with other data, the survey also 
asked for the names of the corporate investors.  To enhance the response rate, a 
summary of the results was promised.  
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 Data collection procedure. The target companies for the survey were selected in 
accordance with whether they undertook any CVC investment during the period 1996 to 
2000 based on the VentureXpert database.   
 The first mail-in survey was addressed to CVC managers or executives in charge of 
new business development in the survey companies.  The mailing addresses used to 
contact the participants were obtained from multiple sources: VentureXpert, the 
2000-2002 Corporate Venturing Directory and Yearbooks, Corporations’ websites, and 
Hoover’s.  Two weeks later, reminder emails were sent out as suggested by Dillman 
(1978, 2000).  Four weeks after the original surveys were mailed, I mailed a follow-up 
survey using the same questionnaire.  One week later, a second reminder email was sent 
out.   
Sample.  The unit of analysis for the second study is the portfolio company- 
corporate investor dyad.  Thus, the population includes all CVC investment 
relationships in the United State since 1969.  Again, VentureXpert was primarily used to 
construct the population based on the same criteria used in the first study.  The sample 
to test the focal research questions was restricted to the period of time from 1996 to 2000.  
The reason why I chose this time frame is the accessibility of incentive scheme data 
obtained through survey research.  This time frame was also appealing for reasons of 
time and cost economy.  In addition, this time frame allowed me to collect performance 
data within 5 years after the investment.   
Based on the VentureXpert Database, a total of 208 U.S. public companies performed 
CVC investments between the 1996 to 2000 time period.  By the survey time, eleven out 
of the 208 firms had dissolved, and twenty-seven companies had ceased their CVC 
  118 
 
operations.  Eight weeks after the surveys were administered, 18 surveys had been 
received reflecting a 10.6% response rate.   
The descriptive statistics for the 18 responding companies are reported in Table 5.1.  
In 2000, the average age of the 18 companies’ CVC programs was 10.56 years.  Their 
assets averaged $30449.75 million, and ranged from $1006.58 million to $242223 million 
at the end of 2000.  In addition, sales averaged $19955.52 million in 2000.  Thirteen of 
the 18 respondents had very few staff working on CVC programs (0~5 people), two 
respondents had 6 to 10 CVC staff, and three respondents had 11 to 20 CVC staff.  Most 
of the CVC programs used traditional compensation packages (base salary/bonus/stock 
option), and only 2 companies had adopted carried interests in their incentive schemes.  
The 18 companies cover 8 major industries according to their SIC codes.  The industry 
distribution is shown in Table 5.1. 
I also compared the 18 respondents with the 152 non-responding firms using the 
Mann-Whitney Test1 (See Table 5.2).   Results indicated that respondents had 
significantly more assets, more sales and older CVC programs than non-respondents.    
Measures 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the impact of structural and 
managerial characteristics of a CVC program on bilateral interorganizational learning 
from the perspective of agency theory.  The variables were operationalized by measures 
that were either newly developed for the study, or adopted from the literature.  This 
section describes how each variable was measured as well as the rationale associated with 
each measurement.  Measures of major variables are presented in Table 5.3. 
                                                 
1 As nonparametric test, a Mann-Whitney Test is more appropriate than a T-test since the sample size is 
only 18.   
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Dependent Variables 
Innovativeness of a corporate investor.  There are a number of measures of a firm’s 
innovativeness identified in the literature, such as R&D expenditures (Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994), new product announcement (Acs & Auretsch, 1988), or patents 
(Griliches, 1990) and patent citations (e.g. Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et al., 1999, 
Dushnitsky & Lerner, 2005a, 2005b) (see Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003, for a recent 
review).  Among these measures, patent citations are perhaps most popular (Dushnitsky 
& Lerner, 2005a).  Previous studies have employed patents and citation-weighted 
patents to gauge innovative output in the chemical (Ahuja, 2000), pharmaceutical 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1994), information (Stuart, 2000) and devices (Brockhoff et al., 
1999) sectors, among others.  Built upon these previous studies, the present study 
measured innovativeness of a corporate investor by its citation weighted patent counts, 
that is, the total number of citations to patents it applied for in a given year.  Regressions 
were also run with unweighted patent counts. 
Performance of a portfolio company.  In the strategy literature, firm performance is 
typically measured by accounting indicators (e.g. ROA, sales growth), or market value.  
However, this information is not easily accessible for most portfolio companies.  Thus, 
in the present study, a dummy variable was used to capture the performance of a portfolio 
company after the focal investment relationship was initiated.  The dummy took on the 
value of 1 if the portfolio company had gone public after the investment and a zero if it 
hadn’t.  Both a 3-year time frame and a 5-year time frame were employed to test the 
robustness.  
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Independent Variables 
 Incentive scheme.  In order to measure the characteristics of CVC managers’ 
compensation during the focal period, respondents were asked: (1) the extent to which the 
compensation and incentive scheme for CVC managers was dependent upon the financial 
returns of the CVC investments for the years 1996 to 2000; and (2) the extent to which 
the compensation and incentive scheme for CVC managers was dependent upon the 
strategic benefits of the CVC investments for the years 1996 to 2000.  The items were 
rated on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 = Not at all to 10 = Always.   
 Autonomy.  There are four primary dimensions which were used to evaluate the 
autonomy of a CVC program:  1) funding source, 2) investment objective, 3) staffing, 
and 4) the decision-making process.  Two items assessed the funding source of the CVC 
operation, including “CVC investments are managed by closed venture capital funds with 
outside investors” and “Funding is project-based rather than budget-based”.  Two items 
assessed the autonomy of determining the investment objective.  These items were, 
“Investment objectives are determined by the parent company” and “Investment 
objectives are determined by the CVC program”.  Two items assessed the staffing 
autonomy in the CVC program.  The two items included, “Staffing decisions in the 
CVC program must be approved by your parent company” and “The CVC program has 
the authority to hire anyone it needs”.  Finally, two items were used to examine the 
autonomy of the investment decision making process, including “CVC managers have the 
authority to make investment decisions on their own.” and “All investments made by the 
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CVC program must be approved by the parent company”.  These items were measured 
using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  
 A factor analysis using varimax rotation was conducted on all 8 autonomy items.  
Two factors emerged with the first factor accounting for 44.14% of the variance 
(eigenvalue = 3.53).  The second factor accounted for 19.8 percent of the variance 
(eigenvalue = 1.58).  Although there are two factors, all 8 items were included in the 
measure of autonomy due to the small sample size.  Responses to the 8 items were 
averaged to provide a score that represented the autonomy of CVC programs.  The 
reliability of the scale is adequate (α = .70).   A list of the 8 items, as well as the factor 
loadings and Cronbach’s alpha are provided in Table 5.4. 
Monitoring mode.  A dummy variable was used to capture the monitoring mode.  
The dummy took on the value of 1 if the CVC managers held board seats in the portfolio 
companies; otherwise a value of zero was assigned.    
Knowledge flows. Given the rich variety of knowledge present in an organization, 
Schluz (2001) categorized organizational knowledge into three general, but different, 
domains: knowledge related to sales and marketing, knowledge related to technology, 
and knowledge related to strategy.  Using this categorization, he created a set of survey 
instruments to measure horizontal and vertical knowledge outflows and inflows among 
sub-units within an organization.  His scales demonstrated strong convergent and 
discriminant validity.  Thus, this study adapted this scale to measure the knowledge 
flows between corporate investors and portfolio companies.   The current study 
modified the original measure to better reflect the CVC programs examined.   
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For knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies, the 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following 
statements: (1) The parent company provides a great deal of knowledge about sales and 
marketing to the portfolio companies (e.g., knowledge about advertisement, public 
relations, service delivery); (2) The parent company provides a great deal of 
technological knowledge to the portfolio companies (e.g., knowledge about R&D, 
information systems, production process); and (3) The parent company provides a great 
deal of strategic knowledge to the portfolio companies (e.g., knowledge of competitors, 
suppliers, government regulations).  For knowledge flows from portfolio companies to 
corporate investors, three similar items were asked.  These items were measured using a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree.  Both of 
the scales had strong internal consistency (α = .93, and α = .82, respectively). 
In order to validate the measures of knowledge flows in both directions, a factor 
analysis of the 6 items was conducted.  When the items were entered in the factor 
analysis, two factors emerged.   The first factor had an eigenvalue equal to 3.44 
(accounting for 57% variance) and was comprised of items 1, 2, and 3.  This factor 
represented the knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies. 
Responses to the 3 items were averaged to provide a score that represented the 
knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies.  The second factor 
had an eigenvalue equal to 1.70 (accounting for 28% variance) and was comprised of 
items 4, 5, and 6.  This factor represented the knowledge flows from portfolio 
companies to corporate investors.  Responses to the 3 items were averaged to provide a 
score that represented the knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate 
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investors. The correlation between the two variables is not significant (ρ = .374, p=.11).  
Table 5.5 shows the factor loadings for both of the scales. 
Control Variables.  
Prior studies have suggested that macroeconomic factors, industry attributes, or firm 
characteristics may influence the financial and strategic outcomes of CVC investments 
(e.g., Dushnitsky & Lerner, 2005a; Gompers & Lerner, 1998, 2000).  Thus, three groups 
of control variables were included in the present study: portfolio company control 
variables, corporate investor control variables, and environment control variables.  
Portfolio company control variables.  Consistent with prior research, some 
characteristics associated with portfolio companies were controlled due to their effects on 
portfolio companies’ performance.  The development stage of a portfolio company and 
the industry in which it operates are viewed as factors that may influence its valuation 
and success (e.g. Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  Thus, these two firm attributes were 
employed as controls in the present study.  A series of dummy variables was used to 
measure a portfolio company’s industry and development stage according to 
classifications in VentureXpert.  
Corporate investor control variables.  There are many factors that may influence a 
firm’s innovativeness.  First, organizational size may approximate resource endowments 
of corporate investors, thereby reflecting their innovativeness (Dishnitsky & Lerner, 
2005a). Firm size in the present study was measured as the logarithmic transformation of 
assets (in millions).  Second, a corporate investor’s absorptive capacity obviously 
influences its innovativeness (e.g. Dishnitsky & Lerner, 2005a, 2005b).  It was 
measured by the patent stock in this study (Dishnitsky & Lerner, 2005a).  Finally, the 
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age of the CVC and the annual number of CVC investments per corporate investor were 
controlled according to Dishnitsky and Lerner (2005a). 
Environment control variables.  Different industries may possess different 
technological opportunities.  In addition, some industries at some points in time may 
experience greater technological ferment that may drive both the opportunities to invest 
in new ventures and the opportunities to innovate internally (Klevorick et al., 1995).  To 
eliminate the potential confounding effects caused by the differences in the industries and 
the years, the average number of citation-weighted patents applied to by firms in a given 
year in a given industry was used as a control (Dushnitsky & Lerner, 2005a).  The 
industry was defined by each four-digit standard industrial classification (average 
industry citation).   In addition, the year in which the investment relationship was 
initiated was controlled.   
Data Analysis 
Reliability.  In order to increase the reliability of the survey data, multi-item scales 
were used to measure a majority of the constructs, and the inter-item reliabilities were 
tested using Cronbach’s alpha.   All of the Cronbach’s alpha were above the acceptance 
level (α = .70, .93, .82).   
Validity.  The questionnaire was pre-tested by venture capital practitioners or 
researchers familiar with the research questions.  In order to examine construct validity, 
for most of the variables, two or more sources of measurement were employed, and factor 
analysis and correlation matrices were examined to make sure that the measures of the 
same variable are correlated and those of different variables are not correlated.   
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 Regression analysis.  The present study employed OLS regressions, logistic 
regressions, and negative binomial regressions depending upon the nature of the 
dependent variables. 
Testing the relationship of CVC structure characteristics->knowledge 
flows->portfolio companies’ performance 
 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that the VC-like incentive scheme of a CVC program leads 
to knowledge flows from the corporate investor to its portfolio companies, and thus help 
portfolio companies to succeed after they initiated the investment relationship.  
Likewise, hypotheses 3a proposed that board representations of CVC managers help 
transfer knowledge from corporate investors to portfolio companies, thereby enhancing 
portfolio companies’ performance.  To test the proposed relationships, I specified the 
following OLS regression and logistic regression models:  
errorscontrolsINCEVCBROADCVCKFLOW ++++= __1 210 ααα  (1) 
errorscontrolsKFLOW
P
P
Log
f
f +++=− 1)1( 10 αα  (2) 
where Pf is the probability of going public after initiating the CVC investment 
relationship.  
To support H1a and H3a, I expected the coefficients for the VC-like incentive scheme 
(VC_INCE), and the board representation of CVC managers (CVC_BOARD) to be 
positive and significant in Model (1), and the coefficients for knowledge flows from the 
corporate investors to the portfolio companies (KFLOW1) to be positive and significant 
in Model (2).  
Testing the relationship of CVC structure characteristics->knowledge 
flows->corporate investors’ innovativeness  
 
  126 
 
Hypothesis 1b predicted a negative relationship between the VC-like incentive 
scheme of a CVC program and the knowledge flows from its portfolio companies to the 
corporate investor, and thus negatively affects its innovativeness. On the contrary, 
Hypotheses 2 and 3b proposed that a low level of autonomy of a CVC program and the 
board representation of its CVC manager would help increase the knowledge flows from 
portfolio companies to the corporate investors, and thus positively affect its 
innovativeness.   
First, OLS regressions were used to test the relationships between the CVC programs’ 
characteristics and knowledge flows.  The OLS regression model is as follows   
BOARDCVCAUTONOMYINCEVCKFLOW __2 3210 αααα +++=  
errorcontrols ++  (3)  
where KFLOW2 refers to knowledge flows from the portfolio companies to the corporate 
investors.  
Next, I adopted negative binomial regression models to test the relationship between 
knowledge flows and corporate investors’ innovativeness because the dependent variable 
(Patent Citations) is a count of patent citations for patents applied for by a firm in a given 
year, and as such is bounded at zero and assumes only integer values. 
The negative binomial model is commonly used in the patenting literature for over 
dispersed count data (Griliches et al., 1987). The negative binomial model is a 
generalized form of a Poisson model where an individual, unobserved effect is introduced 
in the conditional mean (Greene, 2000).  A Poisson model was not adopted because the 
dataset violates the assumption of constant dispersion (Dushnitsky & Lerner, 2005a).  
In general, the random-effects specification can be expressed as follows:  
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 )2(|[ KFLOWCITATIONSE νεα ++= )2exp( 1KFLOW  (4) 
where ν and ε are independent random variables. 
 To support H1b, H2 and H3b, I expected the coefficients for VC-like incentive 
scheme (VC_INCE) and autonomy (AUTONOMY) to be negative and significant, the 
coefficient for board representation of CVC managers (CVC_BOARD) to be positive and 
significant in Model (3), and the coefficient for knowledge flows from portfolio 
companies to corporate investors to be positive and significant in Model (4). 
RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the data analyses beginning with the descriptive 
statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables.  Next, the results of the logistics 
and binomial regression analyses testing the study’s hypotheses are presented, including a 
number of post hoc analyses.   
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, independent 
variables, and the control variables.  An average corporate investor in the sample 
applied for approximately 386 new patents per year.  The average autonomous level of 
CVC programs in the sample was 2.77, which shows that most of the CVC programs had 
low levels of autonomy.  A total of 238 portfolio companies were under the 
management of the 18 corporate investors.  Among them, 202 companies were in the 
information technology industry, and 26 companies were in the medical industry.  The 
portfolio companies were also in the different development stages: 15 in the stage of 
seed/startup, 53 in the early stage, 126 in the expansion stage, and 38 in the later stage.  
Fifty companies went IPO within 5 years after the corporate investor’s first investment.   
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 Table 5.7 presents the intercorrelations among the variables in the study.  The 
intercorrelations among the study’s independent variables ranged from -.84 to .77.  
Larger than desirable intercorrelations were found between autonomy and incentive 
scheme (ρ=.64, p < .001), and between the two industry dummies (ρ=-.84, p < .001).  
Thus, to investigate potential multicollinearity problems, I examined variance inflation 
factors (VIFs).  The maximum VIF obtained from the linear regressions was 3.71, which 
is substantially below the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10 for multiple regression models 
(Netel, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). 
Tests of Hypotheses 
 Results for Hypotheses 1a and 3a.  Hypothesis 1a predicted that the VC-like 
incentive scheme (dependent upon financial returns rather than strategic benefits) is 
positively related to knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies, 
which would enhance the performance of portfolio companies.  Similarly, Hypothesis 
3a proposed that the board representation of the CVC managers in their portfolio 
companies increases knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies, 
and thus help portfolio companies to succeed.   
 Table 5.8 presents the results of the OLS regressions examining the relationships 
between the VC-like incentive scheme and the board representation, and the knowledge 
flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies.  None of the coefficients were 
significant in Table 5.8, which suggests that the structure characteristics of CVC 
programs such as the VC-like incentive scheme and the board representation was not 
related to the knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies.   
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 Table 5.9 reports the results of the logistical regressions that were employed to test 
the relationships between the knowledge flows and portfolio companies’ performance.  
Portfolio companies’ performance was measured by dummies of going IPO after the 
initial investments, and both a 5-year window and a 3-year window were adopted in the 
regressions.  In Table 5.8, Model 3 and 5 present the baseline models in which the 
analyses were restricted to the effects of the control variables: portfolio companies’ 
industries and development stages, and the year of initial investments.  Model 4 and 
Model 6 argument the baseline models by including the effects of knowledge flows.  As 
seen in Table 5.9, the hypothesized positive relationship between knowledge flows and 
portfolio companies’ performance was significant in the regression analyses (5-year 
window: β = .282, p < .05; 3-year window: β = .307, p < .05).  Combining the results 
from both the OLS regressions and the logistic regressions, evidence indicates partial 
support for Hypotheses 1a and 3a.    
 Results for Hypotheses 1b, 2, and 3b.  These three hypotheses predicted the impacts 
of CVC programs’ structure characteristics on corporate investors’ innovativeness.  
Specifically, Hypotheses 1b and 2 predicted that the VC-like incentive scheme and 
autonomy would negatively affect the knowledge flows from portfolio companies to 
corporate investors, and hence negatively affect corporate investors’ innovativeness.  
Hypothesis 3b predicted that the board representation of CVC managers would increase 
the knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors, and help improve 
corporate investors’ innovativeness. 
 Table 5.10 presents the results of the OLS regressions examining the effects of the 
VC-like incentive scheme, autonomy, and the board representation on the knowledge 
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flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies.  The hypothesized negative 
relationship between the VC-like incentive scheme and the knowledge flows was fully 
supported as the beta coefficients were significant in the regression analyses (financial:  
β = -.2.345, p < .01, strategic: β = 6.202, p < .001).  The hypothesized negative 
relationship between autonomy and the knowledge flows was also supported as the beta 
coefficients were negative and significant in the regression analyses (β = -.2.405, p < .01). 
The hypothesized positive relationship between the board representation and the 
knowledge flows was not supported.  Overall, the independent variables accounted for 
20.3% of the variance in knowledge flows (∆R2 = .203, p < .001). 
 Table 5.11 reports the results of the negative binomial regressions testing the 
relationships between the knowledge flows and corporate investors’ innovativeness.  
Corporate investors’ innovativeness was measured by both citation-weighted patent 
counts and non-weighted patent counts.  In general, a 1-year lag between the regressors 
and dependent variables was assumed.  That is, the following year’s patent level was 
used in the regressions.  In Table 5.11, Models 9 and 11 present the baseline models in 
which the analysis is restricted to the effects of the control variables, including corporate 
investor’s size and technology competency, CVC age, industry patenting activity, and the 
investment year.  Model 10 and Model 12 argument the baseline models by including 
the effects of knowledge flows.  As seen in Table 5.11, the hypothesized positive 
relationship between knowledge flows and portfolio companies’ performance was 
significant but negative (citation-weighted patent counts: β =-.382, p < .05; non-weighted: 
β = -.304, p < .05).  Combining the results from both the OLS regressions and the 
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negative binomial regressions, evidence indicates partial support for Hypotheses 1b, 2, 
and 3b.   
Analysis on the direct effects of the incentive scheme, autonomy, and the board 
representation on portfolio companies’ performance 
 
 Although no significant relationships were found between the CVC programs’ 
structure characteristics and knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio 
companies, these structure characteristics may directly affect portfolio companies’ 
performance.  Thus, two logistic regression models were employed (Model 13 and 14) 
to test these direct impacts.  The results are shown in Table 5.12.  First, the dummy 
variable of going IPO within 5 years after the initial investment was used as the 
dependent variable.  It showed that after controlling for portfolio companies’ industries 
and their development stages, only the coefficient of monitoring mode was significant 
(β=-1.332, p<0.05), but the sign was opposite to what was expected.  Additionally, a 
dummy of going IPO within 3 years after the initial investment was used as dependent 
variable in Model 14.  Similar to Model 13, only the coefficient of monitoring mode 
was significant (β=-1.383, p<0.05), and the sign was again opposite to what was expected.  
Thus, the findings failed to support the hypothesized relationships. 
Analysis on the direct effects of the incentive scheme, autonomy, and the board 
representation on corporate investors’ innovativeness 
 
 Two negative binomial regressions models were also employed (Model 15 and 16) 
to examine whether these structure characteristics had direct effects on corporate 
investors’ innovativeness.  Table 5.12 presents the results. 
 Model 15 employed the citation-weighted patent counts as the dependent variable.  
To test the robustness, the pure patent count was used as the dependent variable in Model 
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16.  The models generated consistent results.  The coefficients for the extent to which 
an incentive scheme was dependent upon financial returns were negative and significant 
in both models (β=-.880, p<0.001; β=--.337, p<0.1).  This result provides evidence for 
the extent to which CVC managers were incentivized by financial returns is negatively 
related to corporate investors’ innovativeness.  However, the coefficients for the extent 
to which an incentive scheme was dependent upon strategic benefits were not significant.  
The coefficients of monitoring mode was significant in both models (β=-7.349, p<0.001; 
β=-3.257, p<0.05), but the sign was opposite to what I expected.   Similarly, the 
autonomous level of a CVC program significantly increased the corporate investor’s 
innovativeness.  This result is opposite to what was expected.  In sum, the findings 
were also similar to previous results of the OLS regressions and negative binomial 
regressions. 
DISCUSSION 
This section first evaluates the findings of study two in detail.  Next, a discussion of 
the contributions of the research is provided.  The limitations of the study, as well as 
future research directions are then addressed.  
Discussion of Findings 
Learning new knowledge has been regarded as one of the most important objectives 
of corporate venturing (e.g. Keil, 2002; McNally, 1997; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005).  
This study investigated outcomes of interorganizational learning from both the corporate 
investor’s and the portfolio company’s perspectives.  Through the theoretical lens of 
agency theory, I examined how the autonomy, types of incentive scheme, and monitoring 
mode of a CVC program influenced the knowledge flows between the corporate investor 
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and its portfolio companies, thereby impacting the corporate investor’s innovativeness, 
and the portfolio company’s performance.  Table 5.13 presents the study’s results, 
which are discussed in detail below. 
 Hypotheses pertaining to the impacts of CVC characteristics on portfolio 
company’s performance.  It was predicted that a VC-like incentive scheme and the 
board representation in portfolio companies would encourage CVC managers to transfer 
knowledge from corporate investors to portfolio companies, and ultimately enhance the 
portfolio companies’ performance.  The study provided support for the positive impact 
of knowledge flows on portfolio companies’ performance; however, the results did not 
show a significant relationship between the VC-like incentive scheme and the knowledge 
flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies.  It is possible that this lack of 
finding is because relatively few corporations have adopted VC-like incentive schemes 
(e.g. carried interests) in their CVC programs.  In our sample, only 2 out of 18 
responding firms reported the adoption of “carried interests”, and the mean score of the 
extent to which CVC managers’ compensation was dependent upon financial returns was 
2.08 out of 101.  Similarly, the findings didn’t provide significant evidence pertaining to 
the relationship between the board representation and the knowledge flows.  This result 
may be reflective of the fact that corporate investors primarily use the board 
representation to learn new technologies from portfolio companies, rather than to transfer 
knowledge to them.     
                                                 
1 In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which the compensation and incentive scheme for CVC managers 
were dependent upon financial benefits of CVC investments for the years 1996 to 2000.  The items were rated on an 11-point scale 
ranging from 0 = Not at all to 10 = Always.   
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Hypotheses pertaining to the impacts of CVC characteristics on corporate 
investor’s innovativeness.  Consistent with the expectations of Hypotheses 1b and 2, the 
results suggested that both a VC-like incentive scheme and autonomy may discourage 
CVC managers to transfer knowledge from portfolio companies to corporate investors.  
Surprisingly, a negative relationship was found between the knowledge flows from 
portfolio companies to corporate investors and corporate investors’ innovativeness.  
This finding may be due to limitations of the research design.  Corporate investors’ 
innovativeness was computed based on the historical patent data, while the data of 
knowledge flows were recently collected via survey data.  Thus, the negative 
relationship may reflect a reversed causality between corporate investors’ innovativeness 
and knowledge flows; that is, because corporate investors may suffer from the lack of 
technology innovativeness, they may learn from portfolio companies and generated 
affluent knowledge flows back to corporate investors.   
Additional regressions excluding the variable of ‘knowledge flows’ were also 
performed to investigate the direct effects of CVC characteristics on corporate investors’ 
innovativeness.  Similar to previous results, VC-like incentive scheme was negatively 
related to corporate investors’ innovativeness.  The finding implies that corporations 
should be cautious when adopting VC-like incentive schemes in their CVC programs.  
Interestingly, the relationship between autonomy and corporate investors’ innovativeness 
was positive.  Although autonomy may hinder the knowledge flows from portfolio 
companies to corporate investors, it may also allow CVC managers to explore new 
technologies or new markets, which in turn may increase corporate investors’ 
innovativeness.   
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In sum, the findings of the study contributed to the interorganizational learning 
literature by empirically analyzing the mutual learning processes in the context of 
corporate venturing.  The study extended prior literature in corporate venturing by 
revealing the underlying mechanism of interorganizational learning between the 
corporate investors and the portfolio companies.  Specifically, the results showed that 
the structural characteristics of CVC programs such as incentive scheme and autonomy 
may facilitate interorganizational knowledge flows, and ultimately influence portfolio 
companies’ performance and corporate investors’ innovativeness.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The use of surveys as a method of data collection can be considered a limitation to the 
study as self-report questionnaires have the potential for allowing response bias to affect 
the results.  For example, the corporate respondents may exaggerate the knowledge 
flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies, and underestimate the knowledge 
flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors.   
 Second, the study primarily investigated the impacts of incentive scheme, autonomy, 
and monitoring mode.  However, there are other factors that also influence the 
interorganizational learning processes between corporate investors and portfolio 
companies.  For example, Henderson and Lelux (2002) reported that the involvement of 
the business unit was positively related to the transfer of resources between the portfolio 
company (i.e., the CVC venture) and the parent, whereas business unit’s lack of 
commitment is a significant obstacle to resource transfer.  Thus, future research should 
extend this line research to other factors.  In particular, the relationship between a CVC 
program and existing business units deserves further investigation.   
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Chapter Six: Study Three 
Developing the Selection and Valuation Capabilities through Learning 
INTRODUCTION 
Before venture capitalists decide to invest in entrepreneurial firms1, they need to appraise 
the investment proposals in order to select the investment targets, and then evaluate and 
negotiate the value assigned to the target companies so as to calculate the number of 
shares they take after the investment.   In other words, venture capitalists need to 
possess two kinds of capabilities to improve the effectiveness of the appraisal and 
valuation process: (1) the selection capability that determines whether VC firms could 
invest in entrepreneurial companies with most financial potential, and (2) the valuation 
and negotiation capability that helps VC firms to take a fair proportion of the equity; 
otherwise the future financial returns may be eroded by overpricing the entrepreneurial 
company.  Both of the capabilities are crucial to the success of VC firms.  
In the context of corporate venture capital (CVC) investments, the issue of 
selection and valuation is more complex due to the strategic consideration inherent in 
CVC activities.  The high level of uncertainty associated with the potential strategic 
benefits as well as the lack of appropriate measurements make it more difficult for CVC 
programs to properly select and accurately evaluate their portfolio companies.  For 
example, CVC programs have been criticized for overpricing their investments as 
compared to independent VC firms (e.g. Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  Although there are 
a number of reasons underlying the valuation premium associated with CVC investments, 
one of the concerns falls in the inefficiency of corporate venture capital programs; 
                                                 
1 Once venture capitals invest in the entrepreneurial firm, it is called “the portfolio company”.  In this paper, these 
two terms are used interactively.  
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namely, entrepreneurial companies would be exploiting the incapability of CVC 
programs and exaggerate their value1.  Thus, how to develop the selection and valuation 
capabilities of CVC programs is an important issue relating to their ultimate performance.   
However, this question has not been explored in the literature.  To fill the gap, 
the purpose of this study is to investigate the question of how the CVC program can build 
their selection and valuation capabilities from the learning perspective.   
In addition, the learning literature suggests that initial conditions such as 
structural characteristics and resource endowment define the learning trajectory and 
influence the learning efficiency (Cockburn et al., 2000; Holbrook et al., 2000; Keil, 
2004; Raff, 2000; Teece, et al., 1997).  Therefore, the research focus of this study falls 
in the impacts of the structural and managerial characteristics of CVC programs – 
lifespan, stability, incentive schemes, and syndication with VC - as antecedents of 
learning mechanisms underlying the capability building process.  Since those structural 
and managerial characteristics are summarized using VC practice as the benchmark, this 
study also investigates to what extent the adoption of VC-like features influences the 
abilities of a CVC program to learn from its experience as well as to acquire knowledge 
from external resources.   
Thus, this study has three central arguments.  First, the selection and valuation 
capabilities positively affect a CVC program’s financial and strategic performance.  
Second, based on the learning perspective, I propose that CVC programs could develop 
the selection and valuation capabilities through both learning-by-doing and acquisitive 
                                                 
1 Besides the inefficiency of CVC programs, the valuation premiums may due to additional strategic benefits that 
independent venture capital investment can’t generate.  In addition, corporate venture capitalists may have “superior 
project selection ability” (Ivanor & Xie, 2003) that enables them to invest in companies with high success potentials.  
This type of companies will naturally generate higher valuation.    
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learning.  Third, the structural and managerial characteristics of a CVC program act as 
antecedents that will influence its learning ability. 
The findings of this study will contribute to the literature of CVC in two ways.  
First, by revealing the relations between the structures of CVC programs, and their 
selection and valuation capabilities, the findings of this study will offer directions on how 
to improve the appraisal and valuation operations of CVC programs from the perspective 
of organizational learning.  Second, this study will also help to further our 
understanding as to what extent the adoption of VC-like mode enhances the efficiency of 
CVC operations.  This finding will present new evidence for the debate over whether 
CVC programs should be designed “under the shadow of private venture capital” 
(Chesbrough, 2002, Birkingshaw & Hill, 2003; Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  In addition, 
this study will extend this line of organizational learning research by showing how 
structural and managerial characteristics of CVC programs influence not only the 
learning path but also the learning effectiveness in the capability development process.    
APPRAISAL AND VALUATION PROCESS 
The appraisal and valuation of VC investment proposals is a process including four 
sequential steps: initial screening, information gathering for due diligent, the assessment 
of risk and required return, and the choice and deployment of valuation methods (e.g., 
Fried & Hisrich, 1994, Manigart, Wright, Robbie, Desbrieres, & Waele, 1997).   First, 
through the initial screening, venture capitalists informally value the proposals according 
to their general investment criteria such as industry preference and investment stage 
preference.  Most of the proposals will be discarded either because they fail to meet 
such criteria or because they are clearly not viable on the basis of initial information 
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(Wright & Ribbie, 1996).  In the next step, information is gathered for due diligence.  
Venture capitalists collect both accounting and non-accounting information not only from 
the business plan but also from many other sources (Manighart, et al., 1997).  Third, 
venture capitalists use the information to assess the risk of the venture, adjust the desired 
rate of return, and estimate the future cash flows and profits potential.  Finally, one or 
more valuation method is used to compute the current value of the company.  Barrow 
and his colleagues (2001) conducted an international comparison of the venture capital 
valuation process and found most of the venture capitalists relied on simple valuation 
methods supported by extensive due diligence.  In addition, the ultimate valuation is 
also determined by the bargaining power of entrepreneurs versus venture capitalists 
(Gomper & Lerner, 1998), as well as their negotiation skills.   
Given the nature of the entrepreneurial companies, venture capitalists face a more 
difficult task of appraisal and valuation than other economic agents, for example, 
investment bankers, who typically deal with well-established companies.  First, because 
entrepreneurial companies are non-public and have few legal information requirements, 
the information gathering is more difficult than with public companies.  Second, venture 
capital investments are often very risky, due to the early stage of the company, the lack of 
historical record of the company, or high uncertainty associated with the new 
technologies and/or markets.  The high level of investment uncertainty makes it more 
difficult to determine the appropriate rate of return and estimate the potential profits in 
the future.  Third, there is no standard valuation method in the venture capital industry.  
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Price/Earnings multiples are two approaches 
frequently used although both of them pose particular problems in the context of venture 
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capital investments with high levels of uncertainty (Wright & Robbie, 1998).  Thus, 
many of the venture capitalists typically rely on rules of thumb or experience to estimate 
the future trend and set up the acceptable internal rates of return (IRRs) (Murray, 1991).  
Because of the highly uncertain investment environment, substantial subjective 
assessments and the lack of universal standards to guide the practice, the appraisal and 
valuation of a venture capital investment is a complicated and difficult task.  Venture 
capitalists could make investment decisions based on different information, different risk 
assessment and different valuation methods.  However, whatever information and 
techniques they use, the selection of a target entrepreneurial company is mostly 
determined by the forecasting of its future financial performance.  Likewise, an 
appropriate value assigned to an entrepreneurial company should be positively related to 
the potential financial return it generates for the investor.  Thus, if a venture capitalist 
expects a higher value appreciation from the investment, he/she is more likely to make a 
positive investment decision and the entrepreneurial company associated with the 
investment will be evaluated higher.   
CVC programs experience a similar appraisal and valuation process; however, the 
appraisal and valuation task is more challenging because corporate investors also enjoy 
strategic benefits from their involvement with portfolio firms.  First, the selection of 
investment targets may be not only influenced by the potential financial returns, but also 
determined by the desired strategic benefits.   
Likewise, the value assigned to the entrepreneurial company should also be 
affected by the strategic surplus generated by the investments.  Similar to a bargaining 
process, appraisal and valuation involves negotiations about how to allocate the final net 
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gain satisfactorily between venture capitalists and their portfolio companies (Nash, 1950).  
In the case of CVC, the final net gain includes not only financial benefits but also 
additional strategic surplus.  Thus, according to the standard bargaining model (Nash, 
1950), corporate investors have to share the additional strategic surplus with their 
portfolio companies in addition to financial gains to reach an agreement that satisfies 
both parties.  The sharing of the strategic benefits will be in the form of less equity 
taking compared to the same amount venture capital investment without strategic benefits, 
resulting in the valuation premium assigned to the portfolio company1.   
In sum, to appraise and evaluate the entrepreneurial companies, CVC programs 
not only need to estimate the future financial returns but also need to assess the potential 
strategic synergies generated from the collaboration between the two companies.  In the 
context of CVC investments, the selection of investment targets is determined by both the 
potential financial returns and the desired strategic objectives.  In addition, the 
appropriate value assigned to the entrepreneurial company should be positively related to 
both the potential financial and strategic benefits. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHSES 
The Selection and Valuation Capabilities  
As describe in an earlier section, appraisal and valuation is a broad process from 
information gathering and due diligence, to profit estimation and evaluation, and finally 
to negotiation.  Thus, it requires a nexus of a range of venture capital investment 
abilities.  They include the ability to gather appropriate information from multiple 
sources, the ability to make extensive and deep analyses of the information, the ability to 
appropriately assess the risk and set up the desired rate of return, the ability to estimate 
                                                 
1 See Appendix C for the detailed proof. 
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the future cash flow and the potential returns, the ability to estimate the strategic benefits, 
and the ability to utilize the appropriate valuation methods, and the ability to negotiate 
and reach the agreements with entrepreneurial companies (e.g. Wright & Robbie, 1998).   
In practice, these abilities, collectively, help CVC managers effectively select the 
most potential target companies, and enable them to reach a fair price for their strategic 
investments by accurately evaluating their portfolio companies.  They may interact with 
each other and it is impossible to separate them apart.  However, theoretically these 
abilities may be simply combined into two major capabilities in accordance with the 
outcomes associated: (1) selection capability and (2) valuation and negotiation capability, 
so that we can test the relationships between the structural characteristics of a CVC 
program and the development of each capability.   
Here, I define the selection capability as the CVC program’s abilities to identify 
exceptionally promising portfolio companies according to its investment objectives.  
This kind of capability enables CVC programs to invest in entrepreneurial companies that 
are more likely to generate desired strategic benefits and financial returns.  
Consequently, a positive relationship is more likely to be observed between an 
investment in an entrepreneurial company from a CVC program with selection capability 
and the entrepreneurial company’s subsequent financial performance and strategic 
benefits1 (e.g., Baum & Silverman, 2002; Shepherd et al., 2000).  On the other hand, 
CVC programs with poor selection capability may encounter difficulty in identifying 
promising companies, and are more likely to invest in companies that fail to generate the 
desired strategic and financial benefits.  Thus, CVC programs without the selection 
                                                 
1 The subsequent performance is also determined by the “coaching” ability associated with the CVC 
programs (e.g. Baum & Silverman, 2002; Jain & Kini, 1995; Hellmann & Puri, 2002).   
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capability are more likely to result in poor performance regardless of their valuation and 
negotiation capability.   
The valuation and negotiation capability is defined as the abilities to accurately 
evaluate the portfolio companies, as well as reach a fair price through negotiation.  Poor 
valuation and negotiation capability may lower the financial returns even though a VC 
firm could select the appropriate company to invest.  Without the valuation and 
negotiation capability, CVC programs would either overprice or underprice their 
investing targets, both of which may negatively influence the ultimate financial returns 
and strategic benefits.  In the case of overpricing, the valuation premiums of the 
entrepreneurial companies reduce the proportion of shares CVC programs receive in 
return for their investment and thus decrease their ultimate returns.  On the other hand, 
given the assumption that entrepreneurs have more information and have a better idea 
about the current value of their ventures, they are less likely to accept the valuation that 
will unfairly dilute their shares in the entrepreneurial companies.  So the deal is less 
likely to be materialized if it underprices the venture, and the CVC program may lose the 
opportunity of potential financial returns and strategic benefits.   
Thus, in order to examine whether a CVC program possesses the valuation and 
negotiation capability, we need to look at whether the CVC program can evaluate the 
portfolio companies corresponding to their quality; in other words, whether the CVC 
program can assign low value to portfolio companies with less financial as well as 
strategic potential, and assign high value to those with more.  Thus, we should observe, 
when the CVC program possesses such valuation and negotiation capability, significant 
relations exist between the value assigned to the portfolio companies, and the strategic 
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benefits as well as the financial returns generated by such investment; if the CVC 
program doesn’t possess such capability, the significant relations will diminish or even 
disappear.   
In sum, the two capabilities are complementary to each other and CVC programs 
have to possess both to increase the probability of desired financial returns as well as 
strategic benefits. 
Capability Development through Learning 
Learning enables firms to perform their activities in improved ways.  Likewise, 
CVC programs can build the selection and valuation capabilities by either learning from 
their own experience by repetitive practice, or learning from independent VC firms 
through collaboration.  Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 3, the learning literature 
suggests that initiative conditions such as organizational structures may influence the 
learning direction and effectiveness.  In the context of CVC activities, four structural 
characteristics - lifespan, stability, incentive schemes, and syndication with VC - may 
constrain the learning trajectory of a CVC program and influence its learning 
effectiveness.  Specifically, the lifespan and stability of a CVC program will influence 
both the quantity and quality of its experience, and then impact its learning effectiveness.  
Different incentive schemes (VC-like vs. CVC traditional) will simulate the CVC 
program to focus on a specific learning area and then determine the direction of learning.  
The syndication with VC firms will provide the accessibility of acquisitive learning.  
The proposed models are presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
Lifespan of a CVC Program.  The dynamic capabilities literature suggests that 
experience accumulation is the central learning process by which capabilities are 
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developed (Zollo & Winter, 2002).  The routines or existing capabilities are the outcome 
of trial and error learning and the selection and retention of past behavior (Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000).  The learning curve effects arise when firms continuously undertake 
an activity.  Empirically, research shows that in manufacturing settings such as 
producing airframes or microprocessors, more experience improves product performance 
and reduces product costs (e.g. Argote, 1999; Argote, Beckman & Epple, 1990; see, 
Yelle, 1979 for a review).    
In the context of CVC investment, selection and valuation is a process full of 
subjective assessment and lacking of standard guidelines, thereby emphasizing the 
importance of tacit knowledge.  The difficulty in explicit knowledge articulation and 
codification makes experience accumulation particularly important to the valuation 
capability development during the appraisal and valuation process.  Some researchers 
have argued that the valuation premiums associated with CVC investments simply reflect 
the lack of experience of CVC programs compared to independent VC firms (e.g. 
AbuZayyad et al., 1996).  As a result, entrepreneurs could be exploiting the relative 
inabilities of the CVC investors during the appraisal and valuation process, in particular 
at the presence of information asymmetry (Arrow, 1985).  They may provide incomplete 
information to disguise the low success probability or exaggerate the potential strategic 
benefits to the corporate investor, thereby persuading them to invest in “lemon” 
companies or overvalued transactions.  
The lack of experience of CVC programs is partially due to their shorter lifespan 
compared to that of independent VC firms.  The latter has a typical lifespan of 10 years 
predetermined by the limited partnership agreement.  In contrast, the duration of a CVC 
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program is not protected by the legal agreement.  A CVC program can be terminated 
much earlier if the parent company changes its strategic profile or the top management 
team loses interest in it (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).   
Unlike routine activities such as production, R&D, marketing, and accounting, 
that continuously occur along with the life of a company, CVC activities are irregular and 
typically confined to the lifespan of a CVC program.  The longer a CVC program exists, 
the more CVC activities it may undertake, and the more experience it can accumulate, the 
better it can learn from the experience to build its selection and valuation capabilities.  
Ultimately, these capabilities may assist CVC programs in generating superior financial 
as well as strategic performance. 
Thus, I propose: 
H1a: The lifespan of a CVC program is positively related to the financial benefits 
associated with its investments. 
H1b: The lifespan of a CVC program is positively related to the strategic benefits 
associated with its investments. 
H1c: The lifespan of a CVC program moderates the relation between the value 
assigned to the portfolio company, and the financial benefits generated by such 
investment.  That is, a positive relationship is more significant when the CVC program 
has long lifespan than it has short lifespan.   
H1d: The lifespan of a CVC program moderates the relation between the value 
assigned to the portfolio company, and the strategic benefits generated by such 
investment.  That is, a positive relationship is more significant when the CVC program 
has long lifespan than when it has short lifespan.   
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Stability of a CVC program. Experience accumulation is not only dependent upon 
the quantity but also quality of the experience.  Researchers have argued that the quality 
of the experience is more significant at unclearly defined problems.  The literature has 
suggested that experience curve effects are questionable whether they hold for strategic 
decisions like acquisitions (e.g. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002).   
Likewise, the experience accumulation ability of corporate venture capitalists may 
be confounded when they face CVC decisions.  First, CVC activities are heterogeneous 
with diverse objectives (e.g. McNally, 1997; Maula, 2001).  Therefore, inferences from 
prior CVC investments differ in the extent to which they are relevant for a focal CVC 
investment.  Second, the high level of uncertainty in conjunction with the high failure 
rate in the venture capital market leads to significant variation in a firm’s CVC 
investment performance.  This impacts the intensity with which managers search for 
inferences from those experiences (Levinthal & March, 1993; Weick, 1979).  Third, the 
pursuit of strategic benefits makes it difficult to measure CVC performance 
unambiguously, which further increases the possibilities that managers may draw wrong 
inferences or misapply those inferences (Hayward, 2002).  Finally, CVC activities occur 
irregularly. Compared to independent VC firms, CVC programs are less stable due to 
internal pressures from the parent and the frequent personnel change.  Thus, those 
inferences may not be generated and applied in a timely fashion (Huber, 1991).  All this 
suggests that the quantity of experience in CVC activities may be insufficient to ensure 
capability development.  The development of the selection and valuation capabilities is 
also dependent upon the quality of such experience.   
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The stability of a CVC program is the major structural characteristic that 
influences the quality of CVC experience as well as the effectiveness of experience 
accumulation.  The stability of a CVC program has two manifestations: constant 
objectives and consistent operation.  CVC programs are typically not as stable as 
independent VC firms in both aspects.   
First, as discussed in Chapter Two, corporations tend to have multiple goals in 
their CVC activities (Maula, 2001), and many CVC programs lack well-defined 
long-standing missions (Fast 1978; Siegel, et al., 1988).  Unlike independent VC firms 
that steadily focus on financial returns, CVC programs struggle with the balance between 
financial and strategic goals, and even worse, the priorities of different strategic goals 
keep changing along with the internal and external conditions (Brody & Ehrlich, 1998).  
Thus, the dissimilarity between CVC investments makes inferences from prior CVC 
investments differ in the extent to which they are relevant for a focal CVC investment.  
In addition, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) reported a U-shaped relation between 
acquisition experience and acquisition performance.  This finding demonstrates that 
there is an experience threshold of appropriate generalization for similar activities.  If a 
CVC program frequently changes its objectives, it may never reach such an experience 
threshold for any type of CVC activity and fall in the cycle of failure-new trials-failure 
again.   
Second, due to the lack of legal agreements between investors and fund managers, 
many CVC programs experienced operation discontinuity along with the ups and downs 
in the venture capital market.  The duration of CVC programs is also determined by the 
preference of the parent company’s top management team (Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  
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In many cases, new top management teams look at CVC programs as expensive “pet 
projects” of their predecessors, and are reluctant to make sufficient commitment 
(Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  Under this circumstance, even a successful CVC program 
may be terminated early.  The discontinuous operation of a CVC program leads to 
uneven temporal intervals between CVC investments, which cripple the CVC program’s 
learning ability.   
Research has reported that a very long or very short interval between two projects 
hampers project development (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Gersick 1994).  On the one 
hand, very long intervals increase the likelihood that inferences from prior experiences 
are unavailable, inaccessible and inapplicable (Argote, Beckman, & Epple, 1990; 
Ginsberg & Baum, 1998).  Managers are more reluctant to codify learning and 
otherwise generate inferences from activities that they do not expect to repeat (Winter & 
Szulanski, 1998).  Further, learning resides in routines, as well as the people who know 
how to operate those routines (Levitt & March, 1988).  These people are more likely to 
have left the program or moved to another division during the long interval between two 
CVC investments, and unable to apply the inference to the focal investment.  Some 
scholars pointed out that CVC programs are less active than independent VC firms, 
which may result in their inexperience compared to independent VC firms.  In the 
sample of venture capital investments in the U.S. from 1983 to 1994, the corporate 
venture capital programs made a mean of 4.4 investments during its lifespan while the 
independent funds made 43.5 investments (Gompers & Lerner, 1998). 
On the other hand, CVC programs may be unable to generate meaningful 
inferences during a very short interval due to the “time compression diseconomies” 
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(Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  Acquisition fieldwork and laboratory experiments have 
shown that mangers cannot carefully evaluate acquisitions that occur in quick succession 
(Haunschild, David-Blake & Fichman, 1994). Preoccupied with doing the next deal, 
these managers ignore inferences from prior acquisitions (Haunschild et al., 1994).  
Similarly, very short intervals between CVC investments prevent inference from taking 
root and being applied in a timely fashion.  
Based on the above discussion, I propose that 
H2a: The stability of a CVC program is positively related to the financial benefits 
associated with its investments. 
H2b: The stability of a CVC program is positively related to the strategic benefits 
associated with its investments. 
H2c: The stability of a CVC program moderates the relation between the value 
assigned to the portfolio company, and the financial benefits generated by such 
investment.  That is, a positive relationship is more significant when the CVC program 
is stable than when it isn’t.   
H2d: The stability of a CVC program moderates the relation between the value 
assigned to the portfolio company, and the strategic benefits generated by such 
investment.  That is, a positive relationship is more significant when the CVC program 
is stable than when it isn’t.   
Incentive scheme of a CVC program. Many researchers have pointed out that 
seasoned fund managers are crucial to venture capital investments.  As I discussed 
previously, tacit knowledge embedded in VC managers is particularly important for the 
appraisal and valuation of an investment proposal since this process is full of substantial 
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subjective assessments and lacking of universal standards.  On the other hand, VC 
managers also overload with information during the process.  For example, a VC 
manager can be flooded by thousands of business plans.  And for each business plan of 
interest, he or she should collect information from multiple sources and make analyses 
considering multiple factors.  Thus, VC managers tend to summarize some rules of 
thumb based on prior experience to reduce the information processing load.   
However, learning from experience is a tedious process as well.  People typically 
simplify the process by focusing attention to specific areas.  In other words, people will 
decide what to learn and what not to learn.  The general criterion to discern what is 
worth learning depends upon whether the incremental benefits derived from learning 
exceed the incremental costs of pursuing it (Winter, 2000).  Thus, the incentive scheme 
of a CVC program should play an important role in determining the learning direction of 
its CVC managers.  
As I discussed in the Chapter Two, there is a spectrum of incentive schemes 
among CVC programs in accordance to the extent to which the VC-like incentive system 
is adopted.  A number of corporations have adopted VC-like incentive schemes in their 
CVC programs in order to attract and retain sophisticated and experienced VC managers 
to manage their funds.  As high as 20 percent of profit sharing stimulates fund managers 
to maximize financial returns, and so how to appraise and evaluate the portfolio 
companies from the financial perspective becomes their learning locus.  On the other 
hand, since strategic benefits won’t be rewarded as much as financial returns, learning 
how to accurately estimate the potential strategic benefits becomes less of a concern.  In 
contrast, this kind of learning will be emphasized by CVC managers who are 
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compensated based on the traditional salary-bonus-option incentive systems.  Under this 
incentive system, strategic benefits are more significant than financial returns in that the 
former will benefit the parent company and relevant to managers’ personal career 
development within the organization.   
The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
H3a: The adoption of VC-like incentive scheme of a CVC program is positively 
related to the financial benefits associated with its investments. 
H3b: The adoption of VC-like incentive scheme of a CVC program is negatively 
related to the strategic benefits associated with its investments. 
H3c: The adoption of VC-like incentive scheme of a CVC program moderates the 
relation between the value assigned to the portfolio company, and the financial benefits 
generated by such investment.  That is, a positive relationship is more significant when 
the CVC program adopts the VC-like incentive scheme than when it doesn’t.   
H3d: The adoption of VC-like incentive scheme of a CVC program moderates the 
relation between the value assigned to the portfolio company, and the strategic benefits 
generated by such investment.  That is, a positive relationship is less significant when 
the CVC program adopts the VC-like incentive scheme than when it does.   
Syndication with independent VC firms.  As discussed in the Chapter Three, 
organizational learning is not limited to internal activity but also results from assimilating 
and utilizing knowledge generated outside the firm (e.g. Deeds, et al., 1999; Zahra, et al., 
1999).  The acquisitive learning is crucial for capability development.  First, it is 
essential for the development of a new capability because the firm doesn’t have prior 
experience.  The borrowed experience frequently forms the basis for the development of 
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new capabilities (Teece, et al., 1997).  Most CVC programs are novel to venture capital 
investments; therefore acquiring knowledge about how to appraise and evaluate their 
portfolio companies from external sources and applying it to the CVC context becomes 
highly important to capability development and critical to ultimate performance.  
Second, acquisitive learning is also vital for capability evolution.  The path of capability 
development is constrained by the existing capabilities and assets because the learning 
myopia makes the search for new knowledge close to current knowledge base and 
capability (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Levanthal & March, 1993).  Thus, most of these 
firms have limited capabilities that are narrowly focused on a few specific applications.  
For example, a CVC program could excel in estimating the strategic benefits while being 
poor at predicting the financial returns.  To avoid being trapped in existing capabilities 
and assets, firms should broaden their horizons and access to the external knowledge 
source.  The literature has suggested that external sources of knowledge are critical to 
innovation (e.g. Rosenberg & Steinmuller, 1988; Saxenian, 1990).   
However, some knowledge assets lack mobility.  For example, tacit knowledge 
is linked to individuals, and is very difficult to articulate and imitate without direct 
observation (Inkpen & Dinu, 1998).  Thus, strong ties and collaborations, such as 
alliances, are necessary for the transfer of such knowledge over organizational boundaries 
(Bresman et al. 1999; Kogut & Zander 1992; Mowery et al. 1996; Steensma 1996; 
Steensma & Lyles 2000).  Numerous studies have identified learning and knowledge 
acquisition as important motivations for entering interorganizational relationships such as 
alliances (Badaracco, 1991, Hamel et al. 1989, Hamel 1991, Inkpen 1996, Kogut 1988).  
In addition, social capital (Yli-Renko et al. 2001) and prior collaboration experiences 
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(Mowery et al, 1996; Simonin, 1999) are factors facilitating the interorganizational 
learning.  
Venture capital syndication is the most significant alliance form in the venture 
capital industry (Wright & Lockett, 2003).  Venture capital syndication is analog to 
equity joint ventures in that two or more sponsors invest equity in an independent legal 
entity, and their returns are determined by the performance of the entity.  Because of the 
strong ties of equity investment, syndication partners share expertise and give each other 
“the second opinion”, which lead to better decisions about whether and how to invest in 
firms (Lerner, 1994).  Therefore, by syndicating with prestigious VC firms, CVC 
programs could observe and further learn the best practices in the industry.  Thus, more 
syndication experience with venture capitalists will help CVC programs to build 
appraisal and valuation capabilities.   
In addition, syndication provides corporate venturing managers a frontier to make 
networks in the venture capital industry.  The knowledge exchange through networking 
is another important source for acquisitive learning. 
Although collaboration with VC firms will provide access to external experience 
and help CVC programs build their selection and valuation capabilities, the knowledge 
obtained from VC firms is oriented toward financial consideration.  In other words, this 
knowledge is useful for CVC programs to build the ability to select and evaluate their 
portfolio from the financial perspective, but may be irrelevant to the capability of 
evaluating the strategic potentials.  Thus, I propose that:  
H4a: The syndication activities with VC firms of a CVC program is positively 
related to the financial benefits associated with its investments. 
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H4b: The syndication activities with VC firms of a CVC program moderates the 
relation between the value assigned to the portfolio company, and the financial benefits 
generated by such investment.  That is, a positive relationship is more significant when 
the CVC program undertakes more syndication activities than when it undertakes less 
syndication activities.  
METHODOLOGY 
Research Design 
Similar to the first and second studies, the present study utilized a longitudinal, 
correlational design, and an unbalanced panel data set was consequently generated from 
archival records and survey.   
Data Collection 
Archival data collection. Similar to the first and second studies, multiple archival 
sources were used, including the VentureXpert database, Computstat (North American), 
SDC M&A database, and LexisNexis. 
Survey.  The same as the second study (see the Appendix B). 
Sample.  The unit of analysis for the third study was individual CVC 
investments.  Thus, the population included all of the CVC investments in the United 
States since 1969.  Again, VentureXpert database was primarily used to construct the 
population.   
  The sample employed to test the focal research questions was restricted to CVC 
investments during the period of time from 1996 to 2000.  There are several reasons that 
I chose this time frame.  First, the years from 1996 to 2000 were a period of growth in 
the CVC investment cycle (see Figure 2.2), and thus the assumption that entrepreneurial 
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companies would walk away from the undervalued offers was more likely to be satisfied.  
Second, fluctuations in the private equity market may significantly influence CVC 
evaluations (Gompers & Lerner, 2000).  Thus, a monotonous increasing period of 
1996-2000 can avoid such confounding impacts.  I further restricted the time-specific 
effects in the data analysis.  Third, the time frame of 1996 to 2000 was the most 
prosperous period in the CVC history, and saw over 8,600 CVC investments1 which 
provide sufficient data points for multivariate analysis.  In addition, there exist a time 
lag between an investment and its outcomes.  Thus, this time frame allowed for 
collection of outcome data within 5 years after the investment.  Finally, the data of 
incentive scheme were obtained through survey.  This time frame was appealing for 
reasons of economy of time and cost, as well as data availability. 
 The base sample consisted of 3,037 CVC investments by 208 US public companies 
during the period 1996-2000.  A total of 2,358 portfolio companies received CVC 
investments in the five years.  Due to the missing financial data of valuation, the final 
sample without survey data consisted of 1,737 investments covering 152 firms and 1,057 
portfolio companies.  Among the 152 firms, 18 firms returned the survey questionnaires, 
and the sample with survey data comprised 178 CVC investments received by 140 
portfolio companies.  The summary of the samples is demonstrated in Table 6.1.  
Because only one variable (incentive scheme) was measured through the survey, and 
because the survey provided a very small portion of the data, data analyses were made 
with and without the survey data, respectively. 
                                                 
1 If only including CVC investments associated with public companies, the sample size shrinks to 
approximately 3000 observations.  
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 To test whether the final sample was biased, the samples with and without valuation 
data were compared relative to corporate investors’ assets and sales, the number of 
previous investments, CVC age, the mean and variance of previous investment intervals, 
investment preference (development stage and industry), and the time difference between 
investment and IPO.  For most of the indictors, no significant difference was found 
between the two samples.  However, the t-tests did demonstrate that the sample with 
valuation had significantly more previous investments, and the portfolio companies in 
this sample took less time to go public if they did so.  Table 6.2 presents the results.  
Measures 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the impact of the structural and 
managerial characteristics of a CVC program on its selection and valuation capability 
development.  The variables were operationalized by measures that were either newly 
developed for the study, or adopted from the literature.  This section describes how each 
variable were measured as well as the rationale behind each measurement.  A summary 
of the major measures is presented in Table 6.3. 
Dependent Variables: 
Valuation.  The valuation refers to the value of the entrepreneurial company 
when venture capitals invest in it.  In the venture capital industry, two types of 
valuations exist: the pre-money valuation and the post-money valuation.  The former is 
computed as the product of the price paid per share in the financing round and the shares 
outstanding before the financial round, while the latter is defined as the product of the 
price paid per share in the financial round and the shares outstanding after the financial 
round.   In fact, the two types of valuations are the same in terms of the price per share 
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because pre-money valuations don’t exist until an investment is completed (Amram, 
2002).  The size of the investment, the percent of the equity taken, and the pre-money 
valuation are offered at the same time (Amram, 2002).  Here is an example of how the 
pre-money as well as the post-money valuations are calculated.  A venture capitalist 
would be willing to invest $10 million and take 20% of the shares in the financial round.  
The entrepreneur then calculates that her share of the firm would be worth $40 million 
before the financial round (pre-money valuation), and the total firm value would be $50 
million after the financial round (post-money valuation).  The price per share is the 
same for both the pre-money valuation and the post-money valuation.  
Some scholars argued that the per-money valuation is a more appropriate 
dependent variable than the post-money valuation because it is independent of the 
amount invested in the firm during the current financing round (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; 
Lerner, 1994).  The present study used both the post-money valuation and the 
pre-money valuation.  The post-money valuation data were obtained directly from the 
VentureXpert database1.  The pre-money valuation was calculated as the difference 
between the post-money valuation and the disclosed amount of money a portfolio 
company received in the financing round.  There are more missing data in pre-money 
valuation than post-money valuation.  
Strategic benefits.  Evaluating the strategic benefits a CVC investment could 
generate for its corporate investor is complex.  In the present study, I used several 
proxies to capture this variable.  Based on the perspective of resource dependence, the 
alliances between corporate investors and their portfolio companies after the investments 
reflect strategic interdependence between the two parties (e.g. Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976).  
                                                 
1 The pre-money valuation is not available in VentureXpert.  
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Obviously, the more strategic fit a portfolio company has to its corporate investor, the 
more likely they are to form a certain kind of strategic alliance to exploit strategic 
synergy.  Moreover, a corporate investor may acquire its portfolio company if it 
displays great strategic importance (e.g. Hardymon, DeNino & Salter, 1983).  Indeed, 
based on a study of 20 Japanese venture capital firms, most of which were affiliated with 
big corporations, Hurry et al. (1992) found that CVC programs typically materialize 
strategic benefits in the form of joint programs for product development or acquisitions 
of their portfolio companies.  Thus, the present study first used a categorical variable to 
capture strategic benefits: (1) acquired by corporate investors; (2) forming alliances with 
corporate investor; and (3) others.   
To test the moderator effects of CVC structural characteristics, two dummy 
variables were created to measure the strategic benefits. One dummy indicated whether a 
portfolio company was acquired by its corporate investor; namely, the value of one was 
assigned if the portfolio company was acquired by its corporate investor; other wise, the 
value of zero was assigned.  Likewise, the other dummy was used to indicate whether a 
portfolio company formed any strategic alliances with its corporate investor after 
receiving the CVC investment.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the strategic benefits associated with CVC investments 
are diverse.  Thus, portfolio companies may be involved in a variety of alliances 
depending upon the corporate investors’ strategic objectives.  For example, if a portfolio 
company is developing new technologies that are a fit to its corporate investor’s strategic 
objectives, its corporate investor is more likely to be willing to form a R&D alliance for 
technology development.  Alternatively, if a corporate investor use CVC investments to 
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leverage its resources, it may be more likely to form a marketing alliance with its 
portfolio companies.  Thus, in addition to the general measure of whether a strategic 
alliance was formed after the CVC investment, a series of dummy variables were utilized 
to identify the types of alliances (e.g., R&D, marketing, and manufacturing) in which the 
portfolio companies had involved after the CVC investments; so that I could investigate 
the impact of the structural and managerial characteristics of a CVC program on different 
types of strategic benefits. 
Financial benefits.  The direct measurement of financial returns is challenging 
because the data are not available for portfolio companies that have not gone public or 
been acquired.  The literature has suggested that venture capitalists generate most of 
their profits from portfolio companies that go public (Gompers & Lerner 1998).  A 
Venture Economics study (1988) reports that a $1 investment in a portfolio company that 
goes public provides an average cash return of $1.95 over a 4.2-year mean holding period.  
Thus, I used the success or failure of a portfolio company (e.g. IPO or being acquired) 
after receiving the CVC investment as a proxy to measure the financial benefits 
associated with the investment.  A total of three dummies were employed.  One 
dummy variable took on the value of 1 if the portfolio company had gone public within 
five years after the investment; one took on the value of 1 if the portfolio company had 
been acquired within five years after the investment; and the other took on the value of 1 
if the portfolio company was no longer in business within five years after the investment.  
In addition, I constructed a categorical variable according to the four possible statuses of 
a portfolio company after the CVC investment: (1) IPO; (2) Being acquired; (3) Keeping 
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private; (4) Defunct.  This categorical variable was used in the multinomial logistic 
regressions.   
In addition, the span between the times of the investment and going public may 
also influence a CVC program’s financial returns.  The shorter span suggests a quicker 
investment return, and thus more investments may be undertaken in a certain period of 
time given a certain amount of fund.  Thus, the present study used the span in months 
between the times of the investment and going public as a proxy to capture financial 
benefits associated with the investment.  For those portfolio companies that did not go 
public or were acquired favorably within five years after the investment, a maximum 
value of 60 was assigned.  Finally, the score was reversed by being subtracted from 61.  
So in the regression analysis, I would expect a significant positive sign of its coefficient.   
Independent Variables: 
Lifespan.  According to Gompers and Lerner (1998), the lifespan of a venture 
capital firm can be measured in two ways: (1) the total number of investments conducted 
before the focal investment and (2) the time span in years between its first investment and 
the focal investment (Gompers & Lerner, 1998).   
Both of the measures, however, may be associated with potential problems in that 
they both assume that CVC programs are in continuous operation and the experience 
accumulation is constant over time.  However, it is not always true in the case of CVC 
activities.  As I discussed previously, CVC programs are typically not as stable as VC 
firms because of the lack of legal agreements.  Corporate investors could terminate their 
CVC programs due to external or internal reasons, and reactivate them at a later time.   
Obviously, operation discontinuity may interrupt experience accumulation, and even start 
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over the accumulation process.  To reflect the impact of operation discontinuity, two 
more measures were used in the present study: (1) the number of investments for the 
latest continuous period before the focal investment, and (2) the time span in years of the 
latest continuous period before the focal investment.  In the present study, a continuous 
period is defined as a period during which a CVC program made at least one CVC 
investment per year.  To test the robustness, both two-year and three-year time frames 
were also employed.   
Stability.  In this study, stability was measured from two dimensions: continuity 
of operation, and consistency of investment objectives, and reliability of CVC managers.  
Similar to Hayward (2002), the temporal interval between prior investments was used to 
capture operation continuity.  Specifically, two variables were adopted to measure how 
frequently a CVC program managed its CVC activities: (1) the mean time and (2) the 
variation of intervals between two investments before the focal investment.  If there was 
no prior investment, the value of zero was assigned. 
To measure consistency of a CVC program’s investment objectives, I looked at 
the similarity of prior industries it invested in.  Adopted from Hayward (2002), industry 
similarity was measured by the percentage of prior investments that conformed to the 
same industry according to the Venture Economics Industry Codes.  For example, in the 
case of four investments, if all prior investments are within the same industry, the score 
was 1; if no investments are in the same industry, the score was 0; if two investments are 
in the same industry, the score was 0.5.  
I also looked at the similarity of the portfolio company stage before the focal 
investment. In VentureXpert, portfolio companies at investment date are coded into 
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several stage categories: seed/startup, early stage, expansion, later stage, 
buyout/acquisition, and others.  Similar to industry similarity, stage similarity was 
measured by the percentage of prior investments that conformed to the same stage 
category.  For both types of similarity, if there was no investment prior to the focal one, 
the value of zero was assigned.  
Incentive scheme.  In order to measure the characteristics of CVC managers’ 
compensation during the focal period, respondents were asked: (1) the extent to which the 
compensation and incentive scheme for CVC managers were dependent upon financial 
returns of CVC investments for the years 1996 to 2000; and (2) the extent to which the 
compensation and incentive scheme for CVC managers were dependent upon strategic 
benefits of CVC investments for the years 1996 to 2000.  The items were rated on a 
11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 = Not at all to 10 = Always. 
 Syndication.  In the present study, the frequency of syndication activities was 
measured objectively; that is, the percentage of syndicated investments to total 
investments before the focal one.  If there was no investment prior to the focal one, the 
value of zero was assigned.   
Control Variables.  
Similar to the previous studies, three groups of control variables were included in the 
present study to control for portfolio company specific effects, corporate investor specific 
effects, and environmental effects.  
Portfolio company control variables.  The same two attributes associated with 
portfolio companies used in the second study will be employed as controls in the present 
study; namely, the portfolio company’s industry, and development stage. 
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Corporate investor control variables.  Consistent with prior research (e.g., Gulati, 
1995), I considered that organization size may approximate resource endowments of 
corporate investors and influence their CVC activities. The measure of firm size is the 
logarithmic transformation of assets (in millions). The data were gathered from 
Compustat.   
Environment control variables.  Gompers and Lerner (2000) reported that the 
valuation level of portfolio companies was significantly influenced by fund inflows in the 
venture capital market.  Thus, the total venture capital investment per year was 
employed as a control in the present study.  In addition, a year dummy variable was 
used to control for the time-fixed effects.  
Data Analysis 
This section elaborates on the data analysis techniques that were utilized to validate the 
measures and test the hypotheses.  SPSS and STATA statistical packages were used to 
conduct most of the data analyses.  
The present study primarily used multivariate linear regressions as the statistical 
analysis technique.  To test the moderator relations, hierarchical regressions were 
employed.  
In addition, since two of the dependent variables of financial as well as strategic 
outcomes are categorical variables, the hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, and 4a were 
tested using the multinomial logistic regression models.  Multinomial logistic regression 
involves nominal response variables more than two categories. Multinomial logistic 
models are multi-equation models. A response variable with k categories will generate 
k-1 equations. Each of these k-1 equations is a binary logistic regression comparing a 
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group with the reference group. Multinomial logistic regression simultaneously estimates 
the k-1 logits.  
Multivariate linear regression models and multinomial logistic regression 
models. Hypotheses 1a and 2a predicted that the lifespan and stability of a CVC program 
are positively related to the financial benefits associated with its investments.  Likewise, 
Hypotheses 3a and 4a also proposed that the adoption of VC-like incentive scheme and 
syndication activities with VC firms are positively related to the financial benefits 
associated with the investments.  To test the proposed relations, I specified the 
following multivariate linear regression model (1): 
SYNINCEVCSTABCVCLIFECVCTIMEPSUCC 43210 ____ ααααα ++++=  
Controls+  
where PSUCC_TIME denotes the time span a portfolio company took to go public after 
receiving a CVC investment; and multinomial logistic regression models (2), (3), and (4): 
SYNINCEVCSTABCVCLIFECVC
P
P
Log
fi
fi
43210 ___)1
( ααααα ++++=−  
errorscontrols ++   ( i = 1, 2, or 3) 
where Pf1 is the probability of going public after receiving a CVC investment, Pf2 is the 
probability of being acquired after a CVC investment, Pf3 is the probability of being 
defunct after receiving a CVC investment.  The reference group in the multinomial 
logistic regression was “keeping private”  
To support H1a, H2a, H3a, and H4a, I expected the coefficients for CVC programs’ 
lifespan (CVC_LIFE), stability (CVC_STAB), adoption of VC incentive scheme 
(VC_INCE), and syndication activities with VC firms (SYN) to be positive and 
significant in Model 1, 2, and 3, and to be negative and significant in Model 4.   
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Hypotheses 1b and 2b predicted that the lifespan and stability of a CVC program are 
positively related to strategic benefits associated with its investments.  On the contrary, 
Hypothesis 3b predicted that the adoption of a VC-like incentive scheme of a CVC 
program is negatively related to the strategic benefits associated with its investments.  
To test the proposed relations, I specified the following multinomial logistic regression 
models (5) and (6): 
SYNINCEVCSTABCVCLIFECVC
P
P
Log
sj
sj
43210 ___)1
( ααααα ++++=−  
errorscontrols ++    ( j = 1 or 2) 
where Ps1 is the probability of being acquired by the corporate investor after receiving a 
CVC investment, and Ps2 is the probability of forming strategic alliances with the 
corporate investor after receiving a CVC investment.  The reference group in the 
multinomial logistic regression was “neither being acquired by nor forming an alliance 
with the corporate investor”  
To support H1b, H2b, H3b, and H4b, I expected the coefficients for CVC programs’ 
lifespan (CVC_LIFE) and stability (CVC_STAB) to be positive, and the coefficient for 
the adoption of VC incentive scheme (VC_INCE) to be negative and significant in 
Models 5, and 6.  
Hierarchical regression models.  I employed hierarchical regressions to test the 
moderator effects proposed by Hypotheses 1c, 1d, 2c, 2d, 3c, 3d, and 4b.   
Hypotheses 1c, 2c, 3c, and 4b predict that the structural characteristics of a CVC 
program, such as lifespan, stability, adoption of VC-like incentive scheme, and 
syndication, may moderate the relation between the value assigned to the portfolio 
company, and the financial benefits generated by such investment.  To test these 
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moderator effects, I first specified the following regression models: 
+++++= SYNINCEVCSTABCVCLIFECVCVALUE 43210 ___ ααααα                 
errorscontrolsSUCCESSPF ++_5α  
where PF_SUCCESS was a series of dummy variables to indicator the status of a 
portfolio company after the investment 
Then, the interaction terms were added to the regression one at a time. 
SYNINCEVCSTABCVCLIFECVCVALUE 43210 ___ ααααα ++++=  
)__(_ 65 SUCCESSPFLIFECVCSUCCESSPF ×++ αα  
or )__(7 SUCCESSPFSTABCVC ×α  
            or )__(8 SUCCESSPFINCEVC ×α  
or )_(9 SUCCESSPFSYN ×α + controls + errors 
I expected the coefficients for all of the interactive terms to be positive and significant.  
If so, I further examined whether the moderation effects follow the expected directions 
using the interaction plots.   
Hypotheses 1d, 2d, and 3d predict that the structural characteristics of a CVC 
program, such as lifespan, stability, and adoption of VC-like incentive scheme, may 
moderate the relation between the value assigned to the portfolio company, and the 
strategic benefits generated by such investment.  Similar to the pervious section, I first 
specified the following regression models: 
+++++= SYNINCEVCSTABCVCLIFECVCVALUE 43210 ___ ααααα            
errorscontrolsALLIANCESTR ++_5α  
where STR_ALLIANCE was a series of dummy variables.  
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Then, the interaction terms were added to the regression one at a time. 
+++++= SYNINCEVCSTABCVCLIFECVCVALUE 43210 ___ ααααα    
ALLIANCESTR _5α )__(6 ALLIANCESTRLIFECVC ×+α  or 
)__(7 ALLIANCESTRSTABCVC ×α  or 
)__(8 ALLIANCESTRINCEVC ×α  or  
)_(9 ALLIANCESTRSYN ×α + controls + errors 
To support H1d, H2d, and H3d, I expected the coefficients for all of the interaction terms 
to be positive and significant.  Furthermore, I drew interaction plots for significant terms 
to examine the moderation directions. 
RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the data analyses beginning with the descriptive 
statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables.  Next, the results of the multivariate 
linear regression and multinomial regression analyses testing the study’s hypotheses are 
presented.  Finally, the hierarchical regressions testing the hypothesized moderator 
effects are discussed.   
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 6.4 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample (N=1,737).  The average 
CVC program’s lifespan before the focal investment was 7.01 years, and the average 
number of previous CVC investments before the focal investment was 69.82.  When I 
used the one-year window to identify the discontinuous period and accordingly calculated 
the two variables only in the latest continuous period before the focal investment, the 
CVC program’s lifespan became shorter and averaged 3.3 years, and the number of 
previous investments was slightly smaller and averaged 66.65.  The mean and variance 
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of temporal intervals in years between previous investments was .36 and 385.16 on 
average.  The stage similarity and industry similarity of pervious investments 
averaged .066 and .435, which shows CVC programs preferred to make investments in 
portfolio companies in different development stages and different industries.  In addition, 
CVC programs also preferred to syndicate their investments with an average ratio of 
77.9%.  The post-valuation of a portfolio company after an investment averaged 
$141.22 million and ranged from $3650.5 million to $1 million.  Portfolio companies 
were acquired by their corporate investors in one percent of the CVC investments, and 
formed strategic alliances with their corporate investors in two percent of the CVC 
investments.  With respect to the status of portfolio companies after the focal investment, 
portfolio companies went IPO within 5 years after the focal investments in 27 percent of 
the cases, were acquired in 23 percent of the cases, and dissolved in 14 percent of the 
cases.  On average, it took approximately 13 months for a portfolio company to go 
public after receiving the CVC investment.  
Table 6.4 also presents descriptive statistics for the sample with survey data (N=178).  
Compared to the full sample, the sample with survey data demonstrates similar 
descriptive statistics except for the much smaller number of previous investments before 
the focal investment.  The mean scores for the extent to which CVC managers’ 
compensation depended on financial returns or strategic benefits were 1.1 and 2.45, 
respectively.  This shows that neither financial returns nor strategic benefits associated 
with CVC investments were important determinants of CVC managers’ compensation 
Table 6.5 presents the intercorrelations among all of the variables in the study.  The 
intercorrelations were calculated using the full sample.  The correlation matrix indicated 
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that unexpected high intercorrelations between the two incentive scheme variables 
(ρ=.665, p < .001), and between the two industry dummies (ρ=-.84, p < .001).  Thus, to 
investigate potential multicollinearity problems, I examined variance inflation factors 
(VIFs).  The maximum VIF obtained from the linear regressions was below the 
rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10 for multiple regression models (Netel, Wasserman, & Kutner, 
1985). 
Results for the Hypotheses Pertaining to the Selection Capability 
Table 6.6 presents the results of the regression analyses examining the impacts of CVC 
structural characteristics on financial returns measured by the time difference between the 
focal investment and IPO.  Model 1 is the baseline model in which the effects were 
restricted to the control variables.  Models 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 add the individual effects of 
each CVC structural characteristics to the baseline model one by one.  Models 7 and 8 
present the models including all the characteristics and controls except for the incentive 
scheme.  Models 9 and 10 are the full models including all the characteristics and 
controls.  
    Most of the control variables (i.e., stage dummies, industry dummies, and portfolio 
company age) were significant in all of the models.  Hypothesis 1a predicted that the 
lifespan of a CVC program is positively related to the financial returns associated with its 
investments.  In the present study, I used two different variables to measure the lifespan 
of a CVC program, and each generated opposite results.  When the lifespan was 
measured by the number of previous investments before the focal investments, the results 
were contrary to Hypothesis 1a (β=-.02, p<0.001, Model 2; β=-.02, p<0.01, Model 7).  
These results suggest that the more previous investment a CVC program performed, the 
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longer time its portfolio companies took to go public.  When the lifespan was measured 
by the years between a CVC program’s first investment and the focal investment, the 
results supported Hypothesis 1a (β=.25, p<0.05, Model 2; β=.34, p<0.01, Model 7).  
Considering the possible discontinuity in CVC operations, I also computed the number of 
previous investments and the years of operation in the latest continuous period.  The 
results were consistent with those without considering the operation discontinuity.  No 
support was found for Hypothesis 2a, which predicted a positive relation between the 
stability of a CVC program and its financial returns.  Hypothesis 3a predicted that the 
adoption of VC-like incentive scheme is positively related to the financial benefits 
associated with the investments; however, no supportive evidence was found in the 
regressions.  In support of Hypothesis 4a, there was a positive relationship between the 
ratio of syndication activity and the reversed scores of time difference between the IPO 
and the focal investment (β= 2.04, p<0.01, Model 5).  This relation remained positive 
and significant in Models 7 and 8.   
 In addition, I also used the success status of the portfolio companies within 5 years 
after the focal investments as a proxy to capture the financial returns of the CVC 
investments.  I employed the multinomial logistic regression analyses examining the 
impacts of CVC structural characteristics on the four types of status: IPO, acquired, 
defunct, and private.  The group of “private” was employed as the reference group, and 
thus the coefficients reflected the likelihood of a portfolio falling into the focal group as 
compared to the reference group.  I ran the multinomial logistic regressions with and 
without the survey data, respectively.  Table 6.7 presents the results.   
None of the coefficients in the regressions with survey data were significant.  
  172 
 
Without survey data, the control variables of stage dummies such as seed/startup, early 
stage, and expansion, negatively impacted the likelihood of going IPO.  Portfolio 
companies in both the IT and the medical industries were more likely to go IPO or be 
acquired by other companies than stay private.  In addition, portfolio companies in the 
medical industries were less likely to be defunct.  Contrary to the expectation of 
Hypothesis 1a, the coefficients of the number of previous CVC investments were both 
significantly negative for the groups of IPO and acquired (β= -.003, p<0.01; β= -.002, 
p<0.05).  However, the lifespan in years did not have significant impacts on the status of 
the portfolio companies after receiving CVC investments.  The coefficient of CVC 
operation stability measured by the mean of temporal intervals between prior investments 
was insignificantly negative (β= -.167, p<0.1), which was consistent with the expectation 
and supported Hypothesis 2a at the <.10 level.  However, the other variable of CVC 
operational stability – the variance of temporal intervals – was not significant in the 
regressions.  As for investment objective stability, the stage similarity had no significant 
effects on the status of portfolio companies.  Industry similarity was negatively related 
to the likelihood of going IPO (β= -.719, p<0.05).  This negative relationship remained 
significant for the likelihood of being acquired (β= -.754, p<0.05).  Both of the results 
are contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 2a.  The result shows that syndication 
activity increased the likelihood of being acquired, which supported Hypothesis 4a.  
However, the relationship became negative and insignificant in the regression model of 
going IPO.  Thus, Hypothesis 4a was only partially supported in the multinomial 
logistic regression models.   
Table 6.8 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regression analyses 
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examining the impacts of CVC structural characteristics on strategic benefits associated 
with CVC investments.  I used three types of relationships between corporate investors 
and portfolio companies as proxies to capture the strategic benefits, including being 
acquired by corporate investors, forming strategic alliance with corporate investors, and 
neither of them.  The last group was used as a reference.  Because of the lack of 
acquisition occurrence in the sample with the survey data, I was only able to run the 
multinomial logistic regressions using the sample without the survey data.  The control 
variables of stage dummies such as seed/startup, early stage, and expansion, as well as 
portfolio company age, negatively impacted the likelihood for a portfolio company to 
form a strategic alliance with its corporate investor.  Portfolio companies in both the IT 
and the medical industries were more likely to form strategic alliances with their 
corporate investors. As for the main effects of CVC structural characteristics, only the 
coefficients for the number of previous investments were significant at the level of 0.1 in 
both of the regressions; however, the sign of the coefficients was negative.  This result 
is contrary to the expectation of Hypothesis 1b, which predicted that the lifespan of a 
CVC program is positively related to the strategic benefits associated with its investments.  
There is no support for Hypothesis 2b. 
Results for the Hypotheses Pertaining to the Valuation and Appraisal Capability  
Hypotheses 1c, 2c, and 4b predicted that the structural characteristics of a CVC 
program, such as lifespan, stability, adoption of VC-like incentive scheme, and 
syndication, may moderate the relation between the value assigned to the portfolio 
company, and the financial benefits generated by such investment.  To test these 
moderating effects, hierarchical regressions were employed.  In step one, all of the 
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control variables, main effects, and the structural characteristics of interest were entered.  
In step two, the interaction terms for each of the CVC structural characteristic were 
entered one by one.   
Table 6.9 gives the results of the linear regressions examining the moderator 
effects of the CVC characteristics on the relationships between the time portfolio 
companies took to go IPO after the focal investment and their post-money valuations.  
As expected, the control variables for corporate investor’s size and fund inflows in the 
VC industry were positively related to post-money valuations.  The stage and industry 
dummies were also significant in all 5 of the regression models.  As for the “main 
effects”, the time difference between the IPO and the focal investment was negatively 
related to post-money valuations, which suggests that a portfolio company’s IPO 
potential increases its valuation.  The results also indicate that syndication activity with 
venture capitalists can help CVC programs lower the valuations of their portfolio 
companies as the coefficients in all of the five models were negative and significant at the 
level of 0.05.   
The interaction term for the time difference and the number of previous 
investments was significant at the level of 0.1.  Figure 6.3 shows the plot of the 
significant interaction, which revealed that the negative relationship between the time 
difference and the post-money valuation is more significant when the CVC programs had 
fewer previous investments than when they had more previous investments.  This result 
is contrary to the expectation of Hypothesis 1c.  There is no support for the moderator 
effects of CVC operational stability.  With respect to the moderator effects of CVC 
investment objective stability, the interaction term for stage similarity and the 
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post-money valuation was significant, and the interaction term for industry similarity and 
post-money valuation was not significant.  Figure 6.4 gives the plot of the significant 
interaction. Contrary to Hypothesis 2c, the interaction plot depicts a more significant 
negative relationship between the time difference and the post-money valuation for CVC 
programs with low stage similarity (low stability in investment objective) than those with 
high stage similarity (high stability in investment objective).  Hypothesis 4b predicted 
that the syndication activities with the VC firms of a CVC program moderates the 
relation between the value assigned to the portfolio company, and the financial benefits 
generated by such investment.  That is, a positive relationship is expected to be more 
significant when the CVC program undertakes more syndication activities than when it 
undertakes fewer syndication activities.  The interaction term for the syndication ratio 
and the post-money valuation was significant; however, the plot in Figure 6.5 shows the 
moderator effect was opposite to the expectation.  Thus, the result failed to support 
Hypothesis 4b. 
Table 6.10 presents the results of the linear regressions examining the moderator 
effects of CVC characteristics on the relationships between the status of the portfolio 
companies within 5 years after the focal investment and their post-money valuations.  
Three dummy variables were employed to capture the status of portfolio companies 
within 5 years after the focal investments.  The results showed that the post-money 
valuation was higher for portfolio companies that either went IPO or were acquired.  
However, the post-money valuation was also higher for portfolio companies that 
ultimately dissolved compared to those staying private.  The interaction item was only 
significant for the years of CVC operations and the defunct dummy.  The plot in Figure 
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6.6 reveals that the more experienced CVC programs would evaluate the portfolio 
companies that ultimately dissolved lower than those that did not dissolve, while CVC 
programs with less experience would evaluate the portfolio companies that ultimately 
dissolved higher than those that did not dissolve.  The results were consistent with 
Hypothesis 1c.  
Hypotheses 1d and 2d predicted that the structural characteristics of a CVC 
program, such as lifespan and stability, may moderate the relation between the value 
assigned to the portfolio company, and the strategic benefits generated by such 
investment.  Table 6.11 reports the results of the linear regressions examining the 
proposed moderator effects.  Two dummy variables were used to capture the strategic 
benefits. The results showed that the post-money valuation was higher for portfolio 
companies that formed strategic alliances with their corporate investors.  There was no 
support for Hypothesis 1d.  The interaction term was significant for the alliance dummy 
and the operational stability measured by the mean of temporal interval between previous 
investments.  The plot in Figure 6.7 reveals that with short intervals (high operational 
stability), the positive relationship between the post-money valuation and forming 
alliances was more significant than with long intervals (low operational stability).  The 
results were consistent with Hypothesis 2d.   
To test the robustness, pre-money valuation was also used as dependent variable 
in all the regression models examining the moderator effects.  These regressions 
generated consistent results with those using post-money valuation.  The results are 
presented in Tables 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14.  
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DISCUSSION 
This section first evaluates the findings in detail.  Next, a discussion of the contributions 
of the research is provided.  The limitations of the study, as well as directions for future 
directions are then addressed.  
Discussion of Findings 
How to develop selection and valuation capabilities of CVC programs is an important 
issue relating to their ultimate performance.  From the learning perspective, this study 
investigated the impacts of four structural characteristics of a CVC program on its 
selection and valuation capabilities, including lifespan, stability, incentive schemes, and 
syndication with VC.  The results showed strong impacts of syndication activity on the 
selection and valuation capabilities pertaining to financial returns, and mixed effects of 
lifespan and stability.  Due to the limitation of the survey data, this study was not able to 
examine the relationship between incentive schemes and the selection and valuation 
capabilities thoroughly.  The current results based on the limited data did not show 
significant effects of incentive schemes.  Table 6.15 provides an overall summary of the 
study’s results. 
Hypotheses pertaining to the impacts of lifespan (1a-1d). The dynamic 
capability and organizational learning literatures suggest that learning-by-doing is the 
central learning process through which capabilities are developed (e.g. Zollo & Winter, 
2002).  The learning-by-doing approach is particularly important in the contexts 
emphasizing the importance of tacit knowledge.  Selection and valuation in CVC 
investments is such a process full of subjective assessment and lacking of standard 
guidelines.  Thus, experience plays a critical role in the development of the selection 
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and valuation capabilities.  A long lifespan would allow a CVC program to accumulate 
experience from its prior investment transactions, thereby enhancing its selection and 
valuation capabilities and ultimately improving its performance.  However, the study 
provided mixed evidence pertaining to the impacts of lifespan.  On one hand, the 
operating years of a CVC program were positively related to its financial performance, 
reflecting a positive impact of lifespan on selection capability. This finding is consistent 
with the literature of organizational learning.  On the other hand, the number of prior 
investments a CVC program performed was negatively related to the performance of its 
current investment, which suggests that frequent investments may not lead to effective 
learning and even hinder the capability development.   
The contradicting findings may be due to some methodological issues.  The 
current study did not measure selection capability directly.  Instead, the financial returns 
and strategic benefits associated with a CVC investment were used as dependent 
variables in the regressions.  A CVC investment could generate greater financial returns 
and strategic benefits, not only depending upon the CVC program’s selection capability 
to choose the investment target with the most potentials, but also depending upon its 
nurturing capability to help portfolio companies growing.  Thus, although prior 
investments could teach a CVC program how to select, evaluate, and even nurture its 
portfolio companies, more prior investments may lead to more portfolio companies under 
management at the time when the focal investment occurred, and thus a CVC program 
may have less time or fewer resources to take care of the newly investing company.  On 
the other hand, the successful prior investments may affect a CVC program’s successive 
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learning behavior differently from the unsuccessful ones.  Future studies need to take 
the performance of prior investments into consideration.   
The study also provided mixed evidence in support of the hypothesized effects of 
lifespan on valuation capability.  The lifespan of a CVC program was proposed to 
increase its valuation capability, and thus a moderator effect of lifespan was expected to 
influence the relationship between the value assigned to the portfolio company, and the 
financial returns or the strategic benefits generated by such investment.  The results 
showed that the number of previous investments did moderate the relationship between 
the valuation and the financial returns; but the moderating direction was opposite to what 
was expected.  It was found that the positive relationship was more significant when a 
CVC program had fewer prior investments than when it had more.  However, Figure 6.3 
also reveals that the valuation level is generally lower for the group with more previous 
investment than that with fewer previous investments.  It is obvious that the more 
significant positive relationship for the group with fewer previous investments does not 
reflect better valuation capability.  Instead, it is because they evaluated success portfolio 
companies much higher than the group with more previous investments.  In sum, 
although the result is inconsistent with the original hypotheses, it provides significant 
evidence that a long lifespan helps a CVC program build capabilities not only in the 
evaluation process, but in the negotiation process as well.   
Hypotheses pertaining to the impacts of stability (2a-2d).  Learning-by-doing is 
dependent upon not only the experience intensity but also the quality of such experience 
(e.g. Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002).  The study proposed that the 
stability of a CVC program is the major structural characteristic that may influence the 
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quality of CVC experience, and further affect the development of the selection and 
valuation capabilities.  The stability of a CVC program was investigated from two 
aspects in the study: operational stability and objective stability.   
The operational stability reflects the extent to which a CVC program consistently 
performs CVC investments, and it was measured by the mean and variance of temporal 
intervals between CVC investments.  It is believed that frequent investments and even 
temporal intervals may enhance CVC program’s selection and valuation capabilities.  
As Table 6.15 shows, the results provided marginal support for the argument. It shows 
that frequent investments did indeed help a CVC program to enhance its selection 
capability in terms of financial returns.  However, a CVC program with more frequent 
investments evaluates its portfolio company higher than that with less frequent 
investments.  No significant result was found pertaining to the variance of intervals.  
The findings suggest that there may be a curvilinear relationship between temporal 
intervals and capability development; that is, a too long or too short interval may cripple 
the CVC program’s learning ability, and lead to poor performance (Hayward, 2002).   
Objective stability refers to the extent to which a CVC program keeps constant 
investment objectives, and it was measured by the similarity among previous CVC 
investments relative to portfolio company’s development stage and industry.  It is more 
likely that a CVC program that frequently changes its objectives would fall in the cycle 
of failure-new trials-failure again, and thus it would not be able to efficiently build the 
selection and valuation capabilities.  Contrary to what was expected, a negative 
relationship was found between industry similarity and the selection capability.  The 
finding suggests that although changing objectives may lead to dissimilar experiences, 
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slightly dissimilar experience may enhance learning efficiency due to the richness of 
information (Hayward, 2002).  The results also provide evidence that a CVC program 
investing in portfolio companies in similar development stages could more efficiently 
build its valuation capability than a CVC program investing in portfolio companies in 
different development stages.   
Hypotheses pertaining to the impacts of incentive schemes (3a-3d).  The study 
argued that the incentive scheme of a CVC program plays an important role in 
determining the learning direction of its CVC managers.  Specifically, it was proposed 
that the adoption of a VC-like incentive scheme would encourage CVC managers to 
accumulate experience pertaining financial returns, and discourage them from learning 
knowledge with regard to strategic benefits, thereby influencing the selection and 
valuation capabilities of a CVC program.  Unfortunately, due to the low response rate of 
the survey, I was not able to construct a sufficient sample to test the impacts of the 
incentive scheme on selection capability in terms of strategic benefits, nor the impacts on 
valuation capability.  The results regarding the impacts of the incentive scheme on the 
selection capability in terms of financial returns were not significant.  However, 
considering the lack of variance in the dataset (only 17 different corporate investors) and 
the small sample size, the insignificant relationship may be spurious and deserves future 
research.  
 Hypotheses pertaining to the impacts of syndication activity (4a-4b).  
Acquisitive learning is another important approach by which capabilities are developed 
(Deeds, et al., 1999; Zahra, et al., 1999).  In particular, learning knowledge from others 
is essential for the development of new capabilities (Teece, et al., 1997).  For most 
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corporate investors, CVC investments are made in a new area totally different from their 
core businesses.  Thus, it is essential for them to borrow experiences from the veterans 
in the venture capital industry.  Syndication activity provides an excellent opportunity 
for CVC programs to observe and further learn the best practice in the industry.  Indeed, 
the results show strong support for these arguments.  It was found that the more a CVC 
program syndicated its investments with venture capital firms, the more financial returns 
associated with its current investment.  This finding suggests a positive relationship 
between syndication activity and selection capability.  In addition, syndication activity 
also helped to enhance valuation capability by lowering the average valuation level.   
Contribution of the Study 
The findings of this study contributed to the literature in several ways.  First, to date, 
only two studies have investigated specific learning processes associated with corporate 
venturing (Keil, 2004; Schildt, et al., 2005).  The findings of the study extended 
previous research by examining more micro characteristics and processes related to CVC 
using a large sample.  Specifically, the study examined the impacts of the structures of 
CVC programs, including lifespan, stability, and syndication, on their selection and 
valuation capabilities.  In addition, by showing how structural and managerial 
characteristics of CVC programs influence not only the quantity but also the quality of 
experiences in the capability development process, the study offers directions on how to 
improve the appraisal and valuation operations of CVC programs from the perspective of 
organizational learning.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
As with all research, this study has several limitations; however these limitations also 
provide exciting areas for future research.  First, due to the data availability, the study 
used several proxies to capture financial returns associated with CVC investments.  
Previous research has pointed out that venture capitalists generate most of their profits 
from portfolio companies that go public or are acquired (Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  
However, the categorical variable reduced the variation of the dependent variable.  The 
time difference between IPO and the focal investment is also a problematic measure 
because this variable is relevant to the overall financial returns of a CVC program rather 
than the financial returns associated with a specific individual investment.  Thus, future 
research should use finer-grained measures of financial returns.  
 Second, strategic benefits associated with CVC investments are heterogeneous, 
ranging from technological innovation to new market entry to resource leverage. Thus, 
using one categorical variable to capture the overall strategic benefits is problematic. 
Future research should use finer-grained measures for different strategic benefits. 
 Third, industry similarity was measured by the percentage of prior investments that 
conform to the same industry according to the Venture Economics Industry Codes 
(VEIC). This measure only considered the similarity among prior investment, but ignored 
the similarity between prior investments and the focal investment.  The latter may be 
more relevant to the research questions of interests, and should be used in future research. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The dissertation investigated the impacts of key structural and managerial characteristics 
of a CVC program on major financial and strategic consequences associated with its 
CVC activities.  I conclude my dissertation by first summarizing the impacts of the six 
structural characteristics studied, and then discussing the theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications of the study.   
Summary of the Impacts of the Six Characteristics  
In general, the study provides evidence that the key structural and managerial 
characteristics - lifespan, stability, VC-like incentive scheme, autonomy, investment 
syndication, and board representation - had significant effects on the growth and 
innovativeness of the corporate investor, the performance of portfolio companies, or on 
the selection and valuation capabilities of the CVC program.    
Lifespan.  A long lifespan would allow a CVC program to accumulate experience 
from its prior investment transactions, thereby enhancing its selection and valuation 
capabilities and ultimately improving its performance.  In the current study, the lifespan 
of a CVC program was measured in two ways: the number of years in operation, and the 
number of prior investments.  The study found that the number of years a CVC program 
was in operation was positively related to its financial performance, whereas the number 
of prior investments was negatively related to the performance of its current investment.  
In addition, it was found that the positive relationship between the valuation level and the 
financial returns was stronger when a CVC program had fewer prior investments than 
when it had more.  The mixed findings suggested that the structural characteristics of a 
CVC program (e.g., lifespan) may not only influence the development of the selection 
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and valuation capabilities but simultaneously impact the development of other 
capabilities that may also affect the ultimate financial as well as strategic outcomes.  For 
example, although prior investments may teach a CVC program how to select investment 
targets, they may cripple its nurturing capability and lead to poor financial returns.  Prior 
investments could also help a CVC program develop capabilities in the negotiation 
process, so that compared with CVC programs with fewer prior investments, those with 
more prior investments would have a lower level of valuation in general, but the positive 
relationship between the valuation level and the outcomes became weaker.   Thus, the 
multiple effects of organizational structure on capability development need a closer 
examination in future research.  
Stability.  Consistent with the literature of organizational learning (e.g. Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002), the results provided evidence that the stability of a 
CVC program may have positive effects on capability development, and further influence 
the financial outcomes.  In particular, it was found that frequent investments may help a 
CVC program enhance its selection capability and thus its portfolio companies are more 
likely to go public than stay private.  However, it was also found that a CVC program 
with more frequent investments evaluates its portfolio company higher than that with less 
frequent investments although the relationship between the valuation level and the 
financial returns was stronger for the former group.  The findings suggest that there may 
be a curvilinear relationship between temporal intervals and capability development; that 
is, a too long or too short interval may cripple the CVC program’s learning ability, and 
lead to poor performance (Hayward, 2002).  In addition, objective stability of a CVC 
program failed to be a positive factor related to the financial returns associated with its 
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CVC investments.  The finding is consistent with the literature that has suggested that 
slightly dissimilar experience may enhance learning efficiency due to the richness of 
information (Hayward, 2002).   
In sum, the influence of stability on capability development as well as the outcomes 
associated may be curvilinear.  Although CVC programs have been accused of being not 
as stable as independent venture capital firms, and thus are less efficiency (e.g., Gompers 
& Lerner, 1998), the findings of the current study didn’t support this argument.  Thus, 
the curvilinear relationship between stability of a CVC program and its financial as well 
as strategic consequences deserves further investigations.  
 Incentive scheme.  A negative relationship was found between VC-like incentive 
schemes and knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors.  
VC-like incentive schemes was also negatively related to corporate investors’ 
innovativeness.  These findings suggested a negative impact of VC-like incentive 
schemes on strategic benefits of CVC investments.  Thus, a corporate investor should be 
cautious when it adopts a VC-like incentive scheme in its CVC program if the strategic 
benefit such as technology innovation is its major goal.    
Autonomy.  The impacts of autonomy are mixed.  Although autonomy was found 
to be negatively related to the knowledge flows from portfolio companies back to 
corporate investors, it may also allow CVC managers to explore new technologies or new 
markets, which in turn may increase corporate investors’ innovativeness.   
Investment syndication.  The findings in the study strongly suggested that 
syndication activities with independent venture capital firms can enhance a CVC 
program’s ability to select investment targets with financial potential, and also broaden 
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its CVC managers’ learning.  The findings show that syndication activity provides an 
excellent opportunity for CVC programs to observe and further learn the best practice in 
the industry.  Thus, learning knowledge from others through syndicated investment 
seems essential in the venture capital industry, especially for those new comers.   
Board representation.  Researchers suggested that Corporate investors favor board 
representation because board service lets them protect their investments, and more 
importantly, may gain vital insights into industry trend or new technology secrecy 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2001).  However, the findings of the current study failed to link the 
board representation to knowledge flows between corporate investors and portfolio 
companies.  Furthermore, negative relationships were revealed between the board 
representation and the innovativeness of corporate investors, as well as the performance 
of portfolio companies.  These findings may suggest that corporate investors primarily 
use the board representation to learn new technologies from portfolio companies, rather 
than to transfer knowledge to them; however, that request for board representation may 
also drive good deals away as many entrepreneurs fear that board services provide 
corporate investors with opportunities to appropriate their ideas (Gompers & Lerner, 
2001).  Thus, corporate investors may need to reconsider their post-investment 
monitoring strategy, and shift the focus from representing in the board of their portfolio 
companies to bridging the existing business units and their portfolio companies.   
Theoretical Contributions and Managerial Implications 
By analyzing the relationships between the structural and managerial characteristics 
of CVC programs and the consequences of their CVC activities, this dissertation seek to 
the mechanisms that lead to enhanced CVC performance from a multi-theoretical 
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perspective.  The findings of the dissertation advanced our knowledge about CVC 
activities in several ways.   
From the perspective of organizational learning, this dissertation suggested models in 
which the structural and managerial characteristics of CVC programs may have impacts 
on their capability development and ultimate performance.  For example, characteristics 
such as the lifespan and stability of a CVC programs influenced not only the quantity but 
also the quality of CVC experiences, and further impacted capability development.  
Syndication activity with independent venture capital firms provided external knowledge 
sources, and the acquisitive learning broadens CVC managers’ horizon and helps a CVC 
program to build capabilities.   In addition, structural characteristics such as autonomy 
may also help to mitigate learning myopias, thereby shaping the portfolio configuration 
as for technology diversification.  Although the study has revealed some link between 
organizational structure and organizational learning as well as capability development, 
the findings also suggested that organizational structure may influence a variety of 
capabilities simultaneously but in different ways, thereby leading to complex outcomes.  
Thus, more details need to be investigated through field studies in the future.   
Grounded on agency theory, this dissertation, particularly the second study, examined 
the role of CVC programs in the two-level principal-agency relationships embedded in 
CVC investments.  Specifically, the second study revealed agency behaviors associated 
with these structural and managerial characteristics of CVC programs.  It was found that 
both VC-like incentive schemes and the autonomy of a CVC program may trigger agency 
behaviors of CVC managers and then hinder the bilateral interorganizational learning 
process.   
  189 
 
Based on real options theory, the first study empirically investigated how portfolio 
technology diversification influenced the growth value creation to the corporate investor.  
The results revealed a curvilinear relationship between technology diversification and the 
growth of a corporate investor, which implied that the impacts of the portfolio as a whole 
were different from the sum of the impacts of individual CVC investments.  The finding 
may further our understanding of the interaction among multiple real options (e.g., 
Trigeorgis, 1993; Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 2004).    
The findings of this dissertation also have significant practical implications.  First, it 
provided a guideline for corporate investors on how to organize CVC activities, so that 
they can improve the selection and valuation process, the interorganizational learning 
process with portfolio companies, and the configuration of their investment portfolio.  
Additionally, since the structural and managerial characteristics are summaries using the 
VC mode as the benchmark, this dissertation also helped to further our understanding of 
the extent to which the adoption of VC-like practices enhances the efficiency of CVC 
operations, and may provide suggestions to corporations that are adopting or considering 
to adopt the VC-like practices in their CVC programs.  It seems that certain obligations 
and constraints on CVC activities that VC firms are not subject to, such as transferring 
knowledge back to the corporate investor, might hinder such attempts if corporations 
“blindly” replicate the VC mode.  This dissertation may also help the entrepreneurial 
companies who are seeking corporate investors.  It is important for them to understand 
the potential consequences associated with CVC programs possessing different structural 
characteristics, so that they could choose the right investment partners. 
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Appendix A Venture Economics Industry Classification Description 
 
Company Venture Economics Primary Industry Class 
Industry class is the highest level of classifications, with all companies broken down 
into three main groups: 
All Information Technology 
All Medical/Health Related 
All Non-High Technology 
 
Company VE Primary Industry Major Group 
Based on VEIC codes, industry major group classifies all companies into six industry 
categories: 
All Communications 
All Computer Related 
All Semiconductors/Other Electronics Related 
All Biotechnology 
All Medical/Health Related 
All Non-High Technology 
 
Company VE Primary Industry Minor Group  
Based on VEIC codes, industry minor group classifies all companies into nine 
industry categories: 
All Communications 
All Computer Hardware 
All Software & Services 
All Semiconductors/Other Electronics Related 
All Biotechnology 
All Medical/Health Related 
All Consumer Related 
All Industrial/Energy 
All Other Products 
 
Company VE Primary Industry Sub-Group 1 
Based on VEIC codes, industry sub-group 1 classifies all companies into seventeen 
industry categories: 
All Communications 
All Computer Hardware 
All Computer Software 
All Other Computer 
All Semiconductors/Other Electronics 
All Biotechnology 
All Medical/Health Related 
All Consumer Related 
All Industrial/Energy 
All Transportation 
All Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
All Business Services 
All Manufacturing 
All Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, etc. 
All Construction & Building Products 
All Utilities & Related Firms 
All Other Products 
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Company VE Primary Industry Sub-Group 2 
Based on VEIC codes, industry sub-group 2 classifies all companies into fifty-nine 
industry categories: 
All Commercial Communications 
All Telephone Related 
All Facsimile Transmission 
All Data Communications 
All Satellite Communications 
All Computers 
All Computer Graphics Related 
All Computer Specialized Turnkey 
Systems 
All Computer Scanning Related 
All Computer Peripherals 
All Computer Services 
All Computer Software 
All Other Computer 
All Electronics Components 
All Batteries 
All Power Supplies 
All Electronics Related Equipment 
All Laser Related 
All Fiber Optics 
All Analytical & Scientific 
Instrumentation 
All Other Electronics Related 
All Optoelectronics 
All Human Biotechnology 
All Agricultural/Animal 
Biotechnology 
All Industrial Biotechnology 
All Biosensors 
All Biotech Related Research & 
Production Equipment 
All Biotech Related Research & Other 
Services 
All Other Biotechnology 
All Medical Diagnostics 
All Medical Therapeutics 
All Other Medical/Health Related 
All Oil & Gas Exploration & 
Production 
All Alternative Energy 
All Enhanced Oil Recovery/Heavy 
Oil/Shale 
All Coal Related 
All Energy Conservation Related 
All Other Energy 
All Leisure & Recreational Products 
& Services 
All Retailing Related 
All Food & Beverages 
All Consumer Products 
All Consumer Services 
All Other Consumer Related 
All Chemical & Materials 
All Industrial Automation 
All Industrial Equipment & 
Machinery 
All Pollution & Recycling Related 
All Other Industrial 
All Industrial Services 
All Transportation 
All Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
All Business Services 
All Manufacturing 
All Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, 
etc. 
All Construction & Building Products 
All Utilities & Related Firms 
All Other Products 
 
Company VE Primary Industry Sub-Group 3 
Industry sub-group 3 classifies all companies into specific industries, using 590 
individual VEIC codes.  
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Appendix B Survey Questionnaire 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
We are pleased to invite you to participate in a study on CVC programs affiliated with 
U.S. public companies.  We are investigating the relationship between the structure of a 
CVC program and its abilities to select, evaluate, and nurture portfolio companies, as 
well as generate strategic benefits to its parent.  All participants will receive, via email, a 
summary of the study results.   
 
The questionnaire is one page in length and should take no more than 5 minutes to 
complete.  Your participation in this study is completely voluntary.  However, since 
the validity of the results depends on obtaining a high response rate, your participation is 
crucial to the success of the study.    
 
Please rest assured that because we have no personally identifying information, your 
responses will be anonymous and confidential.  The corporation identities are used only 
to match the survey data with secondary data from public resources.  The data entry will 
be done by the investigators and the questionnaire will be destroyed afterward.  The data 
will be stored electronically offline and only accessible by the investigators.  All 
analyses and reports will be based on aggregated data, and no reference to specific 
individuals or companies will be made.   
 
If you have any questions or would like to request the final report, please contact us at 
yy35@drexel.edu. 
 
Thank you for your consideration. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
V.K. Narayanan, Ph.D. 
Stubbs Professor of Strategy & 
Entrepreneurship 
Associate Dean of Research 
LeBow College of Business 
Drexel University  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yi Yang 
Ph.D. Candidate in Strategy & 
Entrepreneurship 
LeBow College of Business 
Drexel University
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1.   Parent company: ________________________________                                                     
 
2. Approximately how many employees work on CVC investments?  ____________ 
a. 0 ~ 5  b. 6 ~ 10 c. 11 ~ 20 d. 21 ~ 50 e. > 50 
 
3.   The current compensation for CVC managers includes:  (Please check all that apply) 
 Base salary  Bonus  Stock option  Carried interests  Others (please specify: 
______________________________) 
 
4.    Please circle the category which most closely describes your CVC managers’ compensation scheme. 
 
                                                
To what extent are the current compensation and incentive schemes 
for CVC managers in your organization dependent upon the 
financial returns of CVC investments?  
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  DK  NA
To what extent are the current compensation and incentive schemes 
for CVC managers in your organization dependent upon the strategic 
benefits to the parent company of CVC investments? 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  DK  NA
For the years 1996 to 2000, to what extent were the compensation 
and incentive schemes for CVC managers in your organization 
dependent upon the financial returns of CVC investments? 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  DK  NA
For the years 1996 to 2000, to what extent were the compensation 
and incentive schemes for CVC managers in your organization 
dependent upon the strategic benefits to the parent company of 
CVC investments? 
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  10  DK  NA
Not
at all Always
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5.   Please indicate the extent to which you DISAGREE or AGREE with each of the following statements by circling the 
category which most closely describes your CVC investments based on a 7-point scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = 
Strongly agree:  
  Strongly disagree Neutral 
Strongly 
agree 
 
CVC investments are managed by closed venture capital funds 
with outside investors. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
Funding is project-based rather than budgeting-based. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
Investment objectives are determined by the parent company. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
Investment objectives are determined by the CVC program. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
Staffing decisions in the CVC program must be approved by 
your parent company. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
The CVC program has the authority to hire anyone it needs. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
CVC managers have the authority to make investment 
decisions on their own. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
All investments made by the CVC program must be approved 
by the parent company. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
The parent company provides a great deal of knowledge about 
sales and marketing to the portfolio companies (e.g., 
knowledge about advertisement, public relations, service 
delivery). 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
The parent company provides a great deal of technological 
knowledge to the portfolio companies (e.g., knowledge about 
R&D, information systems, production process). 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
The parent company provides a great deal of strategic 
knowledge to the portfolio companies (e.g., knowledge of 
competitors, suppliers, government regulations). 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
The portfolio companies provide a great deal of knowledge 
about sales and marketing to your organization. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
The portfolio companies provide a great deal of technological 
knowledge to your organization. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA
The portfolio companies provide a great deal of strategic 
knowledge to your organization. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7        DK    NA 
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Appendix C 
To some extent, the appraisal and valuation of the portfolio company is a 
bargaining process involved two parties: venture capitalists, ,I  and entrepreneurs, E .  
During the bargaining process, the two parties negotiate how to allocate the final net gain 
satisfactorily between the two parties.  
When the investment only involves independent venture capital, the final net gain, 
G, is typically generated by the value appreciation of the portfolio company when it goes 
to IPO or is acquired by other companies; that is, EIIE VVVG −−= , where IEV denotes 
the value of the portfolio company when it is acquired or goes public, IV  is the value of 
venture capital investment, EV  is the current value of the portfolio company. 
The outcome of the bargaining is the allocation of the net gain to two parties, 
namely gi (the net gain allocated to venture capitalists) and ge (the net gain allocated to 
entrepreneurs).  I define p=gi/G.  According to the bargaining literature in economics, 
to solve this bargaining problem, the two parties have to reach an agreement that satisfy 
Pareto optimality, that is, no other outcome unanimously preferred by each party (e.g. 
Edgeworth, 1881; Nash, 1950; Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975).  Under the standard 
bargaining situations1, the optimal ratio to assign the net gain, Y, is obtained when the 
allocation of the net gain maximizes the product of the two parties’ utilities (Nash, 1950).  
That is, a Nash solution should maximize Ue(ge)Ui(gi) = Ue(1-p)Ui(p)2, where 0≤p≤1.  
                                                 
1 Standard bargaining models obey all of the six axioms Nash proposed in 1950.   
2 A generalized version of the Nash solution is that [Ue(1-p)]r[Ui(p)]1-r, where r (0≤r≤1) is in some sense a 
measure of the relative power vested in the parties. 
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The utility function is necessarily increasing functions and would be expected to 
exhibit decreasing marginal returns to scale (i.e. to be concave).  And the Nash optimal 
solution, p*, is obtained from )()1(
10
pUpU ie
p
Max −
≤≤
 
Let p* be the optimal proportion of the net gain assigned to the corporate venture 
capital. So the optimal portion of the net gain allocated to the venture capital is Gp*, and 
the portion assigned to the entrepreneur is G(1-p*).   However, during the valuation 
process, the venture capital and the entrepreneur do not directly negotiate the ratio p.  
Instead, they negotiate the equity ownership proportion between the venture capital and 
the portfolio company, that is, the ratio of ( IV / EV ).  Let q denote the percentage of the 
equity taken by the venture capital after the investment, and so (1-q) denotes the 
percentage of the equity taken by the entrepreneur, then 
q
V
q
V EI
−= 1 .  Thus, the net 
gain assigned to the venture capital isGq .  Equally, the net gain assigned to the 
entrepreneur is )1( qG − .  If the venture capitalist evaluates the portfolio company 
higher, then the equity shares she is taking with a certain amount of investment will be 
lower, and the allocation of the final net gains will not be impartial.  Likewise, the 
entrepreneur won’t accept too low valuations because her equity ownership will be 
diluted unfairly, and the allocation of the final capital gains will be biased towards 
venture capitalists.  To obtain the optimal q* that satisfy the Nash optimal solution, Gq 
equals to Gp*.  Thus, q*=p* when the investment only involves the independent 
venture capital.   
 In the context of corporate venture capital investment, the final net gain is a little 
complex.  As discussed in the chapter 2, most of corporate venture capital investments 
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have not only financial objectives, but also strategic goals.  As strategic investors, big 
corporations expect to learn new knowledge, obtain options to new technologies and/or 
new markets, or leverage their extant resources through corporate venture capital 
investments.  So, the net gain should include the sum of the financial gain and the 
strategic benefits to the parent; that is, SG + , where S represents the possible strategic 
benefits due to the synergy effects.   
The optimal ratio p* to assign the net gain is still obtained when the allocation of 
the net gain maximizes the product of the two parties’ utilities (Nash, 1950).  In addition, 
it is independent of the size of the final net gain, but only related to the two parties’ utility 
functions.  Assume the independent venture capital and the corporate venture capital 
have the same utility functions, and so we should get the same p* as before.  So the 
optimal portion of the net gain allocated to the corporate venture capital is (G+S)p*, and 
the portion assigned to the entrepreneur is (G+S)(1-p*).   
As mentioned previously, the corporate venture capital and the entrepreneur 
negotiate the proportion of the equity each party is taking after the investment, rather than 
the ratio p.  Thus, the net gain assigned to the corporate venture capital is a function of q 
and equals to SGqc + .  Similarly, the net gain assigned to the entrepreneur is )1( cqG − .  
To obtain the optimal q* that satisfy the Nash optimal solution, let Gqc+S equal to 
(G+S)p*.  Then, we get
G
Sppqc
*)1(** −−= . From this equation, we can see ** qqc < .  
Since 
q
V
q
V EI
−= 1 , when VI is constant, VcE*>VE*.  In addition, when the strategic 
benefit S increases, qc* decreases and VcE* increases. 
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Table 2.1 The Active Corporate Venture Capital Investors in the U.S. and Europe 
(Source: Ernst & Young Corporate Venture Capital Report 2002) 
 
Top U.S. Investors   # of 
Deals 
Top European Investors  # of 
Deals 
1. Intel Corporation 75 1. Innovacon 33 
2. GE Capital 41 2. Intel Corporation 16 
3. J & J Development 20 3. Vertex Management 13 
4. Mitsui & Co. Venture 
Partner 
19 4. T-Telematik Venture 
Holding 
13 
5. Mitsubishi 19 5. Novartis Venture Fund 11 
6. Cisco System 18 6. Accenture Technology 
Ventures 
9 
7. AOL Time Warner 
Ventures 
17 7. GE Capital 8 
8. Alliance Venture 
Management 
16 8. Generics Asset 
Management Ltd. 
7 
9. XR Ventures 13 9. TTP Venture Managers 6 
10. Texas Instruments 13 10. Thales Corporate 
Ventures 
6 
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Table 2.2 CVC Mode versus VC Mode 
 
Attributes CVC Mode VC Mode 
Objectives A wide range of strategic objectives 
as well as financial ones 
Financial objectives 
Structures A diversity of organizational 
structures 
The limited partnership  
Lifespan Short Long 
Stability Unstable Stable 
Incentive scheme A diversity of incentive schemes: 
a. VC-like incentives 
b. Traditional salary-bonus-option 
incentives 
c. Hybrid 
Carried interests 
Management fees 
Autonomy A spectrum of autonomous levels High 
Management Style   
Investment  
Syndication 
Second opinion 
Access to deal flows 
Risk-sharing 
Diversification 
Second opinion 
Access to deal flows 
Monitoring mode Less extensive Extensive 
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Table 2.3 Extant Classifications of Strategic Objectives of CVC Activities 
 
Studies Classifications 
Broady & Ehrlich, 1998  
 
1. Improving the capture of value from strategic assets 
2. Improving the capture of value from good ideas 
3. Respond more competitively in a rapidly evolving 
industry  
4. Support demand for core products  
Kann ,2000  1. External R&D 
2. Accelerated market entry 
3. Demand enhancement.   
Keil, 2000 1. Monitoring of markets 
2. Learning of markets and new technologies 
3. Option building 
4. Market enactment.   
Maula, 2001 1. Learning:  
a. market-level learning 
b. venture-specific learning 
c. indirect learning 
2. Option building 
a. option to acquire companies 
b. option to enter new markets 
3. Leveraging 
a. leveraging own technologies and platforms 
b. leveraging own complementary resources 
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Table 2.4 Organizational Design of CVC Programs1 
 
Type of 
investment Indirect Direct 
Autonomy Independent Wholly-owned Fully internalized 
Type of 
investment 
vehicle 
Pooled 
fund 
Dedicated 
fund 
Self-managed 
Fund 
Central 
fund of 
corporate 
NVD 
Decentral 
funds of 
BUs’ NVDs
Organizational 
structure 
     
 
                                                 
1 Integrated from Mayer, 2003, McNally, 1997: p. 38.  and Hagenmuller & Schmohl, 2003. 
Corpo- 
ration 
Corpo-
ration
Corporation Corporation Corporation 
Independent 
VC 
Independent 
VC NVD NVD NVD
BU BU
U
Ventures Ventures Ventures Ventures 
Corporation
Self-managed
Fund 
Ventures 
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Figure 2.1 Keil’s (2000) Classification of External Corporate Venturing Modes 
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Figure 2.2 Corporate Venture Capital Investments (1970-2004) 
(Source: VentureXpert Database)
  CVC Investments in million     Annual deals  
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Figure 2.3 Compare CVC investments to R&D Expenses in the U.S. (1996-2002) 
(Source: VentureXpert database and World Bank Online database) 
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Figure 2.4 Annual Number of Corporations with CVC Programs in Operation 
 (1970-2004) 
(Source: VentureXpert Database)
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Figure 2.5 Ranking of Strategic Objectives associated CVC activities in the Ernest 
& Young Corporate Venture Capital Report 2002 
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Figure 3.1 Theoretic Backgrounds and General Framework
CVC Structural and  
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Figure 4.1 The Curvilinear Relations between Technology Diversification among 
Portfolio Companies, and the Portfolio Option Cost and Growth Benefits 
Option Cost 
Growth Benefit
Technology diversification 
Super-additive 
growth value 
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Growth value 
Cost, 
Growth 
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Figure 4.2 Proposed Model in Study One 
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Figure 4.3 Tobin’s q vs. Technology Diversification Standardized Data 
Technological Diversification 
Tobin’s Q
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Table 4.1 Sample Comparison (With vs. Without Technology Diversification) 
 
Accounting indicators 
Mean Difference  
with technology diversification – without 
technology diversification) 
Assets in million) 18958.27***
Leverage Debt/Equity) 0.51 
Employee 2242*** 
Advertising expense in million) 404.86***
Capital expenditure in million) 1111.83***
Sale growth -0.09** 
RD expense in million) 395.77** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001(level 2-tailed) 
** Significant level at the 0.01 (level 2-tailed) 
* Significant level at the 0.05 (level 2-tailed) 
† Significant level at the 0.1 (level 2-tailed) 
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Table 4.2 Summary of the Major Measures in Study One 
 
Variables Measures 
Growth value for the 
corporate investor Tobin’s Q 
Autonomy One dummy variable to capture: internal program vs. wholly-owned subsidiary 
Syndication Syndicated investments /Overall investments before the focal year 
Technology 
diversification 
The overlap in the patent domains of all portfolio companies for each year.  The patent domain 
is coded according to the US patent classification.   
CVC portfolio size  # of portfolio companies per year 
CVC age Difference in years between the first CVC investment and the focal year 
Corporate investor’s size  Assets in million) 
Leverage Long-term debt/Total equity 
Capital expenditure  in million 
Sales growth Sales of present year/sales of last year -1  
R&D expenditure  in million 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Study One 
 
Variables N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Growth value for the 
corporate investor 330 0.013 15.73 2.16 2.15 
Autonomy 346 0 1 0.79 0.41 
Syndication 355 0 1 0.84 0.20 
Technology diversification 355 0 1 0.84 0.20 
CVC portfolio size  355 2 159 16.09 21.86 
CVC age 355 1 35 10.48 7.67 
Corporate investor’s size  332 35.79 479603 34199.52 64883.74 
Leverage 329 -70.82 22.51 0.66 4.54 
Capital expenditure  210 0.28 23495 2101.65 3736.22 
Sales growth 322 -0.82 4.81 0.12 0.45 
R&D expenditure  256 0 7700 1341.27 1757.36 
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Table 4.4 Correlation Matrix of Study One 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Tobin’s q           
2. CVC autonomy -.143*          
3. Syndication activity -.122* -.142**         
4. Technology 
diversification -.281** -.045 -.016        
5. Portfolio size .08 .037 .144** .090       
6. CVC age -.119* .097 -.009 .133* .048      
7. Log_Assets -.133* .160** -.091 .128* .032 .275**     
8. Leverage -.076 .021 .011 .011 -.036 .060 .227**    
9. Capital expenditure -.167 .207** -.164* .180** -.078 .266** .638** .274**   
10. Sales Growth .244** -.025 -.062 -.084 -.033 -.147** -.067 -.008 .008  
11. R&D expenditure -.062 .138* .081 -.057 .176** .146* .659** .504** .485** -.062 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level 2-tailed) 
* Significant level at the 0.05 level 2-tailed) 
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Table 4.5 Results of Panel-data Linear Regression Examining the Relationship between Corporate Investor’s Tobin’s Q 
and Technology Diversification of its CVC Portfolio 
Qt Qt+1  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Controls  
year -.184* -.176* -.221** -.095 -.121 -.128 
Industry’s Q .433* .454**    .433** .313†  .354*   .351* 
CVC Portfolio size  -.003     .008    .011 -.016 -.009  -.009 
CVC Age -.024 -.008   -.008 -.037 -.024  -.035 
Corporate investor’s size- log of assets) -.057   .015 -.037  .259  .247    .239 
Leverage -.080 -.095 -.103 -.014 -.039  -.040 
Capital expenditure -.00005  -.00001   -.00004 -.00009 -.00007  -.00007 
Sale growth 2.918*** 2.859***   2.431***  .699  .595   .496 
R&D expenditure  .0003   .00015    .0003 -.000003  .000009 .00003 
Independent variables  
Technology diversification  -3.367* -27.201***  -1.756 -5.777 
Technology diversification2   17.451***   2.973 
# of observations 126 126 126 104 104 104 
# of firms 31 31 31 30 30 30 
R2 overall) .40 .486 .497 .213 .293 .284 
Wald chi2 44.88*** 61.9*** 77.48*** 17.59* 21.16* 21.08* 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level         * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level           † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 4.6 Results of Panel-data Linear Regression Examining the Relationship between Corporate Investor’s Tobin’s Q 
and Industry Diversification of its CVC Portfolio 
 
Qt Qt+1  
7 8 9 10 11 12 
Controls   
year -.430*** -.134*** -.434*** -.381*** -.384*** -.383***
Industry’s average Q .811*** .807*** .813*** .368** .358** .377** 
CVC Portfolio size .002 .002 .003 .0004 .0004 .002 
CVC Age -.064* -.060 -.063† -.052† -.036 -.042 
Corporate investor’s size- logassets) .106 .086 .069 .097 .064 .045 
Leverage -.080 -.081 -.073 -.153 -.163 -.155 
Capital expenditure -.000002 -.000002 -.000004 -.000008 -.000004 -.000009 
Sale growth .770*** .774*** .768*** .355† .363† .349† 
R&D expenditure .00005 .00006 .00009 .00001 .0001 .0002 
Independent variables   
Industry diversification  -.090 -1.716  -.466† -3.987** 
Industry diversification2   .208   .447* 
# of observations 507 507 507 418 418 418 
# of firms 107 107 107 105 105 105 
R2 overall) 0.175 .176 0.178 0.096 .104 .117 
Wald chi2 100.89*** 100.33*** 101.19*** 43.51*** 47.42*** 53.64*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level         * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level           † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
  237 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 Results of Panel-data Linear Regression Examining the Relationship between Corporate Investor’s Tobin’s Q 
and its CVC Industry Diversification (Two Outliers Deleted) 
 
Qt Qt+1  
13 14 15 16 17 18 
Controls   
year -.338*** -.337*** -.333*** -.234*** -2.340*** -.228*** 
Industry’s average Q   .429***  .421***   .428***  .250*** .249***   .268*** 
CVC Portfolio size   .002  .002   .002 -.003 -.003   -.027 
CVC Age -.033 -.019  -.022 -.022  -.022  -.002 
Corporate investor’s size- logassets)  -.022 -.053  -.058 .043   .041   .053 
Leverage -.065 -.068  -.062 -.063  -.063  -.060 
Capital expenditure -.000005 -.000003  -.000005 -.000004  -.000004  -.000006 
Sale growth  .567***  .582***   .578*** .098   .099   .087 
R&D expenditure  .0001  .0001   .0001 -.00004  -.00004  -.00002 
Independent variables   
Industry diversification  -.407* -2.344*  -.15 -2.825*** 
Industry diversification2    .248*   .357*** 
# of observations 505 505 505 416   416 416 
# of firms 107 107 107 105 105 105 
R2 overall) 0.222 0.235 0.242 .174  0.174 0.191 
Wald chi2 122.59*** 129.74*** 134.61***  61.89***  61.72*** 77.01*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level         * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level           † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
  238 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 Results of Panel-data Linear Regression Examining the impacts of CVC programs’ autonomy and syndication 
activity 
 
Technology Diversification Industry Diversification 
 
19 20 21 22 
Controls     
year .004 .003 -.014 -.013 
CVC Age .002 .002 .030*** .028*** 
Independent variables     
Autonomy  .015  .275† 
Syndication activity  .097†   .026 
# of observations 355 355 1233 1233 
# of firms 63 63 189 189 
R2 overall) 0.023 0.007 0.047 0.061 
Wald chi2 5.8† 8.8† 16.02*** 19.98*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level         * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level           † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 4.9 Summary of the Predictions and Results of Study One 
 
Hypothesis Independent variable / Moderator Dependent Variable Predicted Sign 
Overall 
Results 
H1 Technology diversification  Corporate investor’s growth value Inverted U No support (U-shaped)
 Industry diversification  Corporate investor’s growth value Inverted U No support (U-shaped)
H2 Autonomy  Technology diversification  + No support
 Autonomy Industry diversification  + Support 
H3 Syndication Technology diversification  + Support 
 Syndication Industry diversification  + No support
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Figure 5.1 Proposed Model in Study Two
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Table 5.1 Summary of the Major Measures of Study Two 
 
Variables Measures 
The count of forward future) citations to a patent it applied for 
in a given year Corporate Investor’s 
Innovativeness 
The unweighed patent counts in a given year 
Portfolio company’s 
performance Dummy – 1: went IPO vs. 0: others 
To what extent the incentive scheme depended on financial 
returns associated with CVC investments (11-point scale) 
Incentive scheme  
To what extent the incentive scheme depended on strategic 
benefits associated with CVC investments (11-point scale) 
Autonomy Mean of 8 survey items 7-point scale) 
Corporate investor -> Portfolio company, mean of 3 survey 
items 7-point scale) Knowledge flows  Portfolio company -> Corporate investor, mean of 3 survey 
items 7-point scale) 
Board representation Dummy – 1: CVC managers held the board seat in the portfolio company  
Dummy – 1: IT industries  Portfolio company 
industry Dummy – 1: medical industries 
Dummy – 1: seed/startup 
Dummy – 1: early stage 
Dummy – 1: expansion 
Portfolio company 
development stage 
Dummy – 1: later stage 
Corporate investor’s size Assets in million) 
CVC age CVC age in years by the focal investment 
Corporate investor’s 
technology competency Patent stockt=Patentt+1-δ)Patent Stockt-1 
Industry patenting activity  
The average # of citation-weighted patents applied to by 
firms in a given year in a given industry by each four-digit 
SIC code.  
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Table 5.2 Descriptive and Frequency Statistics of the Eighteen Responding 
Companies 
 Mean S.D. Min Max 
CVC age in 2000 10.56 7.006 1 23 
# of portfolio companies 
invested 29.28 32.74 2.00 123.00 
Assets in 2000 in million) 30449.75 57412.60 1006.58 242223.00
Sales in 2000 in million) 19955.52 28063.47 540.50 104385.75
 
 0~5 6~10 11~20 21~50 
# of staff working on CVC 13 firms 2 firms 3 firms  0 firm 
 
 Base salary Bonus Stock 
options 
Carried 
interests 
Compensation components 
for CVC managers 
18 firms 16 firms 12 firms 2 firms 
 
Industry Distribution  
Printing and Publishing 2 firms 
Chemicals  3 firms 
Pharmaceuticals 3 firms 
Information Technology 4 firms 
Motor Freight 
Transportation And 
Warehousing 
1 firm 
Communications 3 firms 
Wholesale Trade-durable 
Goods 
1 firm 
Health care 1 firm 
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Table 5.3 Sample Comparison Using the Mann-Whitney Test 
(Respondent vs. Non-Respondent) 
 
 Mean Rank (Respondent) 
Mean Rank 
(Non-Respondent) 
 
Z-Value 
Assets in 2000 in million) 157.52 120.56 -2.36* 
Sales in 2000 in million) 161.00 120.77 -2.56** 
CVC age in 2000 157.52 111.55 -3.28*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Significant level at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
† Significant level at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.4 Fact Loadings for Autonomy 
 
Loadings Items  (α = 0.70) 
F1 F2 
1. CVC investments are managed by closed venture 
capital funds with outside investors. -.042 -.671 
2. Funding is project-based rather than budgeting-based. -.084 .701 
3. Investment objectives are determined by the parent 
company. .688 .216 
4. Investment objectives are determined by the CVC 
program. .340 .813 
5. Staffing decisions in the CVC program must be 
approved by your parent company. .828 .032 
6. The CVC program has the authority to hire anyone it 
needs. .812 .244 
7. CVC managers have the authority to make investment 
decisions on their own. .555 .607 
8. All investments made by the CVC program must be 
approved by the parent company. .879 -.115 
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Table 5.5 Factor Loadings for Knowledge Flows 
 
Loadings 
Items 
F1  F2 
Knowledge flows  
corporate investors to portfolio companies  α = 0.93)   
1. The parent company provides a great deal of knowledge 
about sales and marketing to the portfolio companies e.g., 
knowledge about advertisement, public relations, service 
delivery). 
.907 .174 
2. The parent company provides a great deal of technological 
knowledge to the portfolio companies e.g., knowledge 
about R&D, information systems, production process). 
.940 -.024 
3. The parent company provides a great deal of strategic 
knowledge to the portfolio companies e.g., knowledge of 
competitors, suppliers, government regulations). 
.944 .145 
Knowledge flows 
portfolio companies to corporate investors  α = 0.82)   
1. The portfolio companies provide a great deal of 
knowledge about sales and marketing to your 
organization. 
-.145 .913 
2. The portfolio companies provide a great deal of 
technological knowledge to your organization. .222 .850 
3. The portfolio companies provide a great deal of strategic 
knowledge to your organization. .590 .720 
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Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics of Study Two 
Variables N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
238 0 7255 385.63 934.839Corporate Investor’s 
Innovativeness 238 0 1390 248.98 318.616
Portfolio company’s 
performance 238 0 1 .21 .405
Incentive scheme - financial  238 0 9 2.08 3.047
Incentive scheme - strategic  238 0 10 2.46 1.921
Autonomy 238 1.25 5.57 2.77 1.24
238 1.00 7.00 4.52 1.59Knowledge flows  
238 1.00 6.00 4.0952 1.48
Board representation 238 0 1 0.86 0.35
238 0 1 .85 .35Portfolio company industry 
238 0 1 .11 .31
238 0 1 .06 .23
238 0 1 .22 .41
238 0 1 .53 .50
Portfolio company 
development stage 
238 0 1 .16 .36
Corporate investor’s size 230 170.34 242223.00
46206.
38 49713.15
CVC age 238 0 22 9.53 4.774
Corporate investor’s 
technology competency 238 .00
4060.8
4
1093.8
6 1275.66
Industry patenting activity  238 .00 7.21 1.33 1.57
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Table 5.7 Correlation Matrix of Study Two 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Citation-weighted patent 
countt+1 
                  
2. Patent countt+1 .77**                  
3. Portfolio company’s 
performance .14* 
 
-.01                 
4. Incentive – financial  -.28** -.50** .05                
5. Incentive – strategic -.17** -.42** .11 .40**               
6. Autonomy -.20** -.36** .09 .62** .32**              
7. Knowledge flow 
(corporation->portfolio 
company) 
.16* .38** .07 .29** .01 .34**             
8. Knowledge flow 
(portfolio company -> 
corporation) 
.24** .33* .02 -.11 .20** -.09 .55**            
9. Board representation .17* .29** -.12 -.10 -.46** .12 -.01 -.14*           
10. Is portfolio in IT .07 .08 -.08 .00 -.02 -.07 .20** .38** .07          
11. Is portfolio in Medical -.07 -.10 .16* -.01 .06 .08 -.24** -.38** -.09 -.84**         
12. Is portfolio a startup -.01 -.05 -.08 -.05 .17** -.09 -.14* .04 -.05 .00 .03        
13. Is portfolio in early stage .11 .11 -.12 -.02 -.05 .06 .07 .06 -.02 -.07 .08 -.13*       
14. Is portfolio in expansion -.09 -.05 -.02 -.07 -.08 -.09 -.13* -.13* .07 .01 .03 -.26** -.56**      
15. Is portfolio in later stage .02 .00 .18** .16* .04 .12 .19** .08 -.02 .18** -.15* -.11 -.23** -.45**     
16. corporate investor’s size 
(log assets) .10 .19** -.07 -.25** -.14* -.18** .02 .19** .51** .23** -.25** .05 -.05 -.03 .02    
17. CVC age in years -.17** -.15* -.12 -.33** .13* -.41** -.56** -.28** -.10 -.19** .24** .09 -.03 .06 -.10 .17**   
18. corporate investor’s 
technology competency .54** .93** -.07 -.56** -.51** -.44** .46** .40** .32** .13* -.16* -.07 .09 -.02 -.01 .27** -.15*  
19. Industry patenting activity .06 .23** -.11 -.12 -.41** -.33** .07 .08 -.24** .16* -.20** -.10 .03 .00 .06 -.12 -.09 .29** 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed).     *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed). 
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Table 5.8 Results of Linear Regressions Examining the Impacts of CVC Programs’ Incentive Scheme, Autonomy, and 
Board Representation on Knowledge Flows from Corporate Investors to Portfolio Companies 
 
Knowledge Flows 
Corporate Investor -> Portfolio Company) 
Model 1 Model 2 
Controls  
year .222*** .237 
CVC Age -.570*** -.536 
Independent variables  
Incentive scheme based on financial return  -.071 
Incentive scheme based on strategic benefits  .060 
Monitoring mode  -.062 
Autonomy   .173† 
# of observations 238 238 
R2 .357 .371 
ΔR2  .024† 
F test 66.87***  24.31*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level  
** Significant level at the 0.01 level 
* Significant level at the 0.05 level  
† Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 5.9 Results of Logistic Regressions Examining the Impacts of Knowledge Flows on the Performance of Portfolio 
Companies 
Logistic 
IPO within 5 years after 
investment 
IPO within 3 years after 
investment 
 
3 4 5 6 
Controls  
Is portfolio in IT 21.293 21.316 21.406 21.437 
Is portfolio in Medical 22.409 22.735 22.320 22.673 
Is portfolio a startup -4.673** -4.699** -4.786*** -4.827** 
Is portfolio in early stage -3.707*** -3.883*** -4.061*** -4.269*** 
Is portfolio in expansion -2.636** -2.655** -2.724** -2.750** 
Is portfolio in later stage -1.381 -1.586 -1.475 -1.702 
Year -.610*** -.688*** -.666*** -.755*** 
Independent variables  
Knowledge flows  
(corporate investors->portfolio companies)  .282*  .307* 
# of observations 238 238 238 238 
Pseudo R2 .273 .300 .289 .319 
χ2 test 45.61*** 50.55*** 48.16*** 53.773*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level              * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level                † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 5.10 Results of Linear Regressions Examining the Impacts of CVC Programs’ 
Incentive Scheme, Autonomy, and Board Representation on Knowledge Flows from 
Portfolio Companies to Corporate Investors 
 
Knowledge Flows 
Portfolio Company ->Corporate 
Investor)  
Model 7 Model 8 
Controls  
year -.076 .455 
CVC Age    -.275***   -8.104*** 
Independent variables  
Incentive scheme based on financial 
return  -2.345** 
Incentive scheme based on strategic 
benefits   6.202*** 
Monitoring mode  .475 
Autonomy  -2.405** 
# of observations 238 238 
R2 .076 .268 
ΔR2  .203*** 
F test 10.71*** 15.45*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level          * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level           † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 5.11 Results of Negative Binomial Regressions Examining the Impacts of 
Knowledge Flows on the Innovativeness of Corporate Investors 
 
Negative Binomial 
Citation-weighted 
patent countst+1 
Patent countst+1 
 
9 10 11 12 
Controls  
Corporate investor’s size  (log 
assets) 
.707*** .572** .118 .111 
Corporate investor’s technology 
competency 
.0003*** .0004*** .0002*** .0003**
* 
CVC age .167** .189*** .121** .103** 
Industry patenting activity -.285 -.587* -.166 -.302† 
Year -.119 .231 .055 .224† 
Independent variables  
Knowledge flows 
(portfolio companies->corporate 
investors) 
 -.382*  -.304**
# of observations 230 230 230 230 
Pseudo R2 0.045 0.048 0.026 0.029 
χ2 test 83.29*** 87.85*** 59.65*** 67.18*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level           * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level             † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 5.12 Results of Logistic and Negative Binomial Regressions Examining the 
Impacts of CVC Characteristics on Corporate Investor’s Innovativeness and 
Performance of Portfolio Companies 
Logistic Negative Binomial 
IPO within 5 
years after 
investment 
IPO within 3 
years after 
investment 
Patent 
Citationt+1 
Patent 
Countst+1 
 
13 14 15 16 
Independent variables   
 Incentive – financial  -.097 -.075 -.882*** -.337† 
 Incentive – strategic -.057 -.054 -.502 -.138 
 Monitoring mode -1.332* -1.383*   -7.349*** -3.257* 
 Autonomy .423 .356 1.376* .343 
Controls   
Is portfolio in IT 21.308 21.430   
 Is portfolio in Medical 22.172 22.105   
Is portfolio a startup -4.706** -4.885**   
 Is portfolio in early 
stage -3.948*** -4.338***   
 Is portfolio in 
expansion -2.623** -2.732**   
 Is portfolio in later 
stage -1.459 -1.572   
 corporate investor’s 
size log assets)   .203 -.042 
 Corporate investor’s 
technology 
competency 
  .0003 .0003 
 CVC age in years   -.229** -.178* 
 Industry patenting 
activity   -.383 -.205 
 Year -.651*** -.712*** .364† .370* 
# of observations 238 238 228 228 
Pseudo R2 .307 .322 .042 .020 
LR χ2 test 51.91*** 54.36*** 74.49*** 44.21*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level        * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level         † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 5.13 Summary of the Predictions and Results of Study Two 
Hypothesis Independent variable / Moderator Dependent Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Overall Results 
H1a VC-like incentive scheme Knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies + No support 
 Knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies Portfolio company’s performance + Support 
H1b VC-like incentive scheme Knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors _ Strong support 
 Knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors 
Corporate investor’s 
innovativeness + 
No support  
(significant 
opposite results) 
H2 Autonomy Knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors _ Strong support 
 Knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors 
Corporate investor’s 
innovativeness + 
No support  
(significant 
opposite results) 
H3a Board representation Knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies + No support 
 Knowledge flows from corporate investors to portfolio companies Portfolio company’s performance + Support 
H3b Board representation Knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors + No support 
 Knowledge flows from portfolio companies to corporate investors 
Corporate investor’s 
innovativeness + 
No support  
(significant 
opposite results) 
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Figure 6.1 Proposed Mode1 1 in Study Three 
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Figure 6.2 Proposed Mode1 2 in Study Three 
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Table 6.1 Summary of the Samples of Study Three 
 
 # of Investments # of Portfolio companies # of Firms 
The base sample 3037 2358 208 
The final sample 
without the survey 
data 
1738 1057 152 
The final sample 
with the survey data 184 140 17 
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Table 6.2 Sample Comparison: with vs. without valuation data 
 
 
Mean 
Difference  
(with valuation 
data – without)
T value 
Corporate investor’s assets at the investment 
time in million) -1008.75 -.71 
Corporate investor’s sales at the investment 
time in million) -272.64 -.30 
# of previous investments before the focal 
investments -12.11 -3.16** 
CVC age at the focal investments .06 .27 
Average interval between previous 
investments .016 .50 
Interval variance before the focal investment 44.703 1.33 
Syndication ratio 0.0089 1.09 
Objective Stability – stage -.0025 -.34 
Objective Stability – industry -.0071 -.87 
The time difference between the date of the  
focal investment and the IPO date in month) 7.25 8.60*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Significant level at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
† Significant level at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 6.3 Summary of Major Measures of Study Three 
Variables Measures 
Lifespan 1. The total number of investments before the focal investment  
 2. The time span in years between its first investment and the focal investment  
 
3. The number of investments for the latest continuous period before the 
focal investment, during which a CVC program made at least one CVC 
investment per year/per two years/per three years 
 
4. The time span in years of the latest continuous period before the focal 
investment, during which a CVC program made at least one CVC 
investment per year/per two years/per three years 
Stability-operation 1. Mean time between two investment between the focal investments 
 2. Variation on intervals between two investments before the focal investments 
Stability-objective 1. Industry similarity among investments before the focal investments 
 2. Stage similarity among investments before the focal investments 
Incentive scheme Two items, 7-point scale 
Syndication Syndicated investments /overall investments before the focal investment
Strategic benefits 1. dummy variable: whether to be acquired or make alliances with the corporate investor 
 2. A series of dummy variables to identify the alliance types: R&D, marketing, manufacturing, and technology transfer 
Financial benefits 1. dummy: whether the portfolio company went IPO or was favorably acquired before Dec. 2004 
 2. The time difference in month between the date of the focal investment and the IPO date.  
Valuation 1. Pre-money valuation 
 2. Post-money valuation 
Investment stage A series of dummy variables: seed/startup, early stage, expansion, later stage, and buyout 
Investment industry Two dummy variables: whether in IT industry; whether in medical/biotech industry 
Portfolio company age In years 
Fund inflows in VC 
industry Annual VC investments in dollars for the whole industry 
Corporate investor size  Log Sales 
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Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics of Study Three 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
 N=178 N=1737 N=178 N=1737 N=178 N=1737 N=178 N=1737
Lifespan - # of investment 39.70 69.82 34.05 95.61 0 0 131 484 
Lifespan – years 9.22 7.01 4.45 5.95 0 0 22 30 
Lifespan – # of investment in a 
continuous period (1-year 
window) 
37.62 66.65 35.17 95.50 0 0 131 483 
Lifespan – years in a continuous 
period (1-year window) 5.72 3.30 3.72 2.46 0 0 15 19 
Operation stability – mean .50 .369 .70 .872 0 0 4.33 18 
Operation stability – variance 188.12 385.16 287.34 996.06 0 0 1887 7586 
Objective Stability – stage .133 .066 .220 .201 0 0 1 1 
Objective Stability – industry .465 .435 .258 .224 0 0 1 1 
Incentive scheme - financial 1.10 -- 1.91 -- 0 -- 8 -- 
Incentive scheme - strategic 2.45 -- 1.88 -- 0 -- 7 -- 
Syndication .774 .779 .214 .220 0 0 .94 .97 
Whether being acquired by the 
corporate investor .01 .01 .104 .083 0 0 1 1 
Whether forming alliances with 
the corporate investor .02 .02 .146 .139 0 0 1 1 
Whether going IPO .33 .27 .470 .445 0 0 1 1 
Whether being acquired .21 .23 .410 .421 0 0 1 1 
Whether being defunct .10 .14 .298 .347 0 0 1 1 
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(Continued) 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
The time difference between the 
date of the focal investment and 
the IPO date 
13.28 13.28 21.80 21.80 1 1 109 109 
post-money valuation 135.24 141.22 152.26 227.13 7.3 1 1000 3650 
pre-money valuation 109.35 113.88 138.69 203.87 -14.4 -43.5 875 3375 
Investment stage – seed/startup .028 .041 .166 .199 0 0 1 1 
Investment stage – early stage .130 .170 .336 .375 0 0 1 1 
Investment stage – expansion .607 .543 .490 .498 0 0 1 1 
Investment stage – later stage .202 .218 .403 .413 0 0 1 1 
Investment stage – buyout 0 .003 0 .059 0 0 0 1 
Investment industry – IT .854 .892 .354 .311 0 0 1 1 
Investment industry – Medical .112 .080 .317 .271 0 0 1 1 
Total Fund inflows in the VC 
industry in million) 83548 99314 52716 49999 16149 16149 148054 148054
Corporate investor size  
(Sales in million) 45394 18463 36570 25126 80.96 1.47 131695 180557
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Table 6.5 Correlation Matrix of Study Three 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Lifespan - # of investment        
2. Lifespan – years .198**       
3. Lifespan – # of investment in a 
continuous period (1Y) .988** .132**      
4. Lifespan – years in a continuous 
period (1Y) .509** .525** .506**     
5. Operation stability – mean -.228** .277** -.231** -.243**    
6. Operation stability – variance -.248** -.222** -.239** -.348** .330**   
7. Objective Stability – stage -.047* -.192** -.040 -.143** -.122** -.127**  
8. Objective Stability – industry -.124** .044 -.126** -.053* .034 -.142** -.382**
9. Incentive scheme – financiala -.229** -.305** -.212** -.292** -.047 -.054 .325**
10.Incentive scheme – strategicb -.099 -.104 -.091 -.187* .055 -.073 .305**
11.Syndication .357** .260** .351** .458** -.170** -.273** -.636**
12. Whether being acquired by the 
corporate investor -.045 .013 -.049* -.042 .016 -.022 .064**
13. Whether forming alliances with the 
corporate investor -.080** -.016 -.082** -.080** .054* .063** -.006
14. Whether going IPO -.174** -.007 -.174** -.080** .052* .069** .042 
15. Whether being acquired .035 -.041 .038 -.010 -.046 -.054* .003 
16. Whether being defunct .040 -.016 .044 .034 -.033 .019 -.033
17. The time difference between the date 
of the focal investment and the IPO 
date 
-.171** -.004 -.171** -.074** .049* .058* .045 
18. Pre-money valuation .001 -.037 .005 -.051* -.013 .015 .015 
19. Post-money valuation .008 -.040 .013 -.047* -.016 .017 .013 
20. seed/startup -.054* -.001 -.055* -.039 -.009 -.013 .034 
21. early stage -.029 -.001 -.028 -.023 -.001 -.007 .007 
22. expansion .064** -.001 .065** .037 -.032 .000 .016 
23. later stage .002 -.011 .000 .002 .039 .021 -.045
24. Investment industry – IT .096** -.222** .115** -.095** -.044 .006 .019 
25. Investment industry – Medical -.089** .273** -.111** .118** .061* .003 -.036
26. Fund inflows in VC industry .272** .013 .278** .114** -.079** -.080** -.094**
27. Corporate investor size  (Log 
Sales) .387** .393** .376** .393** -.016 -.257** -.137**
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed   
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed) 
                                                 
a b N=178 
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(Continued) 
Variable 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Lifespan - # of investment        
2. Lifespan – years        
3. Lifespan – # of investment in a 
continuous period (1Y)        
4. Lifespan – years in a continuous period 
(1Y)        
5. Operation stability – mean        
6. Operation stability – variance        
7. Objective Stability – stage        
8. Objective Stability – industry        
9. Incentive scheme – financiala -.063       
10.Incentive scheme – strategicb .029 .665**      
11.Syndication .265** -.354** -.267**     
12. Whether being acquired by the 
corporate investor -.032 .000 -.015 -.041    
13. Whether forming alliances with the 
corporate investor -.014 -.010 -.031 -.097** .116**   
14. Whether going IPO -.047* .032 -.020 -.137** -.015 .125**  
15. Whether being acquired -.009 -.045 -.002 .062** .112** -.062* -.333**
16. Whether being defunct -.012 -.005 -.041 .047 -.038 -.036 -.134**
17. The time difference between the date 
of the focal investment and the IPO date -.027 -.004 -.015 -.129** -.003 .132** .923**
18. Pre-money valuation -.027 .292** .371** -.015 -.016 .100** .134**
19. Post-money valuation -.027 .295** .379** -.011 -.018 .092** .123**
20. seed/startup .033 -.016 .040 -.104** -.019 -.011 -.075**
21. early stage .023 .144 -.008 -.054* .024 .018 -.087**
22. expansion -.048* -.153* -.115 .033 -.027 -.009 -.037
23. later stage .012 -.034 -.030 .081** .011 -.039 .116**
24. Investment industry – IT -.137** -.231** -.183* .074** -.008 -.051* -.062**
25. Investment industry – Medical .151** .115 .006 -.066** .018 .059* .101**
26. Fund inflows in VC industry .050* .014 .040 .214** -.063** -.092** -.407**
27. Corporate investor size  (Log Sales) -.090** -.366** -.166* .493** -.029 -.032 -.061*
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed   
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed) 
                                                 
a b N=178 
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(Continued) 
Variable 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1.Lifespan - # of investment       
2. Lifespan – years       
3. Lifespan – # of investment in a continuous period 
(1Y)       
4. Lifespan – years in a continuous period (1Y)       
5. Operation stability – mean       
6. Operation stability – variance       
7. Objective Stability – stage       
8. Objective Stability – industry       
9. Incentive scheme – financiala       
10.Incentive scheme – strategicb       
11.Syndication       
12. Whether being acquired by the corporate investor       
13. Whether forming alliances with the corporate 
investor       
14. Whether going IPO       
15. Whether being acquired       
16. Whether being defunct -.220**      
17. The time difference between the date of the focal 
investment and the IPO date -.308**
-.108
**     
18. Pre-money valuation -.023 .041 .200**    
19. Post-money valuation -.028 .045 .190** .995**   
20. seed/startup -.010 .008 -.090** -.101** -.105**  
21. early stage -.036 -.011 -.105** -.169** -.180** -.094**
22. expansion .065** -.003 -.053* -.003 .001 -.226**
23. later stage -.010 .004 .130** .087** .093** -.110**
24. Investment industry – IT .076** .050* -.057* .001 .015 -.048*
25. Investment industry – Medical -.050* -.094** .090** -.091** -.102** .045 
26. Fund inflows in VC industry .083** .097** -.347** .181** .205** -.136**
27. Corporate investor size  (Log Sales) .008 .033 -.051* .094** .101** -.097**
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed   
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed) 
                                                 
a b N=178 
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(Continued) 
Variable 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1.Lifespan - # of investment       
2. Lifespan – years       
3. Lifespan – # of investment in a continuous 
period (1Y)       
4. Lifespan – years in a continuous period (1Y)       
5. Operation stability – mean       
6. Operation stability – variance       
7. Objective Stability – stage       
8. Objective Stability – industry       
9. Incentive scheme - financial       
10.Incentive scheme - strategic       
11.Syndication       
12. Whether being acquired by the corporate 
investor       
13. Whether forming alliances with the corporate 
investor       
14. Whether going IPO       
15. Whether being acquired       
16. Whether being defunct       
17. The time difference between the date of the 
focal investment and the IPO date       
18. Pre-money valuation       
19. Post-money valuation       
20. seed/startup       
21. early stage 1      
22. expansion -.493** 1     
23. later stage -.239** -.575** 1    
24. Investment industry – IT -.044 .074** .058* 1   
25. Investment industry – Medical .036 -.044 -.053* -.847** 1  
26. Fund inflows in VC industry -.023 .034 .042 .162** -.185** 1 
27. Corporate investor size (Log Sales) -.041 .030 .046 .063** -.044 .143**
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 2-tailed   
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 2-tailed) 
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Table 6.6 Regression Results using Time Difference between IPO and the Focal Investmenta as Dependent Variable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Controls  
seed/startup -17.2*** -17.1*** -16.7*** -16.8*** -16.9*** -42.5*** -16.9*** -16.5*** -40.8*** -38.5***
early stage -16.9*** -16.7*** -16.5*** -16.6*** -16.7*** -44.1*** -16.6*** -16.5*** -42.2*** -40.9***
expansion -12.1*** -11.8*** -11.6*** -11.9*** -11.9*** -34.9*** -11.8*** -11.6*** -33.5** -31.7***
later stage -8.54*** -8.12*** -7.99** -8.45*** -8.44** -27.4** -8.09*** -6.0** -26.3** -23.8** 
buyout -2.88 -2.73 -1.93 -2.76 -4.16 -- -4.30 -3.53 -- -- 
IT 5.03 5.23 5.19 45.04 5.02 46.7* 5.28 5.2 43.1* 42.8* 
Medical 11.8** 10.3* 10.38* 11.8** 11.34** 55.2** 9.46** 9.65* 57.3** 53.3* 
Portfolio company age .53*** .51*** .51*** .53*** .54*** .94 .52*** .52*** 1.20† .94 
Year -.77* -.52 -.60 -.83 -.88** -1.91* -.69† -.84* -.1.17 -4.11* 
Corporation size .08 .04 .11 .004 .22 -1.37 .10 .25 -.007 -5.26* 
Independent variables  
# of investment  -.02***     -.02**  .003  
years  .25*     .34**  -.92  
# of investment in a 
continuous period  
  -.02***     -.02***  .06 
years in a continuous 
period 
  .81***     .96***  4.34** 
stability – mean    .44   -.71 .10 4.76 3.60 
stability – variance    .00005   .0004 .0004 -.004 -.003 
Stability – stage    5.43   1.83 2.72 12.8 -1.77 
Stability – industry    2.26   1.61 2.09 -.52 -2.15 
Syndication     2.04**  1.90** 2.06** 8.05 .32 
Incentive scheme - 
financial 
     -.11   -.21 -.14 
Incentive scheme - 
strategic 
     .15   .13 .25 
# of observations 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642 170 1642 1642 170 170 
R2 (overall) 0.079 0.081 0.082 0.072 0.073 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.25 .25 
Wald chi2 170.72*** 187.7*** 196.9*** 187.7*** 180.2*** 68.7*** 197.3*** 209.3*** 73.9*** 76.99***
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level      * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level        † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
                                                 
a This variable is reversely coded.  The larger number means shorter time span between IPO and the focal investment.  
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Table 6.7 Results of Multinomial Logistic Regressions Examining the Impacts of 
CVC Characteristics on the financial returns associated with CVC investments 
Without Survey Data With Survey Data 
IPO Acquired Defunct IPO Acquired Defunct
 
11 12 13 14 15 16 
Controls       
seed/startup -3.346*** .465 1.492 19.853 39.205 37.812 
early stage -2.429*** .508 1.061 10.775 26.258 28.003 
expansion -1.470*** 1.096 1.480 12.761 28.893 29.131 
later stage -.625 1.148 1.587 14.290 29.502 29.579 
buyout -.672 -17.796 3.409† -- -- -- 
IT 1.345** 1.919* -.039 18.272 -26.865 -41.276 
Medical 1.190* 1.813* -2.068* 36.730 -8.741 -23.484 
Portfolio 
company age -.007 -.022 -.084* -.118 -.385 -.059 
Corporation size .029 -.022 .037 -1.387 -1.480 -1.436 
Year = 1996 3.985*** -.373 -.443 1.479 12.320 43.119 
Year = 1997 2.723*** .297 -.868 109.859 132.958 151.607 
Year = 1998 2.332*** .369 -.090 -9.822 16.959 31.772 
Year = 1999 1.784*** .267† -.155 -9.007 17.652 33.501 
Year = 2000    -10.486 17.851 33.301 
Independent 
variables       
# of investment -.003** -.002* -.001 -.023 -.059 -.008 
years .008 -.019 .019 .257 .377 .305 
Stability – mean -.167† -.025 -.213 -3.429 -3.526 -3.246 
Stability – variance .000 .000 .000 .006 .001 .006 
Stability – stage -.859 .469 -.445 -12.441 -8.996 -13.451 
Stability – 
industry -.719* -.754* -.537 1.650 6.654 2.786 
Syndication -.664 1.174† .430 -10.155 -5.987 -9.483 
Incentive scheme 
- financial    -1.291 -1.548 -1.289 
Incentive scheme 
- strategic    2.831 2.532 2.531 
# of observations 1642 170 
Pseudo R2 .30 .40 
Chi2 528.7*** 771.68*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level             * Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level              † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
(The reference group is the portfolio companies that kept independent and private.) 
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Table 6.8 Results of Multinomial Logistic Regressions Examining the Impacts of 
CVC Characteristics on the strategic benefits associated with CVC investments 
Acquisition  Strategic Alliance  
17 18 
Controls   
seed/startup -19.165 -4.021** 
early stage -2.512† -3.085*** 
expansion -2.641* -3.107*** 
later stage -1.842 -3.331*** 
buyout -19.393 -20.531 
IT 17.034 18.948*** 
Medical 17.288 18.943*** 
Portfolio company age -.143 -.203† 
Corporation size -.061 .103 
Year = 1996 -18.529 -16.501*** 
Year = 1997 -19.280 -17.195*** 
Year = 1998 -36.015 -18.330*** 
Year = 1999 -19.226 -18.195*** 
Year = 2000 -20.950 -18.530 
Independent variables   
# of investment -.033† -.021† 
years .077 .004 
stability – mean .046 .020 
stability – variance -.001 .000 
Stability – stage 2.843 -1.331 
Stability – industry -1.802 -.475 
Syndication 3.378 -1.692† 
# of observations 1642 
Pseudo R2 .97 
Chi2 3241.7*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level    * Significant level at the 0.05 level  
** Significant level at the 0.01 level      † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
(The reference group is the portfolio companies that neither were acquired by nor formed 
alliances with their corporate investors.)   
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Table 6.9 Results of Linear Regressions Examining the Moderator effects of CVC 
Characteristics on the Relationships between the Times portfolio companies took to 
go IPO after the focal investment and their Post-money Valuations 
 19 20 21 22 23 
Controls  
seed/startup -.318*** -.316*** -.318*** -.318*** -.316*** 
early stage -.661*** -.659*** -.662*** -.658*** -.662*** 
expansion -.724*** -.723*** -.725*** -.721*** -.725*** 
later stage -.580*** -.579*** -.581*** -.579*** -.582*** 
buyout .007 .006 .007 .010 .004 
IT -.251*** -.248*** -.250*** -.251*** -.248*** 
Medical -.314*** -.312*** -.314*** -.314*** -.314*** 
Portfolio company age .009 .009 .009 .009 .009 
Corporation size .100*** .099*** .100*** .099*** .100*** 
Investment year -.364* -.347* -.367* -.380** -.354** 
Fund inflows in the 
VC industry .622*** .608*** .625*** .638*** .613*** 
Independent variable      
Time difference 
between IPO and the 
focal investment (A) 
.212*** .251*** .211*** .287*** .384*** 
Moderators      
# of investment  -.015 -.004 -.016 -.014 -.020 
Years -.037 -.030 -.037 -.036 -.034 
Stability – mean -.023 -.025 -.019 -.023 -.020 
Stability – variance .015 .014 .007 .015 .015 
Stability – stage -.035 -.032 -.035 .001 -.032 
Stability – industry .010 .008 .009 .029 .010 
Syndication -.084* -.074* -.083* -.082* -.042 
Interactions      
A×# of investment  -.054†    
A×years  -.008    
A×Stability – mean   -.008   
A×Stability – variance   .013   
A×Stability – stage    -.064*  
A×Stability – industry    -.070  
A×Syndication     -.179* 
# of observations 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642 
Adjusted R2  .227 .227 .227 .229 .230 
ΔR2  .002† 0 .002    .002** 
F-value 26.43*** 24.13*** 23.90*** 24.17*** 25.44*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level    * Significant level at the 0.05 level  
** Significant level at the 0.01 level     † Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Figure 6.33031  The Time Difference X Number of Previous Investments Interaction 
Plot
                                                 
30 Time Difference is reversely coded.  Thus, the larger number means shorter time span between IPO and 
the focal investments.   
31 All of the interaction plots were drawn using the online calculator created by Preacher, Curran, and 
Bauer, http://www.unc.edu/~preacher/interact/mlr2.htm.    
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Figure 6.432  Time Difference X Investment Objective Stability (Stage) Interaction 
Plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Time Difference is reversely coded.  Thus, the larger number means shorter time span between IPO and 
the focal investments.   
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Figure 6.533 Time Difference X Syndication Activity Interaction Plot
                                                 
33 Time Difference is reversely coded.  Thus, the larger number means shorter time span between IPO and 
the focal investments.   
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Table 6.10 Results of Linear Regressions Examining the Moderator effects of CVC 
Characteristics on the Relationships between the Statuses of portfolio companies 
within 5 years after the focal investment and their Post-money Valuations 
 29 30 31 32 33 
Controls  
seed/startup -.346*** -.349*** -.346*** -.344*** -.345*** 
early stage -.710*** -.713*** -.709*** -.708*** -.712*** 
expansion -.792*** -.797*** -.790*** -.791*** -.795*** 
later stage -.632*** -.637*** -.630*** -.633*** -.634*** 
buyout -.004 -.010 -.003 .000 -.011 
IT -.247*** -.237*** -.247*** -.247*** -.243*** 
Medical -.309*** -.305*** -.310*** -.308*** -.307*** 
Portfolio company age .014 .016 .014 .014 .014 
Corporation size .100*** .095*** .100*** .098*** .098*** 
Investment year -.307* -.275† -.311* -.305* -.296* 
Fund inflows in the VC industry .572*** .543*** .576*** .570*** .563*** 
Independent variables       
IPO (A) .208*** .251*** .213*** .249*** .314*** 
Being acquired (B) .055* .099* .059* .044 .033 
Defunct (C) .053* .130*** .057* .063 .167 
Moderators      
# of investment  -.016 .001 -.017 -.015 -.019 
Years  -.033 .023 -.028 -.033 -.034 
Stability – mean -.022 -.023 -.008 -.021 -.017 
Stability – variance .016 .012 .008 .015 .012 
Stability – stage -.032 -.031 -.034 .014 -.027 
Stability – industry .017 .016 .018 .023 .017 
Syndication -.090* -.088* -.094* -.089 -.055 
Interactions   
A×# of investment  -.046   
A×years  -.021   
B×# of investment  -.013    
B×years  -.050    
C×# of investment  -.003    
C×years  -.106**    
A×Stability – mean   -.013   
A×Stability – variance   -.001   
B×Stability – mean   -.018   
B×Stability – variance   .010   
C×Stability – mean   -.019   
C×Stability – variance   .014   
A×Stability – stage    -.052  
A×Stability – industry    -.033  
B×Stability – stage    -.025  
B×Stability – industry    .021  
C×Stability – stage    -.014  
C×Stability – industry    -.005  
A×Syndication     -.112 
B×Syndication     .020 
C×Syndication     -.119 
# of observations 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642 
Adjusted R2 .219 .222 .217 .218 .220 
ΔR2  .005† 0 0 .002 
F-value 22.96*** 18.34*** 17.84*** 17.93*** 20.25*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level              *  Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level              †  Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Figure 6.6 Defunct Dummy X Pervious Experience (Years) Interaction Plot
Defunct Non-Defunct 
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Table 6.11 Results of Linear Regressions Examining the Moderator effects of CVC 
Characteristics on the Relationships between Strategic Benefits and Post-money 
Valuations 
 39 40 41 42 43 
Controls  
seed/startup -.373*** -.374*** -.369*** -.373** -.368***
early stage -.746*** -.750*** -.740*** -.745** -.741***
expansion -.814*** -.819*** -.806*** -.814** -.803***
later stage -.624*** -.628*** -.617*** -.625*** -.616***
buyout .000 .000 .001 .000 .002
IT -.235*** -.235*** -.236*** -.235*** -.237***
Medical -.303*** -.302*** -.304*** -.302*** -.304***
Portfolio company age .014 .014 .014 .015 .014
Corporation size .101*** .100*** .100*** .100*** .100***
Investment year -.326* -.336* -.324* -.317* -.342*
Fund inflows in the VC industry .521*** .529*** .520*** .511*** .537***
Independent variables   
Being acquired by the corporate 
investor (A) -.026 -.017 -.016 .059 -.028
Forming alliances with the 
corporate investor (B) .099*** .117*** .119*** .108** .200***
Moderators  
# of investment  -.029 -.029 -.028 -.028 -.031
Years  -.027 -.024 -.027 -.028 -.026
Stability – mean -.032 -.031 -.023 -.032 -.032
Stability – variance .015 .015 .017 .015 .015
Stability – stage -.034 -.033 -.030 -.030 -.032
Stability – industry .009 .010 .011 .009 .010
Syndication -.092* -.090* -.086* -.091* -.084*
Interactions  
A×# of investment  .014  
A×years  -.023   
B×# of investment  .007   
B×years  -.032    
A×Stability – mean  -.014   
A×Stability – variance   .000   
B×Stability – mean   -.058†   
B×Stability – variance   .020   
A×Stability – stage    -.041  
A×Stability – industry    -.081  
B×Stability – stage    -.022  
B×Stability – industry    .003  
A×Syndication     .007
B×Syndication     -.110†
# of observations 1642 1642 1642 1642 1642 
Adjusted R2 .200 .199 .200 .199 .201 
ΔR2  0 .002 .001 .002 
F-value 21.54*** 17.97*** 18.11*** 18.01*** 19.74*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level             *  Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level              †  Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Figure 6.7 Alliance Dummy X Interval Mean Interaction Plot 
Alliance No 
Alliance 
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Table 6.12 Results of Linear Regressions Examining the Moderator effects of CVC 
Characteristics on the Relationships between the Times Portfolio Companies Took 
to Go IPO after the Focal Investment and Their Pre-money Valuations 
 
 24 25 26 27 28 
Controls  
seed/startup -.349*** -.346*** -.349*** -.348*** -.346***
early stage -.712*** -.708*** -.713*** -.708*** -.712***
expansion -.804*** -.801*** -.806*** -.799*** -.804***
later stage -.651*** -.648*** -.652*** -.648*** -.651***
buyout -.018 -.019 -.018 -.015 -.021 
IT -.252*** -.250*** -.252*** -.253*** -.251***
Medical -.310*** -.308*** -.309*** -.310*** -.310***
Portfolio company age .008 .008 .008 .008 .008 
Corporation size .098*** .097*** .098*** .097*** .098***
Investment year -.338* -.320* -.340* -.356* -.329* 
Fund inflows in the 
VC industry .569*** .553*** .571*** .586*** .560*** 
Independent variable      
Time difference 
between IPO and the 
focal investment (A) 
.213*** .251*** .211*** .292*** .373 
Moderators      
# of investment  -.016 -.004 -.017 -.015 -.021 
Years -.031 -.026 -.031 -.031 -.029 
Stability – mean -.022 -.024 -.017 -.022 -.020 
Stability – variance .014 .013 .003 .014 .014 
Stability – stage -.029 -.026 -.029 .004 -.028 
Stability – industry .009 .007 -.009 .031 .010 
Syndication -.077* -.068† -.077* -.076* -.038 
Interactions      
A×# of investment  -.057†    
A×years  -.004    
A×Stability – mean   -.008   
A×Stability – variance   .018   
A×Stability – stage    -.060†  
A×Stability – industry    -.075  
A×Syndication     -.166* 
# of observations 1635 1635 1635 1635 1635 
Adjusted R2 .220 .221 .219 .221 .222 
ΔR2  .002 0 .002 .002* 
F-value 25.27*** 23.09*** 22.86*** 23.09*** 24.29*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level             *  Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level              †  Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 6.13 Results of Linear Regressions Examining the Moderator effects of CVC 
Characteristics on the Relationships between the Status of Portfolio Companies 
within 5 Years after the Focal Investment and Their Pre-money Valuations 
 
 34 35 36 37 38 
Controls  
seed/startup -.380*** -.383*** -.379*** -.377*** -.378*** 
early stage -.766*** -.770*** -.765*** -.763*** -.767*** 
expansion -.881*** -.887*** -.879*** -.878*** -.882*** 
later stage -.710*** -.717*** -.708*** -.709*** -.711*** 
buyout -.030 -.036 -.030 -.027 -.036 
IT -.249*** -.239*** -.248*** -.250*** -.246*** 
Medical -.304*** -.300*** -.305*** -.304*** -.303*** 
Portfolio company age .014 .016 .014 .014 .014 
Corporation size .098*** .093*** .098*** .096*** .096*** 
Investment year -.281† -.247 -.285† -.282† -.271† 
Fund inflows in the VC industry .518*** .487*** .523*** .518*** .510*** 
Independent variables   
IPO (A) .213*** .254*** .217*** .257*** .305*** 
Being acquired (B) .066** .110** .072** .059 .036 
Defunct (C) .058* .135*** .065* .065 .158 
Moderators  
# of investment  -.016 -.001 -.018 -.015 -.019 
Years  -.027 .030 -.021 -.026 -.027 
Stability – mean -.020 -.023 -.009 -.020 -.017 
Stability – variance .015 .011 .010 .014 .011 
Stability – stage -.026 -.024 -.028 .012 -.021 
Stability – industry .018 .016 .019 .027 .017 
Syndication -.084* -.082* -.088* -.083* -.056 
Interactions  
A×# of investment  -.048    
A×years  -.017    
B×# of investment  -.008    
B×years  -.054    
C×# of investment  -.003    
C×years  -.106**    
A×Stability – mean   -.012   
A×Stability – variance   .001   
B×Stability – mean   -.019   
B×Stability – variance   .007   
C×Stability – mean   -.018   
C×Stability – variance   .006   
A×Stability – stage    -.046  
A×Stability – industry    -.038  
B×Stability – stage    -.021  
B×Stability – industry    .015  
C×Stability – stage    -.005  
C×Stability – industry    -.005  
A×Syndication     -.097 
B×Syndication     .029 
C×Syndication     -.104 
# of observations 1635 1635 1635 1635 1635 
Adjusted R2 .213 .216 .210 .211 .213 
ΔR2  .006† 0 .001 .0 
F-value 22.05*** 17.63*** 17.13*** 17.19*** 19.40*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level              *  Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level              †  Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 6.14 Results of Linear Regressions Examining the Moderator effects of CVC 
Characteristics on the Relationships between Strategic Benefits and Pre-money 
Valuations 
 44 45 46 47 48 
Controls  
seed/startup -.410*** -.410*** -.406*** -.411*** -.406***
early stage -.809*** -.808*** -.802*** -.809*** -.804***
expansion -.909*** -.910*** -.902*** -.912*** -.901***
later stage -.707*** -.707*** -.701*** -.710*** -.701***
buyout -.027 -.027 -.026 -.027 -.025
IT -.235*** -.235*** -.236*** -.234*** -.236***
Medical -.296*** -.296*** -.297*** -.294*** -.297***
Portfolio company age .014 .014 .013 .014 .014
Corporation size .099*** .099*** .098*** .098*** .098***
Investment year -.295† -.298† -.294† -.284† -.306*
Fund inflows in the VC industry .461** .464** .462** .449** .473**
Independent variables   
Being acquired by the corporate 
investor (A) -.029 -.011 -.020 .075 -.028
Forming alliances with the 
corporate investor (B) .107*** .098** .129*** .116** .178**
Moderators  
# of investment  -.029 -.030 -.028 -.028 -.031
Years  -.020 -.020 -.020 -.020 -.019
Stability – mean -.032 -.032 -.023 -.032 -.032
Stability – variance .013 .013 .017 .013 .013
Stability – stage -.028 -.030 -.024 -.023 -.027
Stability – industry .009 .008 .011 .009 .010
Syndication -.086* -.086* -.080* -.084* -.080*
Interactions  
A×# of investment  .002  
A×years  -.025   
B×# of investment  .008   
B×years  .007    
A×Stability – mean   -.012   
A×Stability – variance   -.001   
B×Stability – mean   -.053   
B×Stability – variance   .009   
A×Stability – stage    -.048  
A×Stability – industry    -.099  
B×Stability – stage    -.026  
B×Stability – industry    .007  
A×Syndication     .003
B×Syndication     -.077
# of observations 1635 1635 1635 1635 1635 
Adjusted R2 .194 .192 .194 .193 .194 
ΔR2  0 .002 .001 .001 
F-value 20.68*** 17.22*** 17.38*** 17.34*** 18.87*** 
*** Significant level at the 0.001 level              *  Significant level at the 0.05 level 
** Significant level at the 0.01 level              †  Significant level at the 0.1 level 
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Table 6.15 Summary of the Predictions and Results of Study Three 
Hypothesis Independent variable / Moderator Dependent Variable Overall Results 
H1a Lifespan of a CVC program Financial returns Mixed support 
H1b Lifespan of a CVC program Strategic benefits No support (significant opposite results)
H1c Lifespan of a CVC program Valuation <–> Financial returns Partial support 
H1d Lifespan of a CVC program Valuation <–> Strategic benefits No support (not significant) 
H2a Operational stability of a CVC program Financial returns Partial support 
 Objective stability of a CVC program Financial returns No support (significant opposite results)
H2b Operational stability of a CVC program Strategic benefits No support (not significant) 
 Objective stability of a CVC program Strategic benefits No support (not significant) 
H2c Operational stability of a CVC program Valuation <–> Financial returns Partial support 
 Objective stability of a CVC program Valuation <–> Financial returns No support (significant opposite results)
H2d Operational stability of a CVC program Valuation <–> Strategic benefits Partial support 
 Objective stability of a CVC program Valuation <–> Strategic benefits No support (not significant) 
H3a VC-like incentive scheme Financial returns No support (not significant) 
H3b VC-like incentive scheme Strategic benefits No results due to the lack of data 
H3c VC-like incentive scheme Valuation <–> Financial returns No results due to the lack of data 
H3d VC-like incentive scheme Valuation <–> Strategic benefits No results due to the lack of data 
H4a Syndication activity Financial returns Strong support 
H4b Syndication activity Valuation <–> Financial returns No support (significant opposite results)
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